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Originally, this study was to have been based on £ield 
research in Morocco. Un£ortunately, this was not possible. 
Thus, the data gathered are derived primarily £rom library 
sources. This £act naturally places more limitations on 
the conclusions o£ the study than would be the case other-
wise. Further limitations result £rom necessary restric-
tions of examinable data within a sociological £ramework. 
Nonetheless, the conclusions reached are suggestive £or 
future study of integrational problems in the newly develop-
ing societies o£ Africa. 
After having completed the £irst dra£t of this disser-
tation, the author read the recent book by Professor Immanuel 
Wallerstein titled Africa: The Politics of Independence. In 
his book, Pro£essor Wallerstein developed a number of ideas 
based on his research and experience in African countries re-
garding problems of state/society-building. The present 
study had independently reached some of the same conclusions 
advanced by Professor Wallerstein. Thus, as a case study, it 
> 
of£ers concrete support to his ideas, -as well as vice versa. 
In both cases, implicitly or explicitly, it was felt that new 
< 
or restated sociolagical thinking stemming from the African 
context is quite necessary to comprehend the social processes 
i.i 
now going on there. 
FOCUS AND APPROACH OF THE STUDY 
African events are quite often viewed within the frame-
. . 
work of the norms of Western societies. For example~ one 
reads about!'.. the arrest of opposition lead~rs in Ghana., the 
suppres~ion of the Union Maroc~ine de T~avail new~ organ in 
Morecco, and one pa~ty_systems; and ~mmed~ately many staunch 
democrats of ?~r_society exp~rience a deep. sense of repulsion. 
Here, we are concerned with compreh~ndin~ the s~c~al con~~xt 
in which such phenomena are manifested, rather than ethic.al 
evaluations. 
All the newly ~ndependen~ countries ·of Africa have with-
in their borders a congeries of ~roups which now must be for,g-
ed into mo~ern ~itary societies. Unitary societies should 
not be equated here with the hypothetical concept of homoge-
neous or completely integrated societies. Rather the term is 
used to_ indicate_the nece~sit~ of minimal consensus regarding 
behavioral norms. Whil~. the colonial powers had previous~y 
given some se~se of _central_directio~ to these peo~le~ th~y 
did ~ot greatly eoct&Ddc the foundations for large scale soci-
ties. This is not to underestimate the colonial legacies which 
provided many physical and institutional elements for unitary 
• .. ... .. 4 ..... 
societies. In a relative sense~ however~ colonial efforts 
. . 
are dwarfed by the -~igantic nature of_ developing ~ocieties 
from diversified an~ Rr~viously auto~omou~ groups. Further 
complicating the situation is the fact that the colonial peri-
iii 
L9d bequeathed to the new countries a number of avant-garde 
greups, whose sophistication now outpaces the actual social 
. . . 
environment in which they must function. 
African leaders are faced with two basic aut insepa-
. .. - - . 
:abl~ problems: (1) to _find means to_integrate immediately 
their various and socia~ly,unequa~ peoples to a su~~icient 
degree te~contain disruptive behavior; and (2) to establish 
. . ' 
the self-sustaining structural basis of modern unitary soci-
.. - . . 
eties. Therefore, temporary mechanisms _of s~eia~ integration 
must be found and used until·such time as permanent means can 
be instituted. 
' Thus.the so~iologi~al focus is on problems o~ social in-
tegration. Notice is taken o~ what Robin Williams says in his 
brilliant analysis of American society: 
. . . 
For sociological' purposes, "integration" 'is no£ a 
term· to oe used t'6 convey a concealed value- judg-
ment. When we say that one society is highly· inte-
grated and that another is loosely integrated, we 
do not ·necessarily imply that we think one is "'bet-
ter" than the other, any more than·we would'meari 
that one biological· organism was better than the 
other because its parts were more closely inter-
dependent.! 
. . 
Certainly, this statement has the merit of caution in attempt-
ing to place societies on an evaluational scale according to 
.. ~ ~ ... 
integrational criteria. On th? ot~er hand, equal caution must 
be taken not to underestimate the value of social integratio~ 
for the effective functioning o~ society or segments thereof. 
~obin W111i·ams; Jr., American Society (New York: Alfred 
A.Knopf, 1958), PP• 513-514. 
In other·words, minimal social integration is obvio'!lsly a bas-
ic necessi~y for the d~velopment and maintenan?e of society. 
In established societies, the social structure regulates 
.. ~ .. .. ~ ... 
social ~cti~n,_and t~ere~! provides the basis of social inte-
gration. ~hrough participatio~ members of such societies 
learn the values, goals, and norms of behavior generally ap-
. ' . 
proved. By int~rnalizing these, sufficient integration is 
co~~inu~usly ~eproduced so as to contai~ significant disrup-
tive behavior. This allows society to continue as an on-go• 
ing process. 
In most of the newly independ~nt African countries, uni-
tary social structures with their cultural content are embry-
..... ~- .. ..... ~ ... - '"' ,., c • 
onic. There is a hodge-podge of traditional, modern, and 
. . . 
-
transitional structuring. Pa~ti~i~ation by memb~~s in one or 
~nother of these does_not allow the dev~lop~nt of gene~~l 
co~sensus as t~ the presently desired rules of the game. Great 
efforts ar~ thus being made in th~se countries to establish 
modern unitary struct~~s r~pidly. 
But to develop suCh structures requires time, capital, 
and fantastic insight by social planners. As a result, lead-
ers recognize the necessity of devising tem~ora:Y means to inte~ 
grate the various population element~ at once, until such time 
as the modern structures are ~enera~ized. Initial.integrat~on 
has a very direct relationship, alon~ with the above mention-
... .. - ~ """ . " ... 
ed req~irements, to th~ success or failure of dev~loping the 
"permanent" stz:uctures. Thus, in focussing on social integra-
tion, the actual focus is on the process of society-building 
in these new nations. 
Problems o:f socia~: _integration in established societies 
are quite different :from those in emerging societies. In the 
:form~r ~ase,. the _p.ro~l~.m ~akes the i'orm o:f iz;!cr~a~~d. devi_an~}'f 
in the '$ociety, or segments thereof. The investigator directs 
.. ... .. ... .. • .... - .. J ... .., ~ .. ,. *' "' 
his analysis ~o- var~ou~_shif~s, change~, and in:flexib;li~ies 
in the structural and cultural realms of different sectors of 
"' - ~ -
society~ How~ver, in n~wly developing soc~eties, thi_s is not 
the situation. Soc~al integ~a~i~n is no~ to be studied ~s it 
varies in_degree w~th the "rhyth~" o'! "natural" or trend~l 
... ~· . 
processes. Here it must be studied as s derivative o:f the 
. . 
society-~uilding pro?ess itself. ~~ bec~us~ s~ciologi~al 
thinking ~n social integ:~tion h~s_d~vel~~ed primarily in the 
context o:f e~tablished socie~ies, its_ conc~ptual. content is 
necessarily viewed in this study as more suggestive than com-
prehensive. 
Thus, as the Moroccan case study unfolds, such things as 
polit~cal su~pression and one-party.sy~tems are seen t? be 
mechanisms of the initial integrative process in lieu of a 
unitary structure. The_ana~ysis indi~ates the difficulties 
of establishing the st~ctural basis of social integration, 
as well as the proble~s _a~d dangers attendant to ~~~ initial 
and transitional instruments for oQtaining immediate integra-
tion. 
In approaching the problem, the author collected the 
available data on the traditional structu:~ng_in ~orocco as 
well as the ~fforts being made to construct the modern uni-
tary structure. Some attention was also given to psycho-
cultural factors. The data were then exanUL~ed within the 
I 
framework of social inte~ration. The results which emanated 
from the examination offer ideas which broaden the concept of 
social ~ntegration. They fUrther allow a delineation of some 
. . 
of the variables and consequences involved in the integration-
, .... .. .. . 
al process of newly-developing societies. Thus, the conclu-
. . 
sions are presented at the level of_~upported hypotheses fruit-
ful for fUture studies in this field. 
Studies of_t~is_type ~re extr~mel! important because of 
their scientific value which, n~turall~~ aids ~~ ~he compr~­
he~ain~ 9f some o~ the many complex problems facing the new 
nations of Africa. 
PLAN AND PURPOSE OF T~ VaRIOUS CHAPTERS 
The first chapt~~ provid~s t~e g~neral ph~~ical and human 
setting of the Moroccan macrocosm. As a result, the reader is 
able to see more clearly the exact limits of this particular 
stud~ in addition to gaining the perspective of the wider frame-
work. 
The second chapter is a brief account _of Berb~r ~isto~y 
in the Maghreb (Arab~c, Nor~h Africa?• Emphasis is placed 
upon_Morocco, howeyer. The ~~in purpose of the historical 
sketch is to indicate the leng~hy and continuous period of au-
.. .. ,., 
~onomous Ber?er segm~ntat~on, and how it,was possible to main-
tain this status in view of numerous successful foreign inva-
. ~ .. " 
sions. It is precisely this structuring, nurtured and deeply 
rooted over the years, to which an end is now sought. The 
very problem.upon whiCh we focus in this st~d~ exists, for the 
most part, because of what the historical process has been. 
The third chapter is a description of the traditional 
. .. .. ... ~- ~ ... .. 
Berber so~ia~ strll:cturing_. This chapter prov.ides a micro-
scopic look at Berber segments a~ well as offering a_~a~~s for 
understanding the difficulties of and problems in developing 
a modern unitary society 1n Morocco. 
Morocco has man¥ ~thnic groups within_its borders which 
all ~res~nt_certain pro~lems from the point of view of social 
. ' . 
integration. The_Berbers and_Arabized Berb~rs,_however, form 
the largest part of the Morocc~ popul~tion. I~ is P.rimarily 
the~ who prevente~.a society fro~ ~ec?ming established in 
Morocco pr~viously. They had for centuries recogni~ed ex-
treme~y small units,_~t le~st b~ ou~ s~a~dards, as their ef-
fective socio-p?litical reference ~roup~. They demonstrated 
their ability over the years to maintain their uni~s though 
faced on n~e~eus occasio~s by ce~tral~~~n~ forces. 
Since there were numerous ~erber groups i~ Mo~o~c~ with 
variations amon~ ~hem, i~ is impossible to give a general des-
~ription. Therefore, the trad~tiona~ socia~ s~ructuring o~. 
various groups in the former Sous Province of southern Morocco 
. -
was chosen as illustrativ~ of Berber segment~tion. Within the 
Sous Province itself, there were n~erous tribes. Th~y wer~ 
divided into _smaller and ~ven mor~ numerous units. The tri~e 
was by no means the standard effective socio-political unit. 
.. - ,. -
The units were not uniform in size, either ecologically or demo-
viii 
graphically. Functions of the units designated by the same 
name in various areas, groups within the units, and their 
individual members in specific roles were also diverse. 
Nonetheless, each segment or unit had a functional counter-
part. These facts naturally posed problems in attempting 
to describe the social structuring of the Sousi groups. 
If this chapter appears more lengthy and inclusive than 
the needs of this study may require, it is so inten~ionally. 
Since very little information is available in English on 
traditional Berber structuring, the data assembled could be 
useful to interested students. 
With the perspective of environment, history and tradi-
tional structuring~ the fourth chapter describes the embryonic 
modern socia2 structure of Morocco as well as analyzes some 
of the difficulties involved inits development. It a2so in-
dicates the other end of the human pole in Morocco--the 
new urbanites. It further dissects the difficulties of 
finding initial integrative appeals sufficient to contain 
all elements of the population from behavior hindering the 
development of the unitary structure. 
The data of the first four chapters, then, provide the 
material necessary for the sociological analysis of integra-
tional problems, i.e. society-building problems in the coun-
' try. Chapter five defines and analytical2y applies, when 
possible, various concepts that are relevant to the study. 
Chapter six embodies the conclusions drawn from the 
study as well as a somewhat speculative prediction of the 
societal trend in Africa's new countries. 
ix 
A collection of appe~dices follow which, naturally, 
bear material of interest to the reader, but are not 
directly necessary to the content or the study itself. 
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PHYSICAL AND HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Morocco is bardered on the west by the Atlantic, the 
north by the Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, on 
the east by Algeria, and Gn the south by the Sahara. It 
falls within the second and eleventh longitudes west and 
latitudes twenty to thirty-six north. It covers an area 
of approximately 170,000"190,000 square miles. 
Morocco's topography has a variety of sharp contrasts. 
It has four main mountain ranges with some peak elevations 
of 13,000 feet and over. These ranges are as follows; the 
Riff in the north facing the Mediterranean; the Middle 
Atlas in the north-central; t~e High Atlas in the south; and 
the Anti-Atlas further south. They appear to divide the 
~untry almost down the middle. Westward, the lower Atlas 
ranges ~ave finger-like extensions which appear to for.m pin-
cers enfolding the fertile plains of the Gharb, Shaouia and 
Sous. In these plains with their accompanying mountain bar-
ricades live the majority o~ the sedentary groups o~ Morocce. 
A2ong the mountainous stretch, particularly of the High and 
Middle Atlas ranges and to the east of them, are the high 
platea~s. Here live the nomads and semi~omads, generally 
-2-
speaking, facing at once the desert and the high peaks. This 
area was traditionally known as the bled-es-siba, (Arabic, 
the land of dissidence). "The High and Middle Atlas form a 
true central mountain block, difficult to penetrate, where 
sturdy mountaineers were long able to defy the central power 
and t0 threaten communication between the provinces."l 
Where rivers are located in Morocco, e.g. the Moulouya 
in the north and the Dra in the south, the lands are usually 
well irrigated. However, there are numerous areas which do 
not have access to river waters nor is rain plentiful there. 
The high peaks, especially in southern Morocco, often bar suf~ 
ficient sun and rain clouds from reaching the cultivable 
land in the pabh of streams formed by melting snows descend-
ing from the mountains. And last, some areas in lower Morocco 
are desert lands where aases are seg.ttemdi here and there. 
The ~tlantic seaboard of Morocco witnesses harsh sea 
activity. Previous to French control it was a little cGm-
mercial value. However, ports such as Agadir and Casablanca 
stand today ih fine testimony to modern technology. 
The climate of Morocco also tends to vary a great deal. 
One can ~ind here almost all extremes of weather. Starting 
with Tangier in the north, we witness a four seas0n weather 
pattern. The high elevations inland receive a great deal 
of snow which quite often force the closing of some roads. 
lNevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 19$9), p. 78. 
-3-
Moving southward~ Casablanca has Los Angeles-type weather. 
Further south~ around Agadir and Taroudant~~newly developed 
resort cities--the climate is comparable to Havana or Miami. 
Marrakesh~ forming the eastern point of a triangle includ-
ing Agadir and Taroudant~ also has semi-tropical temperatures 
during the day. However,. as evening approaches, the temper-
atures fall rapidly. In much of souther.n Morocco, primarily 
Berber inhabited, there is a two-season cycle, rainy and cold 
and hot and dry. The operation of the cycle is not always 
timed correctly for planting and harvesting. As a result, 
there are periods of famine. When a bad year occurs, 
families and livestock move, seeking plots of land near moun-
tain streams. 
The Sous Province on which this study is rocussed is not 
. 
known by that name today. Presently, it is made up of seve-
ral provinces. However, the traditional name is retained since 
sources consulted refer to the area by that designation. 
The Sous Province should be thought of as the area 
starting with Essaouira (formerly Mogador) on the Atlantic 
' 
coast moving along an eastward line to Marrakesh, Demnat, 
Boumalne, and then southward cutting across Zagora in the 
Sahara. 
· Sousi had within its bounds the High and Anti-Atlas rang-
es as well as the Dra and Sous Rivers with their many irri-
gating tributaries. Its climatic and topographical variabil-
ity ranges between the cold and snowy confines of the Atlas 
plateaus and peaks to the hot, dry heat of the Sahara. 
-4-
Demographic variability is exemplified by the numer-
ous physical types seen there. The three physical categories 
of Berbersl are in ·evidence here., as well as sone Jews, 
Haratins and Arabs. Moreover, the mixture of some of these 
various types, for example, ·has produced a group in the High 
Dra valley known.collect~vely as the Drawa.2 
The limited social uniformity is surprising, since this 
area is concentrated, and its people were in constant communi-
cation through trade, war, migrations, ceremonies and alliances. 
Approximately one-third of the Moroccan population is 
located in Sousi. Most of these are engaged in agriculture, 
though there are some artisans. This area also includes the 
great caravan route to the south. Located along the route, 
~ 
especially in its Sanara extremity, is--as in the past--a 
numbett of ttplunderfug" nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. 
. ~ 
Livestock is kept by both sedentary and nomadic groups in 
various numbers and qualities. 
THE MOROC~AN POPULATION 
The Berbers are the original inhabitants of Morocco as 
well as the Maghreb in general. The Arabs began settling 
lsee infra, ppj 9-14. 
2Lieut. G. Spillman, Districts et Tribus de la Haute 
VAJL1LllB au Dfi! (l'Villes et Tribus du Maroc, h nt, · 
Series·TDibus Berberes, Tome ii; Paris: 19~1), p. 3· 
there in the seventh century. They can ~e referred to as a 
more recently indigenoas group. Thus Berbers, Arabized. 
Berbers and Arabs form the majerity of the Moroccan popula-
tion. These groups numb~r approximately lO,OOO,GQQ today. 
The first two categories probably make up about fifty to sixty 
per cent of the total. About seventy-five to eighty per cent 
of the total are rural inhabitants. The urban population, 
however, is growing at a rate more than three times that of 
the rural population. Forty-one per cent of the Berber-Arab 
populationaie under fifteen years of age; fifty per cent are 
under twenty. This fact is important for a number of reasons, 
bnt is particularly relevant for economic developments, as we 
shall see later. 
The Jewish population numbers approximately 200,000. 
Their rate of increase is held down by migrations to Israel. 
This minority group is primarily urban, carrying on various 
types of business activities. They also fill many of the 
civil service posi~ions of the lower level in present-day 
Morocco. 
There is a small black minority-in southern Morocco known 
as the Haratin group. They represent Sudanese Blacks, used as 
slaves by the Berbers and Arabs in for.mer times; a crossing of 
Berbers and Sudanese; and/or possibly an original Black set-
tlement in southern Morocco. 
Aside from these traditional inhabitants of the country, 
there are various non-Moroccan groups, primarily French, 
< 
Spanish and Italian. They numbered 400,000 before 1956, but 
may be about 300,000 now, due to departures of civil servants 
and some colons. The French make up about eighty per cent 
.. 
of the total; the Spanish, .nine per cent; the Italians, four 
and a half per cent; and other groups, six and a half per 
cerit. Approximately eighty per cent of the category are ur-
ban dwellers. Fifty-one per cent of the group are less tham 
twenty years of age; eighty-three per cent are less than 
forty years. Thirty-six per cent were born in Morocco. 
This study is limited to the primarily Berber element 
of the Moroccan population. Occasional attention is paid to 
the other groups whene it is appropriate in the context of 
tihe> focus. 
THE BERBERS: WHO ARE THEY 
Their Name~ The ~reeks called the Berbers with whom they 
came in contact by the general nmme of Libyans. Berbers of 
eastern Algeria were referred to as Numidians, and those of 
western Algeria as Marousi (Greek) or Mahuri (Punic) from which 
the word Moor may have been derived. The Romans often referred 
to them as Barbarians since they were considered uncivilized 
in Roman terms. The Arabs probably developed the word Braber 
or Beraaer (singular, Berber, Barberi) from Barbarians and 
thus the designation remained with the North African autoch-
thons to the present.l The Berbers, however, do not refer to 
lcharles Andre-Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord 
~aris: Payot, 1952-5Q),I, PP• 9-10,-gives this inter-
pretation as do most other sources. Ibn Haldun 
l.ihaldou!!/Al Mugrabi, The Muqaddimah: An Introdue-
-7-
themselves as such, but rather go by the name of Amazigh 
(tamzight feminine and imazighen plural). The term means 
free man, and it was thoaght to be the title of Berber nobles. 
It may at one time have been a term of distinction regarding 
certain tribal groups,_ but it is presently, and has been in 
the more recent past, utilized by the majority of Berbers to 
designate themselves. 
Their Origin. Vari~s social and physical scientists have 
struggled with this puzzling problem for many years without 
coming to any definite conclusion. Bousquet identifies thPee 
physical types among the Berbers: (1} dolicoeepha.lic, quite 
tall and having either blond or red hair with fair pigmenta-
ti~n; (2) brachycephalic, short, stGcky, pale complexion, and 
with black hair and eyes; ana (3) dolicecephalic, tall, leng-
1 limbed,_ and having narrow pelvis and thorax. It is hypoth ... 
tion to History, trans. F. Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1958), I, pp. 21-22, gives another interpretation 
of the origin of the word Berber. He says, "It is said 
that from their home in the Yemen, (treTubbas Lkings, 
ndne7) used to raid Ifriqiyah and the Berbers of the 
Magnreb. Africus b. Qays b. Sayfi, one of their great 
early kings who lived in the time of Moses or somewhat 
earlier, is said to have raided Ifriqiyah. He caused 
a great slaughter among the Berbers. He gave them the 
nmne of Berbers when he heard their jargon and asked 
what that 'barbarah' was. This gave them the name which 
has remained with them since that time." "Barbarah" in 
Arabic means an incongruous mixture of words, or simply 
babbling. 
1George-Henri Bousquet, Les Berb~res: Histoire et Insti-
tutions (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1957), P• 12. 
Julien, !E•~·' I, P• 51, gives the DeBertholon and 
Chantre classification which is similar to Bousquet's 
but includes two sub-types also. See in addition, -
Joseph Bourrilly, Elements d'Ethnographie Marocaine,' 
(Paris: Libraire Colonial et Orientaliste Larose, 1932}, 
esized from this that the Berbers represent groups which mi-
grated from Europe, perhaps the Nordic area to account for 
the fair-complexioned among them,l and from Asia Minor. 
That there waB intermixture between these groups seems 
~vident from some of the physical appearances of Berbers to-
day. At any rate, they are primarily a caucasoid group. 2 
And no matter where the Berbers originated, as far back as 
we are able to discern, .they have been settled in most of 
North Africa. The majority of them are now located in 
Morocco and Algeria. And thou~h politically segmented, they 
had developed, generally speaking, a common culture quite 
early in their history. 
PP• 15-29. W.B. Harris, "The Berbers of Morocco," 
Journal of the Anthropoiogical Institute of Great. 
Britain and Ireland, XXVII {18~7), pp. 62-63, re• 
lates the tale told by Moroccan Berbers concerning 
their ancestry. According to them, their common an• 
cestors lived in a far off land that was extremely 
windy. One day many years past, the King of that 
land was passing by a girl. A gust of wind blew up 
her clothing and revealed unmentionable parts of her 
anatomy. This event shwned her and her people, so 
that they migrated to Morocco where they settled. 
This tale was told by Berber tribesmen all over 
Morocco, according to Harris. For another interest-
ing, but questionable ~tory of Berber origination, see 
Gaston Boissier, Roman Africa, (London: G.P. Putman's 
Sons, 1898), pp. 2-3. There, he notes and reviews 
Hiempsal II's version as written in Punic many years 
past. Hiempsal was one of the kings of Numidia, an 
early Berber Kingdom. 
lM.F. Ashley Montagu, An Introduction to Physical Anthro-
pology, (2nd edition; Springfield, Illinois: Charles 
Oe Thomas, 1951), pp. 328-329, feels that this Nordic 
type was produced most. likely by a nmere recombina-
tional segregant thrown up from a h~ghly mixed popula-
tionn rather than from migration. 
2Ibid~, pp.326-327. 
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Ibn Khaldounts Classification of the Berbers.l Ibn 
Khaldoun's classification, one that appears in most histor-
ical studies of Nor~h Africa, 2 is based on genealogical ac-
counts left by previous writers, both Arab and Arabic-writ-
ing Berbers.3 He explains away the various physical types, 
i.e. with regard to pigmentation, as being due to the effects 
lFor details regarding the Cfassifieation see Ibn 
Khaldoun, Histoire des Berberes, trans. B. de Slane 
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1925), I, PP• 167-185. E.F. 
Gautier, Le Pass' de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Payot, 
1937}, PP• 216-217, takes note of the fact that various 
Arab accounts of North Africa have dealt with the re-
cording of individual Berber tribes, as have a few 
Roman accounts, but that it is difficult to get a gen-
eral picture of the tribal groups, their lines of de-
scent and movements. 'To secure such information, he 
feels that it is fruitless to look ~ywhere but at 
Ibn Khaldoun 1 s prolific writings. As he says, "Comme 
; .. d 1habitude, les vues generales, l'effort pour grouper, 
ne se trouvent que chez Ibn Khaldoun; il est tout a 
fait inutile de chercher ailleurs. DJail1eurs, parmi 
les historians qui nous sont parvenus, il est le seul 
qui ait ecrit une histoire des Berberes. Il ecrivait 
au XIV9 siecle, et les tribus berberes sur lesquelles 
, ' 1 il est renseigne de premiere main sont ce les qu'il 
a eues sous les yeux. 11 
2see for example, Gautier, loc.cit., PP• 215-244; 
B0usquet, !£•Cit., PP• 51-57; "JUlien, ~.cit., II, pp. 
22-26; and Henri Terra~ History of Morocco, trans. 
Hilary Tee (Casablanca: Editions Atlantides, c. 1952), 
pp. 18-21. 
3Authors using Ibn Khaldoun's classification confuse the 
reader by using the terms ~'tribeu, "race", ttlanguage 
family", and tteconomic orientation" in referring to the 
srune name-categories of Berbers. Terras~ ~.cit., p.l9, 
for example, talks of the Kha~ian categories-is tribes, 
though it is well known today that each category con-
tained a number of tribes. In the same breadth, he re-
fers to them as races. Ibn Khaldoun himself di~feren­
tiated according to alleged genealogical data, but also 
included tribal affiliations, language, and economic 
orientation as coincident with that data. 
of the climate.1 According to him, all Berbers descended from 
two ancestral stocks: Bernas (sometimes called Bornus) and 
Madghis el-Abter (plural Botr). Both men called themselves 
sons of Berr, but the genealogists whose work Ibn Khaldoun 
consulted, do not agree that they were of one father. He 
concludes that there were two Berra: the one with regard to 
~Bernes descended from Mazigh, son of Canaan, son of Ham; and 
the one with regard to el-Abter descended from Gaia, son of 
Gahilan. Many have challenged this alleged line of deseent. 2 
At any rate, descendants of Bernes were 'called Beranes, 
and descendants of el-Abter were called Botr. The Botr groups 
were, and some still are, located in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, 
with the exception of Kabylia, parts of north-central Morocco 
and some islets in the Sahara. AmoDg them were the great 
tribal groups of the Zenata, one of the three main language 
divisions of the Berbers at that. time.3 The Beranes tribes 
1Ibn Khaldoun, Muqaddimah, I, P• 170. 
2For example see Gautier, £E• !!!•• p. 229. He states 
that the genealogies upon which Ibn Khaldoun relies are 
more or less full of fantasy. However, on PP• 241-242 
he notes that the classification can be useful when in-
terpreted in different ter.ms. Julien, 2E• £!!., II, 
P• 22, also challenges the line of descent presented by 
Ibn Khaldoun. 
3see Ibn Khaldoun, Histoire, I, PP• 170·175, for a list-
ing of Botr groups; and III, PP• 180-495, for an ex-
tensive discussion of the Zenata. Gautier, 2£• cit., 
PP• 229-236, lists the main Botr groups also and their 
distribution over North Africa. 
included, among others, the remaining two language~divisions 
prominent in early Berber history, the Masmuda and the 
Sarihadja.l The.Masmuda were primarily located, then, as now, 
in Morocco, ioe• parts o~ the Riff, the western Grand Atlas, 
the Anti-Atlas and its Saharan borders, and the greater part 
y 
of the Sous Valley. The Sarihadja occupied the Kabylias, the 
Middle Atlas, the upper Moulouya environs, Tafilalt, an area 
along the Algerian-Moroccan herder, and the region of the 
Sahara from Senegal in the south to the Sahara border of 
Morocco in the north. 
According to Al Bekri, the Masmuda were the most numer-
ous of the Berber groups in Morocco.2 They were primarily 
sedentary, and rarely, if ever, migrated. They developed many 
towns and villages, and managed to accumulate some wealth. 
Some descendants of the Masmuda in present-day Morocco are:: 
the major part of the Ghomara tribe located in the vicinity 
of Tetuan; the Dukkala, plain dwellers settled in and around 
the Tensift River area of northern Morocco; and the Shleuhs. 
of the Grand and Anti-Atlas with their center in Marrakesh. 
During and after the Arab invasions, the Masmuda were infil-
trated by both Arabs and other Berbers, but, as Terrasse 
notes, they nwere never drawn into amy important displace-
ments.n3 
lGautier, loc. £!i., P• 169, has a listing of Beranes groups. 
2cited in Terrasse, loc. cit., Al Bekri was anArab 
geographer who wrote-In the eleventh century. 
3Ibid. 
The Sanhadja were quite numerous, for.m.ing probably a 
third of the whole Berber population. They were originally 
sedentary groups living in villages. In many ways, they were 
like the Masmuda, i.e. culturally and socially. Araund the 
third century a number of them, or tribes that were closely 
related to them, e.g. the Hawara and Lmmta, set off in the 
direction of the Sahara which they ttconquered". In the 
. 1 ~ 
Sahara, they becmne wandering cmnel-drivers. After they had 
come under the influence of Islrun, they served as carriers of 
the faith to the southern kingdoms of Senegal and Soudan. 
However, the principal Sanhadja tribal group in Morocco was 
and is the Zenaga, located in the Middle Atlas south of Taza. 
In addition to the Zenaga, other main descendants of the 
Sanhadja are the Kabyles of Algeria and the Tuaregs of the 
Sahara. 
The Zenata were perhaps the most complicated of the 
Berber groups in that they had numerous branches and were 
probably quite mixed ethnically. 2 They originally inhabited 
southern Tunisia and Tripolitania where they remained, more 
1Gautier, ~· cit., PP• 239•242, indicates the diffi-
culty in determining whether or not this splinter group 
was originally Botr or Beranes, or, more specifically, 
Zenata or Sarihadja. The Zenata were nomadic while the 
Sanhadja were not. The migrants to the Sahara were 
nomadie. At any rate, most of the sources record the 
version presented in this paper, and, in lieu of a ~et­
ter supported interpretation, will be assumed to be cor" 
rect. 
2Ibid., PP• 223-224, notes, 11Le nom Zenata ne se retrouve 
pas dans l'antiquite. La seule trace est une inscrip-
tion signalee par Gsell dans la region du Gheliff; le 
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or less, until the first Arab invasion. At that t~e, they 
began their slow migrations westward through the Sahara and 
the high tablelgnds. By the eighth century, the Miknasa 
tribe, allegedly belonging or related to the Zenata, settled 
and founded small dynastic kingdoms in Tsoul (near Taza) and 
Sijilmasa. During the same century the Zenata had spread 
over two-thirds of the Maghrebian steppes, and had established 
compact groups around Tlemcem and Tiaret. The latter or some 
of their Botr relatives later followed their Miknasa brothers 
into Morocc~ coming in two waves: the B. Ifren and the 
Maghrawa tribes in the tentl;r century; and the B .. Ouasin and 
B. Marin in the twelfth century. In their way of life the 
Zenata were much like t~e Beduins of Arabia--living in tents, 
riding camels, plundering sedentary groups, etc. They formed, 
perhaps, the best cavalry of the Maghreb. Some of their liv• 
ing descendants still carry the tribal names just related. 
nom de Zenata sty trouve, mais comme nom d'individu. 
Parmi les nombreux noms de tribus maugrebines qui nous 
" " ont ete transmis par les auteurs anciens, les Byzantins 
compris, il n'en est aucun qui puisse avoir le moindre 
rapport avec celui des Zenata. Pour un nom aussi reM 
tentissant, porte par un groupe immense de tribus, on a 
paine a croire que le silence soit fortuit.~ 
"Il est vrai qu.'un certain nombre de tribus qu'Ibn / , Khaldoun range parmi les Zenata semblent avoir ete con• 
nues des anciens. 
"Ges identifications ne donnent pas assure'ment un ter ... 
rain parfaitement solide. Meme si on les rejette, il 
est natural de supposer que les Zenata, lorsqu'ils appa~ 
raissent, ne sont pas tous, en bloc, des etrangers, des 
immigres venus d'ailleurs. Il semble y avoir eu, vers 
1~ fin de l'empire romain, sous l'influence d'une pous-
see venue du dehors, une refonte,.un rebrassage de 
vieilles tribus dans une entite nouvelle." 
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Other descendants are the Warain groups in Morocco, the tribes 
occupying the Degions or M•zab, Ouargla and Touggourt in the 
Sahara, and the Beni Znaten, and Zkaras tribes on the Algerian 
frontier or Morocco. Some retain the Beduin-like character-
istics or their ancestors. 
Briefly, then, Ibn Khaldoun classifies the Berbers in two 
major groups, the Botr and Beranes. Their alleged ancestors, 
el-Abter and Barnes, are suspect today as to their previous 
existence and -relationship to the'Berbers. Ibn Khaldoun sub• 
divided the primaFily sedentary Beranes into many groups, the 
most important or which were the language divisions or the 
Masmuaa and the Sanhadja. He indicated that the nomadic, 
Zenata-speaking tribes made up the bulk or the Botr category. 
Each language division was composed or numerous tribes and 
sub-tribes. 
The Sanhadja•Masmuda-Zenata classification is rarely 
used today. It is too dif~use for practical purposes. It 
was, in the opinion or this author, an unwise classification. 
Nonetheless, the following chapter will retain the Khaldoun-
ian classification, since most or the historical sources make 





For man~ rea~?ns B~rber ~~story is shrouded in the 
cloak of obscurity.1 Most important perhaps is the fact 
~ ... .. _.. ,. 
that the majority of the Berbers did not possess a written 
. .. -- ~-- ,. ,. .. . ..... _ .. ... . ... 
l~nguage. Those ~ho did~ not~bly the anc~stors_ of the 
Tuaregs~ did not ~ake extensive use of it._2 Oral litera-
ture1 such as ~t existed, suffered from the numerous 
"' ... ... ·~ ... - ,. 
interpre~at~o~s~ a?ditio~s, S?btractio~s, etc., that is 
common to this form of culture history.3 
lGautier& .QE.•{.o ill•• P• 7 1 attempts to explain ~his 
fact: Voila done un·pays qui n'a pas de nom 
universellement admis, puisqu'il faut convenir de 
lui·en donner un. C1est ·qu 1il n'a jamais eu d'exis~ 
tence politique distincte.· Et par eons~quent 0n 
h 1 a pas ecri~ son histoire. "Il est·pourtant en· 
p1eine lumiere historique depuis deux mille ans, 
depuis crarthage. Mais l'histoire n'a pas le · 
caractere oecum~n~que des sciences mathematiques, 
pfXysiques ou naturelles~ Elle connait des frontieres." 
JUlien, ~· cit.; I, PP• 27-28 points out· almost the 
same thing:. --,Aussi rien n'est-11 plus decevant que 
cette histofre du Maghreb, depourvue de chronolo~ie 
et qui s 1ecrit a coups d'epee. on·a beau s'en defendre, 
on ne peut, faute de-documentation, s 1evaaer de 
l'histoire~batailles. Aussi quand se presentent 
d'"autres avenues, est-on peut-~tre excusable·, comme 
le vieuX·Silene, de laisser quelque peu son ane 
divaguer."' See also Le Tourneau, ~· ~· 
.. 
2Boissier, 2E• cit., also makes note of this fact. 
.. ... -- .. _ ,. .. . .. 
3Bous~uet, 212.• cit., p. 86, asks:. "Ainsi·donc, le 
berbere est une langue uniquement orale, et n 1 y a-t-il 
' 
-16-
Second, Berb~r hist?ry has been recorded as an adjunct 
to the histories of the various invaders in the North 
- . 
African area.1 O~ly in~ofar as Berbers were involved with 
the foreigners have they b~en di~cussed by h~storians. 
Whe~ the ~rab invasions t?o!:t place ·in the seventh a~d 
eleve~th ?enturies,_mor~ co~le~e information on the Berbers 
per se became available. Arab scholars settling in the area 
began to ~rite accounts of Berber tribal groups and their 
movements. 
Third, with the exception of the Arabs and much later 
the French, foreign t~espas~ers _did not really permeate 
the interior of the Maghreb. B~rbers i~abi~ing the hinter-
land were, then, less known than their coastal and plain 
brethren. 
Thus, it is superfluous to state that Berber history 
. -
has many gaps, and t~at these are ~oo often ill-filled with 
speculative though~~ One has only to s~an the literature 
available to note these gaps and become aware of the contra-
qu 1une litt:rature orale ·at n;cessairement locale, 
en l'absence de langue litteraire universellement 
reconnus'l" Bourrilly, .212.• ill•' .PP• 31-4-3, makes 
some interesting points on the-Berber language 
along the same line stated above. 
.. .. • .. .. .!' 
lGautier, ~··cit., ·p. 8~ says:· "Elle n 1a done 
gu~re ete traitle qu'en fonctions, d 1histoires plus 
generales, cella de l'empire romain, cella de 
l'islam." 
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di~to~y interpretations set rorth rega~ding them. Some or 
the various interpretations may be immediately disqualified 
. . ' 
on t~e b~sis of present knowledge in the social and physical 
s·ciences.l 
A PARADOXICAL PROBLEM 
. Before embarking on the sketch of historical events in 
th~s.area, what_would appear to_~e ~ p~rado~ ~ust be settled. 
The various onslaughts into North Africa have, in varying 
. . ,. .. 
degrees a~d periods or time, been succ~ss~ul. On the other 
hand, practi~ally al~ t~e lite~at~re available on the Berbers 
ind~cates their adept ~a~ring cap~bilitie~ and their extreme 
devotion to independence. The question of why, then, were 
- -
the foreigners so successful in their attempts, naturally 
.. . .. ... 
poses itself. Terra~se, among others, indicates an answer 
to this que:S:tlfen when he notes: 
· Particu1arism was the prevailing wish of the ele-
mentary social un~ts who dreamed only of indepen-· 
dance, equ~libr~um 'and peace in a divided country •. 
The democratic spirit spoke louder than the feelihg 
of racial unity; above all it suspected all personal 
power arid abhorred all tyranny; it took its source fn 
experience and not in idealogy. The central govern-
ment-was for the Berbers a source of profit or of ruin 
according to whether they were'its agents or its 
subjects: the feeling of State, the notion of tlie . 
common good never stood out clearly in their minds. 
At the same time, historical-eXPerience never contra~ 
dieted this pessimistic and narrow view of the collective 
life. · 
1Bousquet, 2£• cit., P• 57, says as·an·example of this: 
"Ce n 1est qu•uil'Ei"spect de l 1.impuissance congenitale 
des Berbe-res a creer quelque chose." He refers here 
to the"Arab influence in Berber dynasties and organi-
zation. 
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The political, and social mentality of the Berbers 
thus rendered them practically inapt Tor great · 
political assembiies and vast tasks executed ih common. 
To catalyse the rare unitive po·ssibilities of their 
social structure and mentality, they almost always 
needed foreign will-power or, at least, an external 
adjuvant.l . . . 
Add to lack of Berber un~ty a topograp~y_which allowed 
discontentedautochthons to retreat to inaccessible mountain 
areas and there carry on their part~cularism, and one can 
readily dismiss the seeming paradox. 
The implication of complete Berber passivity with 
regard to ·the various invasions should not be drawn. At 
times, Berbe~s did o.ffer resistance by forming temporary 
. . . 
federations, or they would join with the foreigners if it 
. . ' 
benefitted them, or if they wished aid in ousting previous 
;nvaders'. The Berbers also formed dynasties and_ruled 
various parts of ~he Magh~eb at dif~erent periods. But 
as Terrasse indicates above, these were often based on 
~oreign 0rganizers or concepts, particularly religious 
. . 
concepts, rather then stemming from Berber culture itself. 
.. . . ... ~ 
For.the most part, however, the Berbers were constantly 
engaged_in internecine warfare, particula~ly when one 
group attempted to assert its authority over another.2 
lTerrasse, ~· £!!., PP• 172-173; also see Boissier, 
.QE.• cit., P• 10 • 
. ' ... - "' 
2Budgett Meakin, Life"in Morocco (London: Swan Sonnen-
scheiri.t.-1902), P• 48. · · · 
Meyer .tt'ortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds •) i 
African Political Systems C4th'impression, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1950), PP• 1~23,·indicate 
that where a segmented "societytt· is found, cultural 
homogeneity is usually associated with it (as is the 
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Their uncompromising demand for individual i~dependence 
led them to shed each other's blood. There was continuous 
feuding and raiding among the various groups and to the 
conqueror went the human and material spoils.1 No internal 
or external centralize~ authority_was conside:ed binding. 
This was ~specially true of Morocco ~ere a number of 
.. . .,. ., 
centralized systems w~r~_establish~d, both Berber and foreign. 2 
The treachery of Moro~can topography gave seclu~ion to the 
ultra non-conrormists. They inhabited the famous bled-es-
~· . ' 
Witht.the above knowledge in hand, the many twists and 
turns of the following excursion ;nto Berber history can 
be comprehended with more clarity. 
case of the Berbers). They believe that this associa-
tion enables the society to·functionwlthout great 
threat of internai conflict. This seems to be less 
true of the Maghreb than of other areas; although it 
may be that at times a common heritage, along with 
the awareness or equal or near equal segments·did 
check the Berbers. But as we shall see later, it 
was their culture, 'in great· part, whiCh drove them 
against each other. E.g., a man is not a man among 
many Berber groups until'he kills·another man outside 
of his own group (Meaken, ~· £!i., P• 41). Revenge 
was then in order to restore ·dignity to the· injured 
tribe,. sub-trice, or whatever the ·segment may be. 
(In this connection see Boissier, ~; £!i., PP• 12-
13). Lack of land tenure laws, agricultural needs 
of nomads, etc., were other reasons for conflicts. 
lMeak!n, ~· cit., P• 181. 
2See for example, Lorna Hahn, North Africa: National~sm 
to Nationhood (Washin~ton, ·n.c.: Public Affairs 
Press, c. 1960), PP• 54-55. 
.. 
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BERBER HISTORY FROM CARTHA§E TO THE PRESENT 
- ~ . . . ~ ~ 
carthage, 845-146 B.o. 
. . . 
The Phoenicians ~ounded Carthage 
(new town) around 845 B.c. There they bought land ~rom the 
local Berbers and paid tribute to them ~or its continued 
use. Berbers tiring o~ the arrangement, however, began to 
attack and plunder the Phoenician center. Carthage res-
ponded with ~orca, some o~ which was provided by Berber 
mercenaries, and brought some o~ the hinterland under their 
control. However, Carthage continued to pay "ground rent" 
. ~ ~ 
to the Berbers until 5oo B.c. Battle exchanges between the 
adversaries continued on a regular basis. 
During the Punic Wars (264-241 B.c.; 218-201 B.c.;. 
and 1~9-146 B.G), both-Rome and Carthage sought and ob-
tained Berber support. In the early days of Carthage, 
many Berbers had distinguished themselves in battle on 
behalf ofi the Carthaginians. Through the prestige which 
they gained as well as through personal kindnesses, they 
were able to attract various Berber groups and thus ~orm 
kingdoms. One of these kingdoms was Numidia, west o~ 
Carthage, and another was Mauritania located ~urther west 
(and not to be confUsed with present-day Mauritania). 
Within each kingdom, there were quarrels as well as 
quarrels between kingdoms and with the foreigners. De-
pending on the problems of the mament, the advantages 
and disadvantages of the situation, and the constant under-
lying Berber individualism, they would plan their course of 
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alignments or non-alignments. 
Thus it was that attachments to either Rome or Carthage 
were somewhat tenuous, with the Berbers shifting alliances 
frequently. Splits within the kingdoms themselves would 
find some groups allied to Rome and some to Carthage at 
the same time. Finally, however, Rome succeeded in de-
feating Carthage in the third Punic War with the aid of a 
sectional King of Numidia. 
Rome, 146 B.C.-429 A.D. Rome annexed Carthage after 
. 
the third Punic War, but did not, attempt to control all 
the areas which Carthage had held under its sway. Rome 
was not really interested in getting too deeply involved 
in Africa. Numidia was left to thre~ Be·rber heirs, including 
their previous ally. However, the independent and disruptive 
action of the other two heirs often led Rome to intervene 
in Numidia. 
During the Roman period, the various Berber leaders 
who came to the fore sometimes succeeded in massing a large 
area under their control. When this occurred, the Romans 
would become wary and seek other Berber allies to check and 
break up such concentrations. 
The great Berber dynasties begun during the Carthaginian 
period finally came to an end1 however, when the last of 
the line, Ptolemy, was put to death by his vain cousin1 
Emperor Caligula. Ptolemy died in 40 A.D., and no really 
significant Berber dynasties appear in North Africa again 
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until the Almoravides in 1053. 
In 42 A.D., Rome took firmer control of the Maghreb 
and divided it into ~our provinces: Proconsular Africa 
(Carthage}; Numidia; and two Mauritanias. However, the 
various Berber groups were difficult to control, and 
many rebelled increasingly. 
The Vandals, 429-533, and the Byzantines, 533-698. By 
the fourth and fifth centuries, Roman power was wearing thin. 
Berber ~prisings created near anarchy in the area. The 
political void in the area attracted.the Vandals, a group 
of Germanic people. They began raiding the coast of the 
westernmost Mauritanian province in 425. In 429, they 
. 
waged a_full scale invasion of Barbary, and picked up 
Berber adherents in their sweep across the Maghrebian 
littoral. Rome, aided by Byzantines, was not able to cheek 
the Vandals. From that point on, Rome g~a~UL~ abandoned 
. 
its African provinces and began concentrating more on its 
problems at home. 
The Berbers, who had joined with the Vandals to rid 
themselves of the Romans, now turned on their new masters. 
Thus weakened by continuous Berber onslaughts, Vandal rule 
was finally challenged by the Byzantines. By 533 1 Vandal 
rule came to an end. 
Shortly after the defeat of the Vandals, the Byzan-
tines were themselves faced with rebellious Berber attacks. 
The Berbers of Numidia and Proconsular Africa, renamed 
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Byzance, revolted. It was a double, though individually 
. 
~nstituted1 attack by Sanhadja sedentaries and nomadic 
Zenata. Byzantine forces met with many defeats at their 
hands. By 565, Byzantine rule in Africa b~came nominal 
rather than effective. 
~he First Arab Invasion, 647-732• The Arabs, invigorated 
. . 
with the Islamic faith and Asian victories turned their 
attention to the Maghreb. By 647, they had established a 
base of operations in southern Byzance (called Ifriqiyah 
. 
by the Arabs). There, they founded the city of Kairouan. 
The Byzantines were pushed to the coastal areas, and were 
not ousted from there until 698. However, during the early 
Arab penetration of the western Maghreb, individual 
Byzantines could be found as adjuncts to Berber resistance 
groups in last-ditch efforts to ward off Arab control. 
The first major Berber resistance was based on a group 
of Sanhadja tribes led by one Kosaila. The main battle 
. . . 
scene took place at the foot of the Auras Mountains south 
of Cirta (Constantine). For three years (683-686), Kosaila 
held sway over the area. However, in 686, the Arabs managed 
to defeat Kosaila 1 s Berber-Byzantine army just outside of 
Kairouan. 
The back of the Satihadja resistance had been broken, 
and the Byzantines could not restore it. The Jerawa, a 
. ' 
nomadic Zenata Berber tribe, led by their legendary queen, 
the Jewess Kahina, took up the resistance. She managed 
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to beat back the renewed efforts of the Arabs, and to control 
the area previously held by Kosaila. 
However, the Sanhadjas along with Greek settlers war~ 
wooed to the Arab cause, more perhaps because or their 
hostility to the Zenata than because of their strong belief 
in Islam. At the same time, Zenata "unity" was beginning 
- -
to crumble under the reassertion of Berber segmentation • 
. 
Thus in 702, a reinforced Arab army defeated Kahina, and 
. 
sent her decapitated head to t~e Caliph. With her death 
came the end of well organized Berber resistance until the 
French and Spanish appear on the scene. 
In 705, the new governor of Ifriqiyah pushed into 
. . 
Morocco recruiting newly Islamized Berbers into his army. 
Wide areas of Morocco fell before this onslaught. By 711, 
Spain had been conquered by a majority Berber army equipped 
with the fire of the jihad {Arabic, Moslem holy war). Arab 
expansion came to an end, however, with the victory of 
Charles Martel in Europe in 732. Berbers, through their 
restlessness, also contributed to the gradual,withdrawal 
of the Arabs. From that point on, Arab control over the 
Maghreb was merely nominal in some areas, and nonexistent 
in others. 
Berber resistance now took on a different form. It 
went under the guise of religious zeal and Islamic reform • 
. 
Berbers quite of-ten led by Arabs established small dynasties 
-
and at~ed a body of adherents to themselves. Such 
-25-
Arab officials that remained in the Maghreb, acted indepen-
dently of their central government in the Near East. Their 
talents served the Berbers well. Thus is the social scene 
in the Magnreb in which the activities of the interim 
between Arab invasions are played. 
The Interim Period, 732-10$3. Arab domination, never 
well organized, became tyrannical intits fading days. The 
Arab treasu~y had been -drained by so many campaigns. They 
' 
sought to replenish the empty till by imposing a land and 
poll tax on converted Berbers. Berbers were infuriated by 
' 
this unjust and, for members of the Moslem faith, illegal 
action. Thus they were quick to grasp upon an Islamic sect 
which preached the equality of all believers. This was the 
Kharijite sect. 
The Berber revolt catalyzed by Kharijitism broke out in 
Morocco. Berbers defeated the Caliph's army twice. United 
against the co~on enemy, Berbers succeeded in pushing 
' 
back the Arabs to Kairouan. Thereafter, Morocco was formed 
-into a number of small groupings, the most important of which 
were located at Nokur on the Hiffian coast, and Sijilmasa in ~ 
the north-central interior. However, the most notable and 
largest kingdom founded in Morocco during this period of 
Arab decline was that of the Idrisside dynasty. 
-
Moulay Idriss, an Arab, was considered a descendant of the 
Prophet, and therefore he allegedly possessed the power 
of baraka (Arabic, a supernatural power which allows 
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those endowed to bestow prosperity in its broader meanings 
upon individuals or groups). ·Having escaped from Arabia 
with his loyal slave, Rachid, he moved into the area of 
Fez and Meknes. There he was welcomed by the Aureba Berbers. 
No doubt his sherifian (Arabic, descendant of Mohammed) 
background influenced the Berber reception. 
Almost immediately a coalition of Berber tribes 
. 
submitted themselves to his rule. He embarked on a policy 
of conquest and Islamization of Morocco and bordering areas. 
After meeting with some success, he was poisoned by an 
emissary of the Arab Caliph. His son, Idriss II, succeeded 
him. Idriss II never achieved complete control of the area; 
. 
but he did establish for the first time in Morocco a 
makhzen (Arabic, an organized central government). The 
makhzen was foreign to Berber tradition, and did not gain 
their allegiance. Nonetheless, later dynasties established 
in Morocco were to follow Idr~ss II 1s governmental organiza-
. . -
tion. 
Idriss II died in 829. The Kingdom was d~yidedp 
. 
between his sons. It dwindled under their neglectful 
management to two main principalities, Fez and an area in 
the Riff. The Idrisside princes of the Riff soon routed 
. . 
those of Fez, and ruled through their heirs both areas 
until 922. Though weak, Fez continued to flourish as a 
capital city~ and th~ Arabic language became established in 
its environs during the ldrisside reign. 
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A period of Fatimid incursions into Morocco ensued. 
There the invaders found both Berber allies and Berber 
opponents. They were never able to penetrate central and 
southern Morocco. A series of incidents led to ~inal 
Fatimid retreat to Ifriqiyah. The western Maghreb then 
became filled with small Zenata principalities, interspersed 
in Morocco with Masmuda and ~ome Sanhadja units. 
The Second Arab Invasion, 10$0-1130; and The Almoravides, 
. 
10$3-1147• The Egyptian Fatimids, .angered by the declaration 
of independence by their Berber Emirs in Ifriqiyah, released 
a number of troublesome Arab tribes on the Maghreb. These 
. 
tribes, the Beni Hillal, the Beni Soleim, and later the Beni 
Maqil ~rom Arabia swept across the ·Maghreb in destructive 
fashion. They found Berber allies along the way. 
The second Arab invasion had the most profound cultural 
influence on the Maghreb than had any previous ~oreign 
invasion. The process of Arabization and Islamizatio~ 
' begun in the seventh century was accelerated. Contrary 
to the first Arab invaders, these groups made Barbary their 
home. They penetrated interior areas which had not received 
great attention by previous invaders. Nonetheless, Morocco, the 
most difficult to permeate and the furthest away from the 
origination point of the invasion, remained the great Berber 
country. Arab inroads were made in succeeding years, how-
ever. The Arabic dialect spoken in the Maghreb today is 
derived primarily from these Beduins. 
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While the second Arab invasionuwas sweeping across 
Barbary, _some Sanhadja gnoups who had migrated to the Sahara 
in the third century became active. They formed a 'confedera-
tion and controlled what is today known as Mauritania. 
Around 1040, the confederation' chief, Yahya B. Ibrahim, 
made a pilgrimage to Mecca, bringing back with him a 
Moroccan scholar, Abdallah B. Yasin. Yasin was to inculcate 
orthodox Islam in the m~nds of Ibrahim's people. He 
- . 
failed, however, and after Ibrahim's death, took refuge 
~ 
with his followers in a ribat (Arabic, monastery) which 
he founded. 
When various Zenata groups began to drift southward 
after.having been pushed in that direction earlier by the 
Fatimids, the confederation called upon Yasin to lead a 
Jihad against the intruders. Thus, in 1053, a northern 
push was made led by the al-murabitin (Arabic, the men of 
' 
the ribat)--corrupted to almoravide--~into the southern 
extremities of Morocco. It was not until 2056, however, 
that the Almoravides occupied the Moroccan Oases, Sous 
Valley and the southern Atlantic plains. 
Later, under Yusof B. Tachfin, Marrakesh was founded 
(1062), and it became the center of the Empire. During 
the period 1062-1082, Tachfin was able to conquer all the 
Zenata principalities and confederations in Morocco. He 
pushed eastward as far as what is today called Algiers. 
Tachfin was also successful in Moorish Spain. 
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The Almoravide rule began to weaken under the leader-
. . 
ship o~ Tach~in 1 s son. Furthermore, within the ranks o~ 
Almoravide groups themselves, there was a constant grumbling 
over the centralization o~ control and other matters. 
While the A1moravide dynasty ~ell soon a~ter, it did develop 
the basis ~or Morocco as a 11political unitu. 
~ 
The Almohades, 1147-1269. The Masmuda Berber tribes 
o~ Morocco were increasingly dissatisfied with the Sarihadja 
Almoravides. Their leader, Ibn Toumert, had returned ~rom 
. . . 
the Near East in the early twel~th century. He was armed 
with new religious concepts which ~ormed the basis ~or the 
largest Berber Empire ever to exist--the Almohades. 
In 1125, Ibn Toumert settled in Tinmel where he estab-
lished a ribat and preached his belief in the oneness o~ 
God, tawid (Arabic, one). His ~ollowars called themselves 
al~mowakhidoun (Arabic, those who believe in the oneness 
o~ God)--corrupted to almohadas. Therea~ter, preparations 
. 
were made to ~ight a jihad against the Sanhadja Almoravides. 
While Ibn Toumert met with some successes, he also mat with 
many de~aats. He diad in 1130 and was succeeded by Abd 
al-Mumen, a Zanata ~rom Tlemcen. 
Al-Muman learned ~rom the mistakes o~ his predecessor 
who had prematurely attempted to taka Marrakesh. Instead, 
he moved northward very cautiously using the topography 
to advantage. He took Tlamcen and Oran and than eased 
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into eastern Morocco taking Taza, Fez, Sale, etc. In 1142, 
he captured and killed the last Almoravide leader. Finally, 
in 1147 Al-Mumen stormed the southern capital, Marrakesh. 
He captured it, and the Ahnoravides fell. 
Al-Mumen was immediately faced with three problems~ 
rebellious Berbers; the Arabs; and the incursion along 
the Tunisian coast by the Normans. He subdued the Berbers; 
formed alliances with the Arabs and absorbed somein his army; 
and arrested the Christian danger by an all-out effort in 1149• 
Thus, ·by 1150, the Almohade Empire ran from southern Spain to 
Tripoli. 
The Almohades succeeded in maintaining much of their 
Empire until the early part of the thirteenth century. 
Christian activity in Spain, added to the corroding effects 
of Arab tribes brought into Morocco as part of the policy 
to neutralize them, as well as Be~bers reasserting their 
segmental tendencies, spelled the downfall of the 
Almohades. 
The Maghreb from Mid-Thirteenth Century to European 
Control. The B. Merins, a Zenata tribal group followed 
the Almohades. They had established themselves in Fez 
by 1248. In 1269, they captured Marrakesh. And in 1270, 
. 
they killed the last Almohade sovereign. But the Merinides 
never restored the Empire to its rormer standing. Among 
other things, the spread of sufist (Arabic, mystical form 
' 
of Islam) ideas, discussed later, checked the development 
. 
of wide Berber support for the Merinides. Sufism 
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became extremely popular in the area, and appears to have 
reinforced the segmental tendencies of the Berbers. 
Terrasse notes: 
This form of Islamism, sub-divided and extra-
governmental was highly to the liking of the tribes; 
it respected the political and social traditions of 
those Berber countries the most attached to their 
traditions and their customs.~ 
After many failures by the Merinides to recapture the 
Maghreb, a Zenata tribe in Morocco, the B. Wattas executed 
a succe·ssful coup d 1 etat in 1465. Successful as they were ' 
in taking the reigns of government, the tide of tribal 
rebellion could not be stemmed. Furthe~ore, no longer 
eould the Berbers and Arabs alike be called to massive 
unity under the guise of Islam and its protective e-<!1'10Spt;t't1ae 
jihad. The country became absorbed in th~ deepest state 
. 
of anarchy yet witnessed. The power of the Wattasides 
extended only to Fez and its environs. They lasted there 
until 1549• 
Meanwhile, Europe had awakened, and the Ottoman Turks 
were developing a formidable Empire. The Po~tuguese and 
~panish captured several northern ports of Morocco during 
the period 1415-1489. In the early sixteenth century, the 
Portuguese, with the aid of Berber allies, established 
fortresses, occupied several towns along the Atlantic coast 
of Morocco, and raided the interior of southern Morocco as 
lTerrasse, ~· £!!., P• 105. 
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fa~ as Marrakesh. There they met resistance from the Saadians. 
The Saadians were Arabs, alleged descendants of the 
Prophet, i.e. shorfa (Arabie, sherif, sing.). They had 
settled in the area of ·Zagora at the request of local 
Berbers in the ~hirt'eeri.th century. The Berbers had hoped 
to derive the benefits of the Saadian baraka. When the 
Portuguese threat became evident, the Berbers requested 
the Saadians to lead a jihad against the invaders~ The 
Saadians succeeded in pushing back the Portuguese to the 
Atlantic, as well as gaining voluntary control ove~ a 
number of sufist-b~sed groupings. 
After their southern successes, the Saadians began to 
move against the Wattasides in Fez, only to find the Turks 
. 
were pressing hard there. This being the situation, the 
Saadians sought an alliance with Christian Spain against 
the Ottomans. 
Heavy taxation, dynastic quarrels culminating in the 
battle of the three kings (157·~), as well as the strange 
-· 
association with Spain led to Berber and Arab disenchant-
ment. Many rebelled and shook off central control. The 
Saadians became increasingly isolated. Finally, their 
structure crumbled in 1669. 
The Saadians were replaced by the Alawite dynasty, 
also shorfa. The Alawites, the present ruling dynasty of 
Morocco, had themselves come from Arabia. They settled 
in the Tafilelt in the twelfth centu~. Because of their 
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assumed descent ~rom the Prophet, they were asked by local 
Berber and Arab tribes to lead a jihad against a growing 
and bothersome sufist order. This they did, and kept 
moving until they captured the Saadian capital in 1669. 
The Alawites attempted to rid the country o~ all 
European penetration, but had only partial success. 
Berbers grew weary o~ heavy taxation, and retreated to 
their inaccessible domains. 
The Alawite reign up to the period of European h~~~m§Ry 
never achieved control over all areas of the country. 
Corruption, violence, crime and lack of internalized social 
control were rampant. Nonetheless, during this period 
increasing commercial and political ties were established 
with European countries. Europeans vied with each other for 
the Alawite Sultan's favor; and, this o~ten served to under-
mine his position. 
When the European scramble for A~rica was on, Morocco 
was not to be excluded, though it had a constituted 
government. After many secret and public negotiations 
between France, Spain, Italy, England and Germany, 
-Morocco was ~inally viewed as a legitimate French sphere 
of influence, with some recognition for Spain also. So cor-
roded and uncontrollable had the situation become in Morocco 
that.the Sultan's gover.rument was completely shaken. This 
' 
situation, ~rther complicated by the increasing debt o~ the 
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Sultan to France and the presence of French troops on 
Moroccan soil left the monarch no alternative but to sign 
a protectorate treaty with France in 1912. Thereafter, 
France and Spain negotiated for the actual partition of 
the country. These negotiations gave Spain an area in the 
Sahara called Rio de Oro as well as the northern area 
of Morocco. Tangier remained an international city • 
. 
Struggle for Independence. It was not long after 
Spain and France had established their hegemony over 
. . 
Morocco that they were faced with problems of pacifying 
the Berbers. The violent uprising of the Riffians led 
by Abd-el-Krim in the Spanish Zone is well documented by 
. 
history. Th~ control of Berbers of the traditional area 
of dissidence in southern Morocco1 was not completed until 
1933· 
Nationalist party movements led by the Arab citizens 
were also a part of the early Protectorate days. The 
details of these movements are covered adequately in other 
works, and need no great reiteration here.1 It is only 
significant to note that a period of disenchantment with 
French rule began early in the century. Initial demands by 
the ·nationalists, however, were usually moderate. They 
called upon France to uphold the Protectorate treaty, i.e. 
lSee, for example, Robert Rezette, Las Partis 
Politiques Marocain3~ (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955). 
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to confine her activities to defense and foreign affairs. 
France continuously skirted these demands and consistently 
violated the terms of the treaty. 
After World War II, ·the nationalists were hopeful of 
- < 
concessions from France if for no other reason than 
Moroccan contributions to the war effort. Such hopes were 
soon discouraged. Thereafter, nothing short of complete 
independence would be satisfactory to the nationalists. 
Demonstrations and bombings increased everywhere. The 
French attempted to disband the various movements and to 
discredit their leaders by associating them with communism. 
Banishment and imprisonment did not quell the fire of national-
ism. Finally, in the 1950's, the National Liberation Front 
was organized. The nationalist movements had no choice 
. ' 
but to align themselves with t~e Front. The goal of 
independence was no longer pursued solely through quasi-
legal means but on the battlefield as well. The French 
situation was complicated by the presence of 400,000 
colons in the country. The colons exerted severe pressure 
in France to have Morocco retained under French control. 
However, after much violence and the forced exile 
and return of Mohammed V, Morocco was given its independence 
in the Spring of 1956. Spain gave up her Protectorate over 
the northern zone soon after, but retained the cities of 
Ceuta and Melilla. Tangier has since been absorbed into the 
Moroccan system. 
During the struggle for independence, the nationalist 
leaders promised their fellow citizens peace and prosperity 
with dignity. To the world, they promised that their 
country would take its place as a responsible and orderly 
member of the world community. In order to achieve these 
goals, it is necessary ~or the Moroccan Government to gain 
-
the support and respect of its citizens, among other things. 
In other words, independence in the modern world requires a 
stable nation-state society. This means that at least 
minimal social integration must be achieved within the 
country. 
Traditional Berber social structuring is recorded 
next so as to better understand some of the difficulties 
facing the Moroccan Government in achieving social inte-
gration. 
CHAPTER III 
TRADITIONAL BERBER SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE SOUS PROVINCE 
GENERAL SEGMENTATIONl 
The reader must be reminded that the segments desig-
nated here usually had counterparts among most Berber 
groups. However, segment names, contents and relative 
importance frequently varied.2 These tended to vary more 
when one looked beyond the Sous Province. 
The basic segment was the patri-lineag~ to which 
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the Berbers had given the name !!h (Berber).3 This usually 
consisted of three generations occupying a single household 
lThe best single coverage of Berber segmentation in the 
Sous Province is Robert Montagne, Les Berberes et le 
Makhzen dans 1e Sud du Maroc {Paris: Libraire Felix 
Alcan, l930), es~. PP• 147-216. See also Robert 
Montagne, 11Le Reg:tme Juridique des Tribus du Sud 
Marocain," Hesperia, IV, No. 3 (1924), PP• 313-331; 
"L'Aghbar_et les Hautes Vallees du Grand-Atlas," 
Hesperis, VII, No. 1 (1927}, PP• 1-32; 11Une Trib~ 
Berb~re du Sud Maroeain--Massat, n Hesperis, IV, 
No. 4 (1924), PP• 357-403; and Spillman, ££• £!!• 
2Victor Piquet, Le Peuple Marocain {Paris: E. Larose, 
1925), p. 185, notes: "Lforganisation de la societe 
berbere aP.paratt souvent comme assez confuse, parce 
;\ " 4 • ; que des memes elements;portent des noms d~fferents 
dans les differentes regions, et aussi parce que les 
popula~ions el1es-m~es emplote~t souvent le meme mot 
pour designer·des groupement tres divers. 11 
3Albert Ribaut, Les Djemaas Judiciaires Be;beres (Algiers: 
Ferraris, 1930), P• 101, notes that among some Berbers, 
the ter.m was used to designate larger segments. Its 
spelling was somewhat different in these cases--!££. 
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or adjoining household and performing tasks cooperatively 
for the common welfare. The eldest mal~ was at once the head 
and absolute ruler of the lineage, formerly holding the power 
of life and death over his charges. 
Several related lineage groups for.med a hamlet or a quar-
ter of a village. Often, however, hamlet or quarter dwellers 
were not all related. When the members of this unit were clan 
members, the obligations betwee~ members were a fuaction of 
the unit rather than those often associated with local or dis• 
persed clans in other areas.1 As Ribaut puts it, "Mais sou-
~ , 
vent aussi, le clan se constitue en dehors de toute idee de 
~ , "" 2 parente. o•est un groupement d'interets, sans plus. 11 A 
client system whereby male strangers gnd sometimes their 
frunilies, if any, were accepted by local families to replen• 
iSh men lost in the many local wars. A hamlet had about ten 
to thirty households within it. 
Three or four contiguo~s hrunlets composed a village. 
For many Berbers, both in Morocco and Algeria, it represented 
, 
the core of their "society". ttorest un veritable groupement 
ethnique qui a son~organis~tio~ propre ••••"3 However, it 
. 
could be easily destroyed because of its limited size. It 
lin this connection see A Committee of the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Notes 
and Queries on Anthropolo~y (6th ed., London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul Ltd., 19S4 , PP• 88-93. 
2Ribaut, ~· cit., P• 100. 
3Ibid., p • 101. 
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usually had fifty or more households. F0r this as well as 
other reasons, villages joined together in larger segments. 
Both the hamlet and the village were designated by one of 
the following terms by the Berbers: taddert, tadchert 
(Berber) or douar (Arabic). 
A number of villages for.med what the French called a 
sub-fraction and what the Berbers called a~~ (Berber), 
A muda, however, could also be made up of several large ham-
lets rather than villages; and likewise a gross village, to 
use the French expression, could perform the functions of a 
~· In the latter case, the village retained the name of 
taddert, or one of the others designating this unit. 
usually had 200 to 600 households. 
A muda 
.............. 
Beveral ~ or gross villages made up what the French 
have called a fraction, or better, a canton, taqbilt (Arabie). 
The Sousi taqbilt was a unit comparable in function to the 
Riffian khoms {Ar~bic) and the Kabylian arsh (Arabic). ~aqbilt 
literally meant tribe. A canton, however, was never a complete 
tribe. Still the term was used to designate that segment. 
Khoms meant five. The Riffians1 used it because the number of 
. 
~ comprising the canton was usually five. Arsh also meant 
tribe. Like taqbilt, it did not include a whole tribe within 
the unit bearing its name. 
The taqbilt was the most important political unit of the 
Berbers. It was the unit in mind when various authors spoke 
of Berber republics. It was ·allegedly a socio-political enti-
ty. The number of households comprising it ranged from 
400 to 800 and sometimes more. 
Three to twelve cantons for.med a tribe, again called 
taqbilt. The tribe possessed a common name, ttculture, 11 and 
~ 
territory. The tribes often were, or at least at various 
periods in history, heterogeneous.l This was due to a great 
deal of migration as part of a nomadic or water-seeking 
process. Strangers moving into one tribal area became 
"members", i.e. t(i)ok the name of that tribe. Tribal units 
-
were composed of 1,000 to 6,000 households. 
Several tribes were, at times, also grouped into 
confederations. The tribe and the confederation were 
extremely tenuous units and were rarely endowed with 
permanent internal political cementation.2 They were only 
recognized and retained under threatening circumstances 
developing from other Berber regions or from the Makhzen. 
The only political segment which existed permanently 
and transcended the canton was the 1::!.!. (Berber) 0r ~ 
(Arabie) as it is known in some areas. It was a strange 
moiety-like aggregation of cantons. For any given region• 
which had no specific borders, there were two ~· The 
lsee Jac~ue Berque, Structures Sociales du Haut Atlas, 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955), P• 3, for a 
discussion of this point. 
2Spillman, 2£• cit., PP• 118-119, gives examples of 
whole tribes and confederations which functioned as 
effective units of action. 
cantons of any tribe were, on the average, divided equally 
between the two ~ in a quasi-checkerboard fasbion.l This 
dual alliance system sometimes extended beyond a tribal 
region so that cantons of either a number of tribes or of a 
confederation were divided between the two 1!!• 
In the Dra valley, a different lef pattern existed. 
Here, some complete nemadic and semi-nomadic tribes belonged 
to the srume ~· Spillman believed that these groups had 
more reason for tribal unity than did the sendentary groups. 
He says: 
. , , On constate auss~ que dans la vallee du Dra, habitee 
par de,s populations semi-nomad~s ou rtcemment s,eden-
tarisees~~ les lef sont beaucoup moins morcelles 
que dans la montagne. Dans la plupart des cas, 
des tribus entieres entrent dans la composition 
des partis politique du Dra, tandis que for.mes d'une 
mosaique de sous-fractions et de clans. Cette 
particularite s'explique si l'on se rappelle que 
les tribus nomades sont infiniment moins divistes 2 que les groupements depuis longtemps sedentarise$~. 
Nonetheless, the cantonal pattern of 1!f participation was 
generally more true than the tribal pattern or lesser seg-· 
ments, e.g., two villages of the same canton joining oppo-
site~· 
lLt. Col. Justinard, Les Ai t Ba Amrane, ("Villas et 
Tribus du Maroc 11 , VIII; Series Tribus Berberes, Tome 
I, 1930), PP• 88-90, for a discussion of lef. See 
also Montagne, Makhzen, PP• 147-226. ---
2spillman, .!£• cit., p. 119; and Edmond D"utte·, 
"L'organisatioilTJomestique et Sociale chez les Haha," 
Renseignements Coloniaux et Document~ No. 1 (1905), ~ 
P• 8, notes the same pattern for tribal lef participa-· 
tion mnong the tribes of the Haha region. 
Lef allies were joined together through verbal treaties. 
Each member of a canton knew which other cantons belonged to 
their lef. The ~was primarily a protective alliance. 
Whenever a canton was attacked by a group of the opposite 
~~ either because of·some unresolved dispute between two 
parties, blood revengei plunder, etc., a recognized signal 
of shots was fired in each region of the canton which bor-
dered a ~ ally. Within a short period of time, a formid-
able force gathered to battle the enemy. 
Theoretically, the ~ system was for defensive rather 
than offensive purposes. It was to serve as a check to 
internecine warfare through a balance of powero However, 
while the lef alliances did play this role, Berber history 
records frequent and bitter internal warfare. In Sousi, the 
lef often appeared to encourage feuding and warfare.l Aware~ 
lin discussing the 1!!1 Justinard, 2£• £!E., p. 90, 
notes the following which tends· to give credence to 
the interpretations of the ~ presented above: 
11C1est une sorte d 1assurance centre les risques de 
guerra. Ctest en meme temps une cause de guerre 
per.manente-puisque toutle pays est amenea prendre 
part au moindre eonflit. Il faut croire que cela 
plait aux Chleuh (name of Berber languaEe spoken 
in Sousi, mine), cette vaste solidarite, pour se 
battre, puisque, de tout temps~ 1 1histoire nous a 
montr$ ce trait de leur caractere." 
See William Lewis, "Feuding and ~ocial Change in 
Moroecoi' Journal of_ Conflict Resolution, V, No. 1 (1961), PP• 43-54, for the traditional view of lef, 
i.e. as a strictly balanced conflict check. ---. 
See also, Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), pp. 1-26, on functions and 
direction of feuding in segmented "societies"• 
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ness of support from members of the lef in a dispute with 
an opposing lef member may have discouraged greater attempts 
at compromise. However, it must be recorded that lef 
members, though rarely successful, usually met to attempt 
to settle the dispute with honor for both sides. Lef members 
also attempted to mediate disputes between members of the 
same~· 
The above interpretation tends to be more valid when 
• 
we note that various aspects of the social structure were 
oriented and reinforcing in that direction, i.e. did not 
offer any real blocks against warfare and vice-versa tended 
to encourage it as a "dignified" and "honorable" means to 
settle matters.1 
The lef also functioned as a socio-economic grouping. 
Trade was carried on between lef members; reciprocal grazing 
rights were exercised; and socializing in the form of a 
great feast took place between lef allies to symbolize their 
alliance. 
lFor example, the vendetta was recognized among most 
Berbers as being outside the realm of those empowered 
to administer jurisprudence. M. Ben Daoud in "Recueil 
du droit coutumier de Massat," Hesperia, IV, No.4 (1924), P• 407, lists one of the laws of this group 
covering one of the vendetta situations, for example; 
11Celui qui exerce le droit du sang en tuant l'azouag 
(meurtrier d 1un de ses parents), n'est possible d 1 au-
cune peine; 1 1aurait-il m~e fait tuer par une tierce 
personne; celle-ci e'galement ne peut ~tre poursuivie. 11 
If the vendetta or whatever dispute existed between 
parties of different lef, whole !!!: could become in-· 
volved if the situation was not settled through dis-
cussion or arbitfation. Lef members were obligated 
to fight on behalf of other ~ members no matter what 
the situation or its justification may have been. 
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PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF BERBER COMMUNITIES IN SOUSI 
The physical relief of Berber communities in Sousi 
varied significantly.l This variety was well reflected 
and consistent with the social structuring. 
The concentrated geographic diversification of the 
area along with Berber values provided the framework for 
the settlement pattern. Settlement was often, but not 
always, determined by proximity to water supply, and/or 
regions inaccessible to invaders. Mountainous settlements 
tended to be smaller and proportionally more numerous than 
plains and desert settlements. 2 Hamlets and villages were 
found scattered throughout the craggy ranges where patches 
of land were round for cultivation as well as water for 
irrigation. Nonetheless, composite segments in mountain 
areas varied from tti sola ted 11 hamlets to tribal and confedera-
. 
tional groupings. Contiguity, need for protection and 
trading ma~ have been the prime factors in forging the 
larger functional segments, e.g. the canton. Village and 
cantonal units as autonomous socio-political segments were 
the most prominent -in the mountainous areas. In the Atlantic 
plains area, the canton was recognized as the chief segment; 
while in the desert, it was the tribe. 3 
l 
lsee for example, Andre Adam, La Maison et le Village 
dans -Quelques Tribus de l'Anti Atlas, ( 11Hesperis, 11 NQ>. 
13, 1951~; and hqbert Montagne, Les Villages et Kasbahs 
des Berberes (Pa~is: Libraire Felix Alcan, 1930). 
2see supra, P• 41~ 
I 
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Typically each low-level community, i.e. hamlet and/or 
village was walled for protection whether it was attached to 
a larger segment or not. Each had a mosque and a collective 
granary, agadir, as the main public buildings. The agadir 
was sometimes used as a fortress in times of war. Some 
' communities also had a residence for visitors. Many groups 
had appropriations for the care and entertainment of strangers 
and guests. 
Within each community or within its range, local reli-
gious brotherhoods, zawiyas, were found. Shrines of dead 
local saints, marabouts, were also found. More will be 
said about marabouts later. 
Housing varied from the tents of nomads to mud huts 
with thatched roofs and to well-masoned houses. Generally, 
the Sous Province Berbers lived in substantial housing. 
Each house was two or three levels. The lower level was 
for animals, and the upper levels were sleeping quarters. 
The wealthy also had a guest ~oom on the upper levels. 
Cooking was done outside and/or in the lower story of the 
house.l 
Fields for cultivation and for pasture were located 
outside the walled living area. This was a source of 
anxiety for the Berbers, since it left their livelihood 
exposed to plunderers and would-be enemies. Each community, 
however, posted guards to watch over their lands, and/or 
lAdam, 2E• ~.; and Montagne, Les Villages, ~· cit. 
over their hamlet 0r village in general. Guan~as were drawn 
from the male population in regular rotation. 
Waterways were also usually guarded. In some cases, 
where several groups used the same water source, whether 
fer irrigation and/or for personal needs, there may have 
been a special official to administer this.l 
There were market places, souks, for trade'hetween 
commlmities scattered within, at most, a day's walking 
distance of the participating groups. Agreements were 
reached between the groups with regard to the day for 
trading at a particular souk. Often groups antagonistic to 
each other traded with each other in these souks. 2 
There were road connections between the groups of the 
plains and the inhabitants of the mountains. They tradea 
with each other, and their relations in this facet of life 
were fairly amicable. In these major trading activities, 
relations were usually better between mountain and plains 
groups than between mountain groups as such. Montagne 
writing in the late 1920's with regard to trading noted: 
••• Les relations sort difficiles entre les vil-· 
t! .. " • , lages etablis a meme alt~tude dans des vallees 
paralleles, et seuls des sentiers de"ehevres per-
mettent de passer de l'une a l'autre; ••• .3 
lsee Montagne, 11Massat", p. 390. 
2See Francisco Benet, "Explosive Markets: The Berber 
Highlands, n eds. KarloPolanyi, C'onrad Arensberg and 
Harry ,earson, Trade and Market in the.Early Empires (Glencoe: The E'ree Press, c. 195'7), pp. 166-213. 
~ontagne! Makhzen, P• 16. 
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The groups living in proximity to nomads and semi-
nomads~ had a different kind of relationship. Because of 
the location of nomadic groups along the trade route as 
well as their need for agricultural products, they often 
played the role of "protectors" to neighboring sedentaries 
-in exchange for a eut of the latter's annual agricultural 
production. More will be said on this below. 
POLITICAL STR~CT~ 
The groundwork was established in ~he previous dis-
cussion for the fact that there was no universal political 
structure. Nor was there a uni~or.m set of political 
structures by which the delineation of one would exemplify 
all. Our accent is again on the pattern of variability. 
Yet, for practical purposes, a general description must 
be off~red, but it will be interspersed with qualifications 
and notations of variations. 
Each of the diverse segments with the exception of the 
M and often the hamlet or quarter, was governed by a 
djemaa (Arabic, assembly or council). Each djemaa deliberated 
on the specific needs of its segment. However, a larger 
segment djemaa could have developed the framework for the 
functioning of smaller segment djemaa(s) within its jurisdic-
tion. But this was by no means the general picture. The 
libid., pp. 147-216; and ~er~ue, 2£• £!!., have fine 
discussions on the political structure. 
council had atiministrative, legislative and some judicial 
pawers. 
Typically$ in the smaller segments$ i.e. usually below 
the level of canton, the council was made up of all adult 
males$ i.e. any male who was able to bear ar.ms for the good 
af the community. In actuality$ the lineage heads had great-
er voice in the council than did the younger members. Fur-
ther$ there was often a group of men called anflous (Berber$ 
sing. inflas) who had particularly valued characteristics--
sagacity$ wealth$ insight$ generosity$ and who also exerted 
much influence in council decisions. Among some groups$ tbe 
whole djemaa was referred to as anflous. At any rate$ when 
anflous represented a special group$ the special qualities 
of its members gave them a more influential position in the 
council and community. 
The larger segments did not have all its male members 
represented in the djemaa. Rather$ males representing par-
ticular units of the larger segment were sent to the council. 
For exmmple$ lineage heads probably represented their units 
in the muda djemaa. There were numerous combinations of rep-
resentation in the djemaa of the larger segments. The djemaa 
usually met as often as once a week at the local mosque. 
Location for the meeting of djemaas of larger segments were 
generally determined by accessibility to all~ or by the home 
site of the presiding officer (discussed below). Usually$ 
it was the for.mer rather than the latter. 
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Among many Berbers a 11president 11 or presiding of'f'icer, 
sometimes called moqaddem (Arabic) and sometimes called amghar 
lBerber),. of' the council was elected each year by the body. 
He was usually a man of' means, either intellectual, f'inancial 
or both. His primary f'unction was to see to it that the 
decisions reached by the council f'or the community were car-
ried out. Of'ten, he served as a mediator between two dis-
puting parties. He served a ter.m of' one year, af'ter which 
. 
another man f'rom a dif'f'erent lineage, hamlet, village, etc. 
--depending on the level of' the se'gmei?-t--served in turn. No 
speeif'ic rules existed f'or determining which lineage, hamlet, 
village, etc. received the "presidency11 • Sometimes, the 
unit having the greatest prestige and inf'luence either be-
cause of' its members' wealth and/or wisdom was chosen f'irst. 
\ 
However, once each unit bad been represented in the of'f'ice, 
the same order was f'ollowed the next time around. If', on 
the other hand, an incumbent was particularly able, he could 
stay in of'f'ice f'or more than one ter.m. The role then had 
the possibility· of' becoming hereditary in his f'amily line. 
In some areas, the title of' amghar ref'erred to a man 
elected by the council to be their temporary war leader in 
times of' strif'e. Sometimes, he would build up support among 
certain elements of' the population through reward f'rom plun-
der, etc., and would become a virtual dictator.1 His power 
lRobert Montagne, "Formation du Pouvoir des Gaids", 
Memorial to Henri Basset, (Paris: __ ~ub. f'or the Institut 
des Rautes Etudes Marocaines If~. 1929), p. 169, has a 
f'ine discussion of' this. Cai~(Arabic) bere means the 
same as amg'har. --
w~s ephemeral, and upon his death, the djemaa system would be 
restored. There were other individual~ who had the support 
of merceRary armies who would WPest power from the local 
moqaddem and council. They would then proceed to institute 
totalitarian regimes, extracting what they could from the 
people. But their status was also ephemeral, and the regimes 
ceased upon their death. 
If one were asked to label the djemaa system in Sousi, 
the most correct, but by no means precise ter.m would have to 
be oligarchic.l Many authors have pictured it as completely 
democratic insofar as they felt all the members had a right 
to speak in the council. However, as we have seen, not all 
had eq~~l weight. 
The djemaa decided on such matters as projects necessar~ 
for community welfare, e.g. irrigation, roads, markets, etc.; 
allocated pasture land; decided on war; appoint~d special ad-
ministrative officers, e.g. market overseer~ and water supply 
overseers, in the more "advanced" areas; and interpreted, in 
some cases, customary law. It, or some of its members, also 
lspillman, 2£• cit., p. 108 notes the impossibility of 
giving a generar-label to this system: "L'etude de 
l'organisation politique des divers groupements ethni-
ques ••• est particulierement interessant. On trouve 
en effect, dans une marne region, des cites tendances 
oligarchiques alors que d 1 autres sont au contraire 
franchement democratiques. On peut aussi saisir le 
mecanisme par lequel un notable energique et intel-
ligent parvient a bouleverser les institutions tra-
ditionnelles et accaparer toute l'autorite a son 
profit et au profit de son clan •. Enfin, quelques 
tribus obeissent a des chefs her6ditaires qui main-
tiennent leur cohesion." 
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occasionally added to the body o£ customary laws already 
available. However, there were numerous other individuals 
involved in the precess o£ jurisprudence, and that will be 
discussed below. 
Djemaa members had one source o£ financial c~mpensation 
£or their e££orts. That was through the collection o£ £ines 
as the punishment £or criminals. The £ines were divided in 
various ways among the members. Sometimes only certain 
members received the £unds; sometimes the elders received 
more than the younger men, etc. Where taxes were levied, 
these usually went £or community purposes. 
The Drawa grouping o£ peoples, those "racially mixedtt 
seden~aries and nomads living south o£ the Anti-Atlas ·around 
the Dra river, are ene o£ numerous groupings who had a vari-
ant political structure £rom the one outlined above. They 
had a "bicameral" assembly system. Nesrat, one o£ the vil• 
2ages o£ the area, provides an idea o£ the £or.mer Drawa coun-
cil system. 
Nesrat was governed by a "senate" o£ twelve to £i:t:_teen 
members drawn from the wealthy £amilies o£ the community, and 
by an assembly o£ twenty members appointed by the "senate". 
Each body had a presiding officer. Assembly members exer-
cised primarily police £unctions. Senate members adjudicated 
disputes over water and land; and selected and dealt with a 
nprotector"--in this case the Ait•Atta confederation of nomad• 
-ic tribes. The latter association, it has been suggested, 
was the equivalent o£ the le£ system operating in most of 
7 
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Sousi.1 "Senate" members also decided on and conducted war 
-
in consultation with a resident representative 0f their 
"protectors". Further they levied a tax on grain and dates 
t0 pay off the protector tribe. 
Each Drawa village also had an Islmnie judge, qadi, 
who was called in for various cases governed by the (~hraa 
(Arabic, Koranic law), rather than customary law. Seden-
taries were always the prey 0f nomads in need of agricultur-
al products. As noted previously, the nomads controlled the 
trade route areas. The only way that the sedentaries c0uld 
carry on trade and avoid plunder from the nomads was to ac-
cept an alliance of' "protectiontt from them. Not only did 
the nomads "protect" their sedentaries from plunder and at-
tack, but they also attempted to resolve internal dis~utes 
and disputes with ather groups with whom the sedentaries were 
in disagreement. If the situation was n0t resolved between 
the parties, the "protectors" were obligated to stand by 
their protectees,~dte~ed lef members did for each other. 
The Mesgita tribe of the Dra Valley offers another con-
trast. Here were found hereditary qaids, (Arabic, officials 
in this area previ0usly equivalent to independent governors). 
An aspirant to office was selected from among a ruling qaid's 
brothers, sons or nephews. Usually the oldest male living in 
lsee F. De La Chapelle, "Une cite de l'Oud Dra sous le 
Protectorat des Nomades--Nesrat", Hesweris IX, No. l {1925), pp. 29-42. 
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the qaid's house--such residence being a requisite of office--
was selected. If the candidates were of equal age, a family 
council was called to decide which one was the most able. He 
was then nmned khalifat (Arabic, in this case something of a 
vice-govern0r). 
Each section of the village or whatever size unit it was, 
was administered by one or two notables, aRflous, taken from 
among the best families of the city. They were directly re-
, 
sponsible to the qaid. The qaid called the notables together 
when he had some important orders to issue. Other officials 
were two qadi (Arabic, judge}, since the Mesgita followed the 
shraa. 
The qaid fixed a duty in kind and money on his people. 
The liquid and material capital was theoretically redistrib-
uted among each section of the segment in proportion to its 
population and wealth. A percentage was kept aside, however, 
for "administration" and far the tribe's "pr0tectors"--again 
. 
the Ait-Atta. After the Glawa victory, (discussed below), 
the Mesgita came under the qaid of Telwet, representing the 
Glawa authority. 
The Ait-Atta nomads offer a&more contrasting picture. 
They were a confederacy of several tribes. Each tribe elect-
ed a sheik (Arabic, chief) of tribe every year from each 
khoms (as the fraction is known among them). The order was 
set by custom. Each fraction elected its own sheik for a 
period of one year. Each sheik designated some mezrag (Berber, 
officials) who were his liaison agents with the notables, 
anflous, o~ the ~raction. All ~raction an~lous were con-
sidered in sum as notables o~ the tribe. The anflous had 
a djemaa in each ~raction as well as a tribal djemaa. 
Their primary ~unctions were to advise the sheiks and to 
keep watch over them lest they misuse power. 
A sheik o~ the e~n~ederacy was also elected. His 
o~~icial title was sheik o~ the people. He was elected 
~rom the participating tribes in rotation; served ~or one 
year; and functioned much as the sheik of tribe. 11Il est 
-
comme lui oblige de compter avec les principaux notables 
de chaque khoms qui con~tituent en quelque sorte, la 
jma'a kibira (the big council, mine) de la confederation. 111 
~ 
However,, the tribal sheik was the piv~tal official in this 
area. 
There were also sheiks who were elected or appointed as 
officials in charge of relations with the confederation's 
tributaries. Again each served for a period of one year. 
Each of the sheiks, but particularly the sheiks of 
khoms, tribe and confederation, was able to serve fo.r a 
period o~ more than a year if he convinced the djemaa 
involved of his abilities, or if he was able to get 
sufficient support from the populace. In some cases, a 
sheik coald nominate his successor and rule through him. 
A powerful sheik got the men he wanted into other sheikhoods. 
In this way, he was able to consolidate his power; but this 
lspillman, 2£• ~., p. 115. 
structure disintegrated when he died. 
The above, then, represents a few 0f the variations 
from the general pattern described initially. There"were 
many more variations, but it is impossible to list all 
known patterns in a study of this type.1 
The traditional political structuring and segmentation 
of Sousi, as other areas, began to change more rapidly at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. ~' as quasi-
politico"military segments, slowly fell into desuetude over 
the years. Cantonal djemaas were reduced to simple func-
tions; and fortress-agadirs were destroyed. The "break-
down" and/or accomo.dation of these units resulte~ from. 
two main forces: direct encroachment by the Makhzen; and 
the rise of the grands seigneurs. 
In the nineteenth century, the Makhzeni authority was 
extended over the coastal area south of Essaouira (formerly 
Mogador) by conquest. Some time later, authority was 
established over the rest of the coastal area stretching 
inward to the Sous River and the initial reaches of the 
Anti-Atlas. It must be noted, however, that Makhzeni 
authority was not always firmly established in the area. 
Over the newly conquered areas, the ~ultan appointed a 
governor, ~:gaid, for each tribe, or recognized a controllable 
libid., discusses the variety. See also Vincent Monteil, 
11N0tes sur Ifni et les Ai t Ba-Am.ran," Notes et Documents 
de 1 1IHEM, II (1948); "Notes sur les Tekna, Notes et 
Documents de 1 1IHEM, III (1948); Suzanne Nouvel, Nomades 
et Sddentaires-au Maroc (Par~s: E. Larose, 1919; and 
Piquet, .2E.• ill• 
native moqaddem or amgb.ar.· The main functions of the offi-
cials were to keep some semblance of control in their areas 
and to extract as mueh revenue as possible. They took 
their share before it went on to the central government, 
much as their lower officials took their share berore giving 
the ~unds to the various tribal governors. 
Many persons actually tried to win the favor of the 
Sultan to be placed in one or these local positions. The 
revenue collected in the course of a few years was sufficient 
to keep them in fine style for life. The Makhzen depended 
on the greed of these individuals to extract sufricient 
fUnds for governmental needs. But as history indicates, 
they either got too greed or could not collect adequate 
runds.l 
Qadis were also appointed to the various areas to 
insure the governing or Islamic law as opposed to Berber 
customary law. Nonetheless, Berbers were o.ften able to 
escape the central authority and maintain their traditional 
system. 
The second force, which was the rise o~ ambitious 
meR, o~ten aided the e~forts of the Makhzen. Throughout 
history, such men--usually holding the of~ice o~ m&qaddem 
or am@harw-seized power from the canton council by force 
with a personal army, and extended the ~unctions of their 
office. Plunder ~rom cantons served as rewards to the 
mercenary ar.my and th~ supporters o~ the leaders. The 
power of the local dictators, as previously noted, was 
usually ephemeral, and the traditional council system 
was re-established upon the death of these personages. 
The progressive encroachment ef the Makhzen, however, 
created conditions more conducive to theemergence and 
perpetuation of these individuals. A djemaa often elected 
or selected an amgnar to lead them against the Sultan's 
ar.my. If he was successful, he had a greater chance of 
establishing his personal power more effectively. Under 
such circumstances, he had two alternative courses of 
action: (1) he could choose to pose as the defender of the 
independent tribes against the ~ultan 1 s forces; or (2} 
he could join the side of the Makhzen and receive an 
appointment. 
If he chose the first alternative, he had an excellent 
chance of establishing a "kinglet"·• Many of the independent 
Sousi tribes who were able to remain independent from the 
central government were ruled by such amghars. 
If an amghar chose the second alternative, he was 
bound to throw his energies and power into increasing 
the domains of the ~ultan. He was rewarded by the Sultan 
by an appointment of some kind, as indicated above. He also 
had an opportunity to intrigue at the SUltan's court for 
favors and more power. 
Three famous Sousi amgnars chose the second alterna-
tive around the end of the nineteenth and begi~ing of the 
twentieth century. They wem the amghars of the Glawa, 
Gontafa and Mtuga tribal groups. The men gained the favor 
of the ~ultan and extended control over most of the plains 
and moun~ain areas of Sousi. They were the so-called 
grands seigneurs, great feudal lords endowed with extensive 
fiefs by the Sultan. They gained control over the caravan 
routes southward and other market routes. At various 
points, they had toll collectors who forced payment from 
the citizens. Later, they extended their domains further 
into the interior, and fought one another for land and 
power. Suddenly, because of the position and power they 
had mustered, they became almost independent from the 
Makhzen. 
However, at the establishment of the French Protec .... 
·torate, they had not fully gained control over the whole 
Province. France found them to be natural allies. They 
in turn co-operated with the French much as they had 
co-operated with the Makhzen before. The French allowed 
them much freedom, so long as they kept their groups 
under control. The French actually helped to pacify some of 
the Sousi Berbers who had until that point effectively 
resisted the great lords of the south. However, during 
the nationalist struggles and after Moroccan independence• 
the feudal lords, some of whom had slowly been losing 
power and prestige, disappeared from the scene. They and 
their descendants, in some cases, were discredited. 
If the petty amghars had undermined the council system, 
the great lords made them almost ineffectual in some areas. 
Yet some groups escaped continual control and were able to 
maintain their traditional system. In other areas, the 
djemaa met, but was not free to make certain decisions 
previously within its jurisdiction. 
The most powerful commandement, as the French called 
the area under the authority of a grand seigneur, was 
that of the Glawa. The Glawa ruler titled himself the 
Pasha (Turkish, official of high rank) of Marrakesh, the 
great southern Berber capital. Other great lords also 
titled themselves pashal~ Theoretically, the pasha 
represented the authority of the ~ultan and was subject 
to him. H0 wever, as we have seen, the pashas of the south 
developed an autonomy of their own. They lived in and 
ruled frqm their eapital cities. These cities, such as 
Marrakesh, were divided in two: (1) the casbah (Arabic, -
us~ally the Mbslem area of the city, but here used more 
specifically) where the pasha, his family, his servants and 
part of his army lived; and (2) the medina (Arabic, literally 
meaning the city) where the Moslem populace lived as did 
their local administrators representing the pasha. A third 
section, the mellah (Arabic, area the the city where Jews 
resided} existed in cities where there were significant 
numbers of Jews to compose it. 
The pasha appointed a number of aides giving them the 
title of khalifet or qaids to rule over the rural holdings. 
They were also given ar.my support to enforce the pasha's 
authority. They too were supposed to operate on behalf of 
the Sultan, but they did not in Sousi. The pashats rule 
was supreme there. He jailed, fined, whipped and executed 
at will. He imposed taxes and had them collected, theoreti• 
cally, for the Sultan. But if the Sultan got any of the 
fUnds, it was only a token payment and nominal recognition 
of his authority. 
The administration of the capital cities and some 
minor ones was different from the administration of the 
rural areas.1 The medina of the pasha's resident city was 
divided into quarters. The medina as a whole, on occasion, 
had a minor pasha (a kind of mayor in this case) who was 
responsible to the commandement pasha. Eaeh quarter had 
a moqaddem acting as a quasi-police chief. He was in 
charge of the guards of his medina quarter, opening and 
closing of his quarter's gates, pointing out criminals to 
the pasha, and keeping law and order in general. He was 
appointed by the supreme pasha. He usually had a female 
aide in charge of policing women. 
Another important official was the mothasseb (Arabic), 
theoretically appointed by the ~ultan, but in Sousi existed 
by the grace 0f, and was associated with the pasha. The 
lpaul Decroux, La Vie Municipale au Maroc (Lyon: 
Bose Freres, 1931), has a very good discussion of 
this subject. 
mothasseb was a kind o:r ttsecretary o:r state," aiding the 
pasha and making sure everything went-well in the quarters. 
An times, he was the liaison officer between the pasha 
and the khalifet and qaids in rural areas. However, the 
pasha also had direct contacts with his rural administrators 
when he called them to special meetings. The mothasseb 
was also responsible for the formalization of Islam on 
behalf of the Sultan, but he neglected this duty often. 
The mothasseb appointed an important official, the 
~ (Arabic). He was in charge of the artisan associa-
tions in the city. His main functions consisted in over-
searing the quality of.the work and acting as arbiter in 
member disputes. However, the members could appeal their 
cases to the mothasseb or even to the pasha. 
While the pasha acted as a judge in certain cases--
usually those threatening his administration and power--, 
a qadi was present in the city to try all other cases. 
He was often consulted in cases handled by the pasha. Often, 
there was more than one qadi. The s~aa was followed and 
was spread into the rural areas where possible. Each 
Yhalifat usually had a qadi as part o:r his court. 
By contrast, in the more northern areas directly under 
the control of the ~ultan, military chiefs were appointed 
as pashas over cities, and relatives of the ~ultan were 
also given some areas to rule. The latter category were 
given the title o:r khalifet of the Sultan. 
Under the French, A French chief of mhnicipal services 
was installed at the side of the pasha to run the city and 
outlying suburbs within it's jurisdiction. A deliberative 
body, the mmn~cipal council, with a mixed membership ad-
vised the pasha and French chief on municipal matters • 
• 
In the rural areas, the pasha's authority was consoli-
dated by the French, bu~ each of his higher officials in these 
areas had a French civil servant counterpart. Howevert 
much of the Berber tradttional structure remained. The 
pasha's officials did not disturb the Berbers SID long as 
they paid their taxes. And it was, after all, French 
policy to maintain the traditional way of life of the 
Berbers. Therefore, Berber particularism and institutions 
were reinforced in many ways during the Protectorate period.1 
In summary, the period of. the great lords was marked by 
inter-commandement warfare and French pacification. Ca~tonal 
skirmishes which led to ~ warfare still continued to take 
place. The 8breakd0wn" and/or accomodation of the previous 
traditional structuring of Sousi was, and still i&, very 
uneven. Though the framework was changing under the 
pashas and French, features of the changing situation were 
utilized to perform some of the same functions as their 
lFor a discussion of the continuation of Berber 
institutions, see Ribaut,~. ~.;and Frederick 
Bremard, L10rganisation R~ionale du Maroc (Paris: 
published for the IHEM, 1 9). 
1 traditional predecessors. Lewis well describes the re-
sults or this period: 
•• • For rural Morocco is hal£-traditional and half-
transitional. Internal consensus is restrained by 
cleavages between tribes, divergent ways o£ life, 
linguistic £actors, isolation from communications 
media, varying educational levels, and highly dif-
ferentiated stages of national consciousness. The 
impact of modern European institutions and values 
has varied £rom region to region, from tribe to tribe, 
even £rom family to £amily, in intensity and con-
sequence.2 
lspillman, 2£• ~., pp. 11~-111, notes that am0ng the 
Ait-Sedrat, a sedentary tribe of the Dra valley which 
was divided in two lef, was ruled as one unit by a 
Glawa qaid. Though the lef structure was no longer 
":-e-xistent," when a quarrel broke out in the area, the 
populace £or.med into two groups. Farthermore, and 
getting ahead of the material here, Ernest Gellner 
in his article, "Independence in the Central High 
Atlas," Middle East Journal, II, No. 3 (1957), P• 245, in discussing party partieipation in independent 
Morocco notes: "Those who resented the pot-rer 
accruing to the ambitious figure who controls the 
local party set-up joined--not a rival party, but a 
rival section of the same party, based on a different 
market town." He further says in attaching this 
action to the tradi ti0nal lef system:. "This illustrates 
the best known thesis abou~erber society--a thesis 
developed about the anarchy before pacification--
that order in these regions was maintained by an 
over-all tribal split into two fairly equal moieties--
which have now reappeared occasionally in some local 
political parties. 11 The reader can also see that 
Gellner is one of the authors who favors the interpre-
tation of the ~ as a balancing and stabilizing unit. 
Ribaut, ~· £!!., p. 64 points out how distasteful it 
was for Berbers of one lef to be forced allies or 
united with an enemy~· They would, according to 
Ribaut, rather be allied with the nGhristian Dogs"• 
Such emotions, i£ true, are not easily dissolved._ 
2william Lewis, nRural Administration in Morocco," 
Middle East Journal (Winter, 1960), P• 46. 
It is particularly important to understand this point 
and to realize the difficulty of generalizing about the 
npr0gress 11 of Sousi and Morocco as a whole with regar~ to 
, 
social integration. It is essential to recognize and 
examine th~ variables presented by Lewis as well as others 
to understand the situation. This is dene in later chapters. 
BERBER JURISPRUDENCE.1 
Among most Berbers~ the Koran was viewed as governing 
religious duties~ but not representing a civil code. Even 
after the spread of Isl~~ the Berbers continued to observe 
their own customary law and its ninstituti0ns 11 of applica-
tion. However, to the degree that the Makhzen made inroads, 
and to the degree of Arabization, one found a tremendous 
range from no recognition of Islamic law, to the acceptance 
of a gadi's judicial position. There was a variety of 
shades within this range. Again the pattern of variability~ 
consistent with the general structuring 0f Berber "society", 
was the standard f0r this area. 
1This section draws heavily on Ribaut~ 2£• cit.~ esp. 
pp~ 88-108; M. ~lliot~ Recueil de JurisprUdence 
Cherifienne (4 Vols.; Paris:: Reeueil Sirey, 1920-1952); 
Ben Daoud, loc. cit.; Montagne, 11Massat" and "Aghbarn; 
Robert M0ntagne and M. Ben Daoud~ "Documen.ts pour _ 
Servir a l'Etude du Droit Goutumier du Sud-Mare>cain," 
Hesperia, VII, No. 4-(1927), PP• 401-445; Robert _ 
Aspinion, Contribution 1 l'Etude du Droit Coutumier 
Berbere Marocain (Casabla~ea: Edit~ons Moynier, 1937); 
nun Llouh du Sous Reglement u0utumier du S0uq . -e-1--=Je-ma~a des Ida ou Gridif,tt Hesperis1 ~I, Nos. 3-4 (1954}, PP• 395-4~0; and Berque, £E• ~·~ PP• 237-397. 
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Berber customary law was known by many nrumes: kanoun 
(primarily in Algeria), azre£, isre£, abrid, or£, ~ and 
l0uh. With the exception o£ the first and last, all o£ 
these words are o£ Berber origin. Kanoun was originally 
Greek and was adopted into the Arabic language. ~ is 
Arabic, literally meaning a blackboard, and perhaps here 
indicating a written body o£ law {in Arabic script). The 
w0rd ~' however, was usually recognized as representing 
the general body of Berber law. Among the Shleuh-speaking 
Berbers o£ Sousi, 2£! designated penal law, and louh 
represented civil law. But there was no clear distinction 
between the two terms. Thus ~~ for exrump~, often 
included some mixture o£ penal and civil law. At any rate, 
shraa influence was felt more in the ~ than in the 2£!• 
There was another distinction made in this area, that 
of ~ and or£. Aada designated, gene~ally, the customary 
legal behavioral expectations established between two tribes, 
i.e. where they existed as separate units, and/or betwe·en 
confederations. Orf, then, represented the legal expectations 
o£ members within the segment in question. 
There was less variability than one would expect in the 
body of Berber customary iaw itself. There was a difference 
in the phrasing of some laws, and a difference, among some 
groups, of actual items covered by law. These varied in 
accordance with the needs of particular groups. But, generally, 
there was a great deal of agreement. Ribaut concludes: 
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/ ' t On a dit et repete qu'il y avait autant de eoutumes 
q~e de tribus differentes. Nous n'en sommes pas tres 
sur. Nous croyons au contraire ~e sous une apparence 
de fausse diversit~, due souvent a une ter.minologie 
differente eta des details de peu d'~mportanee, il 
' ; I existe de grande,regles general~s qui ~'appliquent 
indistinctement a tous ~es Berberes, regles immuables 
et que nous retrouvons partout.l 
It must be remembered, however, that each Berber group 
developed its own laws. Yet, as in so many aspects of 
Berber "society;• laws tended to have general similarity to 
each other without embracing the whole population through 
a central system. 
Berber judicial organization was quite rudimentary 
from a western point of view. It had neither magistrates nor 
regular formation CJ>f ttcourts" and penal institutions. Such 
institutions had their introduction in Sousi with the rise 
of the pashas, and later a more formal system was organized 
, by the French. 
Civil Justice. The djemaa, as previously noted, had 
few judicial powers. Its judiciary role was not the same 
in each area, nor even fixed within a particular group. 
Its primary legal function was to attempt a eoneiliati®n. 
The Q.jeiDEa', as a whole, or some of its members, often per-· 
formed this fUnction in a dispute between segment members. 
It was not formalized and/or expected at the outbreak of 
·a dispute. Rather, it occurred only when the disputants 
asked djemaa members to act as such, or when the djemaa 
felt the dispute was disrupting the conmrunity, or when it 
1Ribaut, 2£• ~., P• 105. 
had become "customary" for the djemaa to act as suoho 
-If the djemaa succeeded in its attempts at conciliati0n, 
the case was closed, and an accord, ameslat (Berber), was 
recognized. If it failed, however, the parties selected an 
arbiter, anahkrun (Arabic), of their own choice who judged 
the case. T-here was always much difficulty in getting an 
arbiter who was agreeable to both parties. He had to have 
a reputation of objectivity and wisdom--though both parties 
attempted to choose someone favorable to themselves. The 
anahkrun could refuse to judge a case, either on personal 
grounds or because he was n0t sufficiently familiar with 
the case. If the parties did not accept the decision of 
the anahkam, the djemaa was,then, able to appoint an 
arbiter. The parties did not have to agree te the person 
chosen. In this event, nothing remained but to feud. 
Some of the local feuds were carried on for years. However, 
in times of war and/or ~ conflicts, local feuds were 
v0luntariy suppressed in the face of the common enemy. 
Often, when an arbiter was selected, each party chose 
a "second", amassai (Berber). The one chosen had to be 
~ 
agreeable to the second party. In some instances, each 
party could choose his opponent's "second". If one of the 
disputants was unable to find an amassai either in his 
djemaa or in a neighboring djemaa, his case was said to 
be unsupportable, and he was condemned. The nsecond" was 
. - -
supposed to guarantee the execution of the judgment of 
the arbiter if it went against his client. However, in 
order to protect himself from loss, he usually held an 
animal or rifle of his client as collateral agai~st such 
idemnity. 
The procedure of the "trial" was simple. On the agreed 
day, the parties presented themselves with their "second" 
and their witnesses to the arbiter. If one of the parties 
did not show up, he was guilty by default, takitut ~ 
(Berber). The arbiter was supposed to judge the case 
according to customary law. He could listen to the opinions 
of others who often played the role of arbiter, but he was, 
theoretically, solely responsible for the final judgment. 
Tf the parties had declared ahead of time that the 
judgment of' the arbiter was to be final, then they were 
obligated to respect his decision. However, if they left 
it open, they had the right of appeal to two more arbiters. 
The decision then became, theoretically, irrevocable. If a 
party got a favorable judgment from the first arbiter, and 
was condemned by the second, the third judgment was definite. 
There were other combinations. No matter how or in what 
order one was condemned or absolved, there was often a 
residue of discontent giving rise to more feuds. If the 
three judgments went against a person, he usually complied 
without a protest, though he probably would bear a grudge, 
and later, feud as well. However, feuds did not always 
ensue. 
When there was a dispute between members of different 
segments, i.e. not under the same djemaa, the djemaa inter-
vened. However, even in this case, it did not play a 
major role. Rather, it, in conjunction with the djemaa of 
the other segment appointed an arbiter to settle the case. 
Again, acc0rding to whatever previous agreement was reached 
between the parties and/or the two·djemaa, the decision could 
be reviewed. 
If the segment disputants were als0 of different lef, 
1ef members came from far to attempt to settle the matter 
before it got out. of hand. They demonstrated their unity 
and willingness to fight for their lef member involved in 
the case. Thus, if the dispute was not settled, which was 
often the case, a large scale lef battle ~a~~~ed. 
Penal Justice. Penal justice was focussed on the 
application and collection of fines for various crimes. 
These fines were usually listed, i.e. written, with the 
crimes to which they pertained. The fines were of twa 
types: the ones inflicted by the amghar in times of war 
for not carrying out his orders; and fines inflicted by 
the djemaa for violation of customary law. As previously 
noted, fines were divided between the djemaa members or 
those specific individuals involved in a case. The arbiter, 
i.e. the anahkam, rarely if ever received~~af the fines. 
Punishment, then, was equated with the payment of a 
fine. Jails and the death penalty were unknown until the 
arr~val of the great pashas. Writers have attributed this 
lack of criminal punishment as we know it in our society as 
being due to the Berber sense of independence and indivi-
duality.1 There were, however, many other reasons for this. 
There were other for.ms of punishment which were used 
by various Berber groups. Some were confiscation of property~ 
destruction of the criminal's house by fire, slaughter of 
some of his livestock, retributions to the injured party, 
and others. Among the Massat, for exrunple, provision and 
preparation of a meal for the anflous (here used for djemaa) 
were usually required along with a fine. 2 
Focus·& Source of Customary Law. The body of Berber 
customary law did net represent a fixed set of laws such as 
the shraa did. Rather, new ones were created and old ones 
removed in accordance with need. However, there was usually 
a number of basic laws, the wording of.which would change 
from time to time, but covered aspects of life of concern to 
the Berbers. These clustered around irrigation rights, 
market conduct, market routes, theft, murder, public discord, 
defamation of character, and others--some of which are sub-
headings of those listed. Among some groups a differen-
tiation was made between premeditated murder and spontaneous 
murder.3 On the whole, Berber customary law appears quite 
. 1~, P• 107. 
2Ben Daoud, loc. ~· 
3Montagne and Ben Daoud, ££• cit., P• 405. 
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sophisticated. 
-Among most Berbers, areas were carefully marked with 
regard to cases coming within the jurisdiction of law and 
those cases subject to personal jurisdiction. However, 
a legal punishment could also be listed for aerime which 
was subject to the rules of the vendetta. For example, 
a lineage head could seek revenge against a young man who 
had compromised his daughter. The young man could also be 
subject to a fine and other legal punishments. 
Most of the records of Berber customary law have been 
found in mosques. As far as can be understood from these, 
the laws were made up by men of influence in the area. 
Sometimes the djemaa or some of its members, such as the 
anfleus, had their signatures affixed to a particular 
document. and sometimes it was the amghar, qaid! or whatever 
official or group of officials was well recognized by the 
community. New laws were added when necessary. 
The civil and penal codes were generallywell known 
by the members of the community. Nonetheless, the laws 
I 
were flagrantly violated, feuds caused and numerous 
conflicts developed.1 It would appear that the flexibility 
and demands of the various sectors of Berber "society" 
encouraged, or at least, permitted this. For example, 
raids by one group upon another were legitimate in the eyes 
of the Berbers. It often went under the guise of a jihad 
for refor.mation purposes where Islam was well entrenched. 
Or it was simply a continuation of Berber means of providing 
lRibaut, 12£• ~· 
needed goods. Among some Berbers, a male was not considered 
a man until he had killed another outside of his particular 
group. 
In concluding the discussion of Berber jurisprudence, 
the following points are important: (1) that the body and 
administration of Berber law reflected well the major. aspects 
and fears of Be.rber nsociety 11 ; (2) . that the high rate of vio-
lation of the laws, particularly between members of differ-
ent segments was consistent with Berber "ethos"; and (3) that 
in spite of signi~icant shraa influence in the area, partic-
ularly after the rise of the great lords, Berber jurispru-
dence still had a characteristic particularism.1 
When the French established their Protectorate, they 
attempted to administer the Berbers, as previously noted, 
through a retention of local institutions or through broad-
ening them. With regard to jurisprudence, they encouraged 
the development of local judicial djemaa. These had French 
recorders attached to them. They tried cases according to 
the orf, where the latter was not offensive to French sensi-
lMontagne and Ben Daoud, 2£• cit., P• 401, summarize seme 
of these points: "Ici (meaning .Sousi, mine), les in-
fluences arabes sont nombreases, 1 1 emprise de l 1 Islam 
est complete, l'organisation sociale a etebrisee 
maintes fois par le mazhzen ou les grands chefs. Il en 
resulte que le ~roit coutumier, d'une exceptionelle 
vi tali te cependant, se trouve al teref et r:m;®. tile. Il 
reste, malgre ces circonstances deffaYorables, l'un des 1 , ""' ; plus riches de l'Afrique du Nord et merite d'etre etudie 
eomme l'une des manifestations les plus parfaites de 1' 
grganisation politique et sociale des Berberes seden- -
taires.u 
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tivities. Such specialized djemaas had never existed ~or.mer­
~W• They were not very success~ul. Still the French claimed 
that Berbers pre~erred them to being ~ut under a qadi.1 
RELIGIOUS STRUCTURE 
While the ~ollowing discussion ~ocuses on Berber religious 
structure and its ~unctioning. It also. includes those ancil-
lary accompaniments o~ any religious narration: magic, sor-
cery, and mysticism. I~ these are not always clearly separat-
ed, it is because it is unnecessary ~or this study, and be-
cause the data are not equally important or relevant to war-
rant detailed coverage. 
While the ~ollowing description is o~ a general nature, 
i.e. covering Barbary, it is also pertinent and accurate ~or 
Sousi. 2 
Because o~ the nature o~ religious development among the 
Berbers, a historical approach best illuminates its many ~ac­
ets. Be~ore embarking on this, however, a ~ew pre~atory re-
lRibaut, £E.• cit., P• 122 says e.g~, "Les Berberes ont 
toujours montre un attachement inebranlable aux. pres-
criptions de leur droit coutumier en la matiere. Leur 
plus grande crainte a toujours ete de nous voir implan-
ter chez eux la Chraa, et aussi, il ~aut bien le dire, 
les cadis qui, a travers le monde musulman, n'ont pas 
toujours une reputation de parraite integrite." 
2Most o~ the sources utilized for this section are o~ 
this general nature. For the most part, only illus-
trative material ~ocuses on particular groups and areas. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive source on this subject 
is Edmond Doutte's great study, Magie et Religion dans 
l'A~rique du Nord, (Algiers: typographie Adolphe 
.Jourdan, 1909}. 
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marks must be made to dispell some common fallacies regard-
ing Berber religion. 
The Berbers are Moslems for the most part. It has often 
been said of them, however, that they practiced a particular-
istic brand of Islam and retained many of their pre-Islamic 
animistic and animatistic religious beliefs and practices. 
This statement is quite true but in itself, misleading. 
In the same way that all Catholics are subject to the 
laws of their Church, all Moslems are subject to the laws 
of Islam. However, it is well known that Catholics, for 
example, in Canada are not the same as Catholics in Cuba~ 
yet Catholicism is not a family of formal types. The srum~ 
is true of Islam. The body of religious doctrine and duties 
within each faith is sacred and binding on all people en-
compassed in the ambit of that faith. However, each group 
adopting a particular religious ideology may tend, quite 
obviously, to accent or absorb some aspects of it more than 
others, in accordance with their way of life and degree of 
internalization of the faith. In this sense, Islam in the 
Maghreb was very particularistic. 
It is also true that religion may help to shape or re-
shape a way of life which itself may be changing. 1 Islam, 
often noted for its integrative powers, served as the social 
lsee M.E. Michaux-Bellaire, 11L1Islam Marocain," Archives 
Marocaines, Conflrences, XXVII (1927), PP• 114-115, for 
an interesting discussion of.this point. Alfred Bel, 
La Religion Musulmane en Berberie, (Paris: Libraire 
Orientaliste Geuthner, 1938), I~ pp. 7-8 reaffirms the 
above analysis. 
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linch-pin in Barbary at times. Nonetheless, the fractional-
izing tendency of Berber ttsociety 11 found its religious suste-
nance in the Islamic sufist movement initiated in the Near 
East, and culminated in its apex in the last few centuries in 
North Africa. 
Many of the pre-Islamic beliefs and practices of the 
Berbers which they continued to recognize after the entrench-
ment of Islam, have often been considered summarily with so-
called Arab pre-Islamic legacies.1 In other words, some of 
the remnant paganism operative in Berber areas even today were 
not exclusively Berber. Rather, these survivals were general 
throughout the Maghreb, the Near East and ~outher.n Europe. 2 
lEdward Westermarck, Survivances Paiennes dans la Civili-
sation Mahometane, (Paris: Payot, 1935), does this al-
though he also includes a chapter devoted especially to 
Berber and Roman survivals, particularly in Morocco where 
he did most of his field research. See also, Frangoise 
Legey, The Folklore of Morocco; (London: Unwin, 1935). 
Alfred Bel, Coup d'Oeil sur 1 1Islam en Berberie, (Extrait 
de la Revue des Religions, Jan-Fe~. 1917; Paris: E. 
Leroux, 1917), p. 56 further notes: non sait que s'il 
n'est pas questio~ des saints dans l'I~~am original, il 
nten est pas de memb des djinns, ces-demons inferi~u~s 
qui peuplent le monde, qui donnent la maladie en pene-
trant dans le corps des humains par example. Ces de-
mons qui existent pour tous les primitifs, existaient 
egalement pour les anciens Arabes du temps de Mohammed; 
il n'a pas cru devoir abolir cette croyance et l'a 
admise dans l'Islam. Et nos Berberes n 1ont eu aucune 
peine ~ garder leur ancienne conception-du monde des 
genies, de ces chamerikh, comme les nomme el-Bekri, et 
de tant d'autres demons berberes, tout en devenant 
musulmans. Ils ont employe leurs sorciers a se les 
conciliar aussi bien que les marabouts musulmans, bien 
souvent, peut-~re, heritiers des privileges de leurs 
predecesseurs les sorciers." 
2see, for example, Henri Basset, "Influence Punique ehez 
les. Berberes", Revue Africaine (1921), PP• 340-374. See 
also Westermarck, Survivances, PP• 178-213. 
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Belief in the evil eye, the drastic effects of the 
spoken curse, and in evil spirits, djoun (pl. Arabic, used 
singularly in Morocco; singular, male is djinni; and singular, 
female is djinniya) are a few pagan survivals.1 H~wever, prac-
tices to check the ill effects of the evil agents as well as 
to exorcize the djoun varied between European, Arab and Berber 
groups. 
The Berber djoun seemed to have had a structure similar 
to the social structure of the Berbers themselves. They were 
represented by tribes antagonistic to each other, as were the 
Berbers in actual life. The Berbers fashioned the djoun, or 
were fashioned in part by them, in relation to their own anti-
pathies toward each other, and to account for the difficulties 
of their life.2 The characteristics of the djoun took various 
for.ms~fua different areas. This was consistent with the pat~ 
tern of variability with regard to other\aspects of Berber 
The Berbers also believed in good forces who, if entreat-
ed, could aid the individual in achieving his goals. 
·rn Barbary, the belief in good and bad spirits took on 
an animistic for.m. Such spirits were thought to inhabit trees, 
lThe author being of Near Eastern descent has heard many 
tales of the effectiveness of the evil eye, curse and 
the djoun. Even today, mnong Arabs, Berbers and others, 
ruthless people are referred to as djoun. See Bel, Coup 
d 10eil, passim, for confirmation of this point. 
2Edward Westermarck, Ritual and Belief in Morocco (London: 
MacMillan & Co.; 1926), I, PP• 262-413. 
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wind, stones, humans, animals, etc., though not necessarily 
on a permanent basis. Belief in the evil djoun and develop-
ment of formulae to check them were pronounced. The oppres-
sive nature of Berber life accounts, in part, for this. Many 
of the so-called Berber beliefs and magical formulae against 
'evil spirits focused o.n the vagaries of agriculture and its 
necessary attendants,l relations of people to people, and 
people to the supernatural forces. Good spirits were thought 
I' 
to distribute "••• a leur gre un fluide capable de faire 
reussir tout ce 'que de'sire leur bon serviteur.n2 Bel relates 
this "fluide" to the later Moslem baraka.3 More will be said 
on this subject below. 
Brief attention will be given to the evolution of reli~ 
gion in Barbary so as to comprehend its pre-modern structure. 
As noted, pre-Islamic religion in the Maghreb was character-
ized by magico-religious rites. Animals were used in the 
rites to a great extent, particularly with regard to rain.4 
Some students of Berber religion thought that the Berbers 
at some time in the era of their unwritten history believed in 
and practiced a cult of saints. There was, perhaps, some eon-
lsee for ex~ple, Edward Wester.marck, Ceremonies and 
Beliefs Connected with A riculture in Morocco 
e singfor: 191 of these appear in the appen4 
dices. 
2Bel, La Religion, P• 76. 
3rbid. 
4wester.marck, Ritual and Belief, II, PP• 283-369, relates 
in detail the many rites and customs regarding animals. 
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fusion of saints with the vague spirits in Berber religion. 
Such students have further stated that the development of 
marabouts in Barbary which flourished from the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries on, was simply an extension and rejuvena-
tion of the alleged cult. The late Edmond Doutte, one of the 
foremost authorities on Berber religion, disagreed with this 
.. 
interpretation. He says: "On n 1 a pas, a n0tre connaissance, 
/ 
trou~e dans l'Afrique du Nord un exemple eoncret d 1un eulte 
" .. musulman local installe a la place d'un culte ancien et 
perpe'tuant les rites de eelui-ci. nl On the other hand, there 
seems to.have been some degree of wors~ip o~ certain person• 
ages. However, it is-not really known whether the Berbers in 
the pre-Phoenician times, worShipped their ancestors, gods of 
natUre, 0r variously endowed people. 2 The latter two categor• 
ies appeared, however, after the spread of Punic and Roman in-
fluence in the area. But it is not necessary to equate be-
lief.s:in early nsaints" with the subsequent success oi' the 
ma.rabouts. The social explanation oi'fered by Bel seens more 
substantiated than the above interpretations. He says: 
I I' ..._ ;' ' _, Eni'in la variate meme des regions de la Berberie, 
leur isolement les unes des autres, creant le 
particularisme tribal eurent aussi pour conse~ 
quence un certain particularisme religieux se 
caracterisant par la croyance en des puissances 
tribales GU locales OU bien regionales, sortes 
lEdmond Doutte, L'Islmm Maghribin, (Paris: E. Leroux, 
1900), P• 15. -
2see Doutte, Magic, pp. 28-32, i'or a discussion of this. 
, ;' 
de divinites speciales dont les saints et santons 
musulmans actuels sont plus ou moins les succes-
seurs.l 
There seems to have been, however, one god, Ammon the 
ram-god, for which there is evidence that the Berbers paid 
some respect in early periods. This god, according to 
Basset, represented "••• la force des troupeaux berb~res."2 
-
Later, under Punic and Roman influence, he became more 
crystallized and represented more forces. Basset generalizes 
well the pre-Islrunic religious state of the Berbers when he 
i' , 
notes:: "••• le rite magique, dans ce pays, a toujours ete 
l'essentiel de la religion; ce n'est point un terrain 
.favorable ~ la naissance de divi~ites.n3 
In the period preceding Islam, the Maghreb came under 
the influence of both Ghristianity and Judaism. There 
were numerous converts to both faiths. However, the in-
digenous paganism continued much as i~ does today with 
Islam, side by side with these more universal religions. 
When Islam entered in the seventh century, it became the 
Predominant faith o.f the Maghreb. Islam was brout in by 
Arabs not too dissimilar in their way of li.fe from that 
o.f the Berbers. Many of the Berbers were captivated by the 
profitable jihad. Others bec~e members .for more practical 
lBel, La Religion, P• 72. 
2 Basset, ~· £!!•• pp. 367-368. 
3!lli, P• 366. 
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reasens, e.g. to avoid paying taxes and being mistreated. 
Thereafter, Islam was used for various conquering enter-
prises as a means to unite the faithful and to goad them 
e>n to conquer the "unfaithfuln. However, with the fall of 
the various empires which had united Berbers; the Berbers 
returned to their segmented groupings. They retained Islam 
as their nominal religion, however, though it no lenger 
served as a basis for unity. The pe>pular acceptance and 
entrenchment of Islam gmong the Berbers did not occur until 
the development of the sufist movement. 
Orthodox Islam had preached of an all-powerful God, 
Allah (Arabic), who seemed far off from the reaches of the 
individual. The only intermediary which existed between 
the faithful and Himself was Mohammed, the only prophet of 
Allah; and even he operated through an intermediary. Upon 
the death of the ~rophet, there was no linkage with Allah 
. 
by which one could seek to "negotiate#rthe fate of his 
soul. 
No sooner had Mohrummed died then the Near East wit8 
nessed the growth of Islamic asceticism. Since Mehammed 
had indicated that the after-life was me>re important than 
earthly life, and since a number of pious and learned 
men had become disgusted with the degBaded and luxurious 
life afforded by the jihad, religious meditation grew in 
popularity ~ong them. These men believed that their fate 
was in the hands of God, and as such, they extended no 
personal effort for their well-being in their earthly life. 
They were the Islamic savants whose days were spent in 
religious recitation~ performance of the Islamic duties~ and 
constant study of the Koran and the Hadith~ i.e. writings 
of the Prophet. They further advanced studies on the 
nature of the world and God. 
These first Islamic ascetics crone to be known as suf~s 
or sufis. Their gar~ents were made of~ (Arabic~ wool), 
and ~may have been derived from their clothing. The 
word may also have had root in the Greek word sophos. 
There were other interpretations of the origin.l 
Here, then, in the seventh and eigDh centuries was the 
beginning of the sufist movement, yet in its intellectual~ 
ascetic stage~ but already in the process of being vul-
garized into a popular mystical movement. The development 
of sufist mysticism in the Orient received its impetus from 
various sources among which were the Hebraic-Christian 
heritage and the mysticism of India. 
Mysticism was a means of bringing one's self closer to 
the far-off God, and even to uniting one • s self with God. 
~ 
For such belief. in the union with God~ Al-Hallag, an Arab 
~. as well as others, was executed as a heretic in 
Baghdad in 858. From approximately this point on, sufism 
moved from the ascetic practices of personal deprivation 
to please Allah and thus secure the eternal happiness of 
lBel~ La Religion, P• 338. 
the after-life, to acts o~ personal humiliation in o~aer 
to transport the soul into that of the Divine. In this 
way, the individual was able to intoxicate himself with 
the love of God which, in turn, enabled him to obtain the 
divine graces to render him capable of extra-human actions. 
This was the essence of mysticism. It offered a means 
also of bringing Allah closer to the populace through 
these endowed individuals. It further allowed humans a 
means of coping with the supernatural and wor~a~~ events 
under Allah's control. These mystic sufis, later known as 
marabouts, with the ability to perfor.m extra-human fetes, 
miracles if one likes, were said to possess barakao 
I~ the~period fallowing the beginning of Islamic 
mystical sufism, a continuous verbal battle between its ad-
herents and the Islrunic purists ensued. In the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, however, an accord was reached between 
the two schools of thought. It must be noted again that 
members of both scheols were the learned men of the Orient. 
Two men in particular were responsible for the rapprochement. 
The first, Al-Qosairi, wrote, in the eleventh century, an 
abridgment of the principal sufist doctrines placed within 
the realm of Islemic law. The secomd, and more influential 
man was a person by the name of Al•Gazali. He was one of the 
great alruns (Arabic, Moslem teacher) at the University of 
Baghdad in the twelfth century. The last ten years of his 
life, however, were spent in Damascus and Jerusalem pur-
suing the life of a mystic. During this period, he wrote a 
book titled Revival of the Religious Sciences. In it he 
attacked both the Islamic purists and the extremist sufis. 
He considered the purists as too clinical. The sufis, he 
felt, had all0wed their movement to stray down the road 
of pantheism, inadmissable to· Islam. He wanted, rather, 
a return to the form of Islamic meditations, rules and 
mood characterized by the early followers of Mohammed. 
These had t0 serve as the fundamental cadre to a sufism 
he felt should be based primarily on the love of G0d and 
moral purity. At first, the purists resisted enveloping 
their teachings in official Islam, but gradually these 
teachings achieved recegnition. 
Mais les doctrines sufies, ainsi introduites 
dans le cadre de l'Tslam official - orthodoxe ou 
schismatique - de l 10rient, devaient aussit6t 
tr0uver des adeptes-dans le vaste monde de 1 1Islam ~ A 
et s•y developper. Nulle part, peut-etre, elles 
ne rencontrerent terrain plus favorabl~ que dans 
l'Occident musulman et surtout en Berberie. 
Ainsi cet Islam mystique qui, des le XIIe 
siecle de notre ere, allait, comme en Orient, prendre 
place dans les disciplines de l'enseignement~religieux 
~ / , ' 
en Berberie, n'etait pas specifiquement berbere, 
ni meme proprement musulman. Malgre l'ostraeisme 
gouvernemental qui frappe les oeuvres d 1Al-Gazali, 
en Espagne et en Afrique~du ~ord, leAsufisme prend 
racine dans ces regions a l'epoque meme de la 
dynastie almoravide. Il trouve ses plus grands 
~ <::\ ; ,. ,- • 
representants, ses maitres - veneres encore auJourd'hui 
• au XIIe siecle, sous le regne des Almohades, 
/ 
et malgre l'opposition du pouvoir central qui ne 
pouvait guere admettre que d'autres hommes que le 
Mahdi Tbn Tumart, fussent touches par la Grace 
divine.l 
Sufism was introduced in Moorish Spain in the tenth 
century by one Ibn Masarra. From there it began to seep 
into the Riff area of Morocco and drift southward and 
eastward. At the same time, it was beginning to make its 
way from the East to the West via the land route. Al-Gazali's 
writings, however, gave the greatest impetus to Spanish and 
Moroccan sufism. They gave style, organization and Islamic 
sanction to a previously vague ana somewhat furtive move-
ment. 
Sufi sm. in the Maghreb as in the Near East was ini-
tially centered in the persons of Moslem alams in the 
great educational and religious centers. During the first 
few centuries of its introduction in this area, it pro-
vided a basis for intellectual achievements. The educational 
institutions, particularly the Kairouan University at 
Fez, became fmnous and extremely respected in Eurcpe. 1 
Sufists also took their places in ribats, much as early reli-
gous reformers had embarked on their careers from these re-
treats. Here they built up s.c.hoolsl!'of thought. They became 
known as murabatin, from which their later designation as 
marabouts is corrupted. ~ Sufi and marab0ut, then, are used 
synonymously. 2 
lAlfred Bel,,"Le Suf'isme en Occident Musulman au XIIe et 
au XIIIe siecles", Annales de la Faculte des Lettres 
D1Alger (1935). ~ 
2Honorific forms of addressing sufis, both male and 
female, are listed in the appendices. 
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Later, in Morocco as elsewhere, as the various students 
o~ su~ists began to disseminate the teachings o~ their alams, 
the mystical doctrines now tinged with increasing ~atalism 
becrune popularized. They began to open up zawiyas (Arabic, 
lodges or houses), in rural areas where the average person 
could receive religious instruction. This spread o~ su~ist 
ideas had two major results: (1) it drained the intellectual 
base o~ s~ism by removing it ~rom the educational centers, 
and by the need to simpli~y mystical doctrines for consumption 
by the average man; and (2) it served to reislamize the Berbers.l 
Gompetmng schools o~ s~ist thought developed, and ad-
herents were sought everywhere. Marabouts with their attri-
bute o~ baraka became greatly venerated. From this developed 
a cult of saints. Marabouts living and dead were held in 
great esteem and respect ~or the most part. Their clothing, 
tombs, and anything they touched were considered to contain 
their baraka. In like manner, however, those who tried to 
rid themselves o~ evil befallen them because of the djoun, 
evil eye, 0r curse, could get rid of it by passing it into 
the various objects and articles touched with sufist baraka. 
Thus, among some groups, a fear developed that baraka-endowed 
articles and objects also had a residue o~ evil with which it 
was necessary to reckon. 2 
lBel, La Religion, PP• 361-376. 
2Bel, Coup d'Oeil, PP• 51-$5. 
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In the sixteenth century when the three ruling dynas-
ties o~ Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia ~ell, the void le~t by 
them gave encouragement to the sufist movement. The Maghreb 
had once more returned to its segmental form of "society". 
The numerous sufist groupings blended well with the numerous 
segments. Followers o~ one marabout often fought with ~ollow­
ers of another, much as Berber community o~ten ~ought with 
Berber community. Thus, here, contrary to the general sit-
uation usually obtaining mnong tribal groups, the religious 
structure as it developed during this period tended to 
be sanctioned by the social structure rather than vice-
versa. With the increasing strength o~ the sufist 
groups, as well as performance of' "miracles", suf'is were 
continuously successful in protecting their wards from 
"foreign" encroachments. As such, they also succeeded in 
' 
reinforcing the fractional structure of' Berber "society. n 
However, because suf'ism received its support from local 
groups, it tended to become too narrow. Thus, this for.m 
of' Islrun was not able to play the unifying role Orthodox 
Islrun had played in the past. As Lewis notes: "Conse• 
~ 
quently the creation of a dynasty from mnong the mystics 
of the south (of Morocco, mine) did not produce any 
hoped-for homogeneity of view between themselves and the 
religious savants from other regions."1 
lWilliam Lewis, "Morocco: The Impact of ~ocial and 
Political Evolution on Foreign Policy," ~unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Pol~tical Science, 
The American University, 1960), PP• 42~43. 
-87-
In Morocco, the sufist brotherhoods were extremely 
popular. Elements in Morocco had early sought to "Berberize" 
Islrun and fashion it to their needs through several move-
ments. One was the Berghawata heresy begun in the eigh~h 
century. The tribal leader, Tarif, had assumed the role of 
Allah's Berber prophet, and wrote a Berber "Koran". 
The ~ceeptance of Kharajitism could also be interpreted 
within the context of the present discussion. Even the great 
Orthodox Islamic reform movements leading to the two great-
est Berber Empires ever to exist, the Almoravide and Almohade, 
were as short~lived as were their religious and unifying ef• 
fects. Still, for example, the Mahdi Ibn Tumert represented 
for them a Berber intermediary with Allah. Berbers at this 
juncture were still coming to grips with the new God. 
Berber unity during the Empire periods was based on 
tenuous alliances creating superior force over non-allies. 
The latter submitted or were crushed. However, traditional 
Islam used as their rallying symbol, had failed to permanently 
unite them or to capture their imagination. Orthodax and 
early schismatic Islam had not the strength to overcome the 
basic structuring of the Berbers. The only permanent aspect 
of traditional Islam was the establishment of the malekite 
rite-~one of the Orthodox rites of Islam--in Morocco. While 
While it was followed, however, it was never generally prac-
ticed except in the realm of the Makhzen. Sufism was more 
compatible with traditional Berber social structure and was 
initially sanctioned by Islam. Furthermore, it was more 
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meaningful to the average Berber. 
A discussion of the marabouts, their zawiyas, and their 
role or roles in the community will complete the descri·ption 
of Berber religion.l 
The first question ta be resolved is that of who could, 
and in fact did, become a marabout. They we~e men who had 
sought knowledge in medersas (Arabic, Moslem schools) and were 
considered wise; men who performed acts of welfare; men with 
reputations for justice; ascetics; religious her.mits; practic-
ing mystics--though all marabouts were partly this through 
their power of baraka; idio~s; epileptics; psychotics--all 
last three thought to be possessed by Allah--; and shorfa. 
Though most marabouts attempted to claim sherifian descent, 
the majority were not shorfa. One could also become a 
marabout upon his death by having died heroically; or by 
stealth, i.e. stealing baraka from others or having it be-
stowed upon one's self by a saint.2 · Some women possessing 
mystical qualities could also· become marabouts. They were 
often aides to marabouts and zawiya moqaddems. There were 
also Jewish marabouts recognized by Jews and Moslems alike. 
The second major feature one could dilineate regarding 
marabouts, particularly after the popularization of sufism, 
, ____________________________________________________________ _ 
~- 1For a discussion 
Coup d'Oeil, pp. 
Drague, Es uisse 
ries et Zaouias, 
1952). 
of these topics see in particular Bel, 
27-74; Doutte, L'Islam; and Georges 
d'Histoire Reli ieuse du Maroc: Confri-
.Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie 11 , II, 
2westermarck, Rituals and Belief8, I, PP• 42-45; and see 
Appendix A for how this is accomplished. 
.. • 
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is that the majority of them were no longer savants. ~any 
' of them hardly knew more about Islron than the various prayers 
and duties to be performed during the day. 
Marabouts married if they so desired, and most of them 
did. Fathers of daughters often offered their daughters to 
them without the benefit of marriage. This was done in h0pes 
of deriving same of the benefits of sufist baraka, and even 
possibly an heir whn would himself possess the baraka. All 
descendants of marabouts were considered to inherit the mysti-
cal powers of their saintly fathers in the sgme way that any-
thing touched by marabouts received an infusion of baraka. 
However, if such descendants, particularly the males, failed 
to "exercise" their baraka, they often lost popular respect. 
. -
Wives of marabouts were addressed with honorific titles, the 
most common of which was lalla in Morocco.1 Adult offsprings 
were also afforded such honors in various areas. 
There was no ranking of the marabouts in Morocco, though 
some had m0re prestige than others. They were not a group of 
priests at the head of which was the Sultan. .The Sultan, a 
sherif, where known, was recognized by the populace as the 
nominal religi0us leader. However, he was to0 rem0te to serve 
the needs of the base ttsocietytt. He also represented the 
central political system which was not always attached to 
benificence in the minds of the masses. 
lsee ~pe»dix B for a list of these titles. 
That some marabouts enjoyed a more prestigeful populari" 
ty than others is evidenced by records left of the size of 
their following, their roles in community life, and the ex-
tent of their ability to perform miracles.l Sherifian mara-
) 
bouts usually had a higher status than non•sherifian ~­
bouts, but this was not always the ease. Idiots and epilep-
tics were more feared for evil power they were thought to 
possess, than respected for good baraka. Certainly this was 
a blending of belief in the djoun spirits. And last, among 
some groups, particularly the nomads of southern Morocco and 
the Tuaregs of the Sahara, marabouts were less respected, and 
existed there only, at times, by the grace of agnostic tol-
eranee.2 
The marabouts played many, few or no roles in the com• 
munity in proportion to the respect accorded them in various 
areas. Som~ of these roles were conciliator; arbiter; pro-
tector; businessman; advisor; member of the local djemaa or 
perhaps represented there by one of his followers; and head 
of a brotherhood devoted to spreading his teachings and gain-
ing followers. 
lsee Col. Justinard, ~e Tazeroualt, ("Notes and Documents 
of the IHEM", V; Paris: Libraire Orientale et Amerieaine, 
1954), for an exrunple of a marabout who established the 
small kinglet of Tazeroualt in the Anti-Atlas. 
2Spillman, .2.£• cit., p. 120 notes: "Chorfa et mrabtin, a 
quelques exceptions pres,,ne jouissent d'ailleurs pas 
d~une situation privilegiee. Ils sont astreints aux 
memes charges que les Dratva et doiv.ent cornme eux re-
chercher la protection soit des Ait-Atta, soit des 
Ouled Yahia. Leur caractere sacrene les preserve nul-
lament des mauvais traitements des Berberes qui n'hesi-
' ~ , ~ " tent pas a les mettre a mort, le cas echeant. 
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In his role as arbiter and/or conciliator~ it is diffi• 
eult to ascertain to what degree he overlapped~ acted indi-
vidually from~ or in conjunction with other community members 
officiating a dispute. It would be difficult to accept any 
i·dea that the marabout generally held juridical reign over 
certain types of cases. However~ it seems plausible that he 
was usually involved in family difficulties and local disputes. 
Where he was involved in legal cases~ he would work with the 
qadi if there was one being used in the case. Often also~ he 
would act as arbiter or conciliator between two warring com-
munities in which he was recognizad. Theoretically~ he was 
supposed to be a neutral and not interfere until the situation 
had reached an impasse. In some areas he became involved at 
a less critical stage. His appeal to the disputing parties 
was often heeded because of his saintly qualities. But this 
was not always the case. 
Marabouts and their organizations were often at odds · 
with the other forces in Berber ttsociety". Montagne points 
out four major forces in Sousi, the interaction of which often 
led to disruption; (1) the chronic anarchy of the Berbers; 
(2) the ambitious amghars and grands seigneurs; (3) the 
brotherhoods; and (4) the religious reformers. He says of 
these: "C 1 est la lutte de ces quatre grands facteurs de la 
vie soeiale, leur interaction constante qui a cr'e ici, au 














~ , .. 
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bles.nl At any rate, the role of the marabouts in community 
disputes i~s difficult to expose and relate. 
Various people, or groups of people sought the protection 
of the marabouts. Caravan trading groups in particular felt 
it a necessity to have a marabout attached to them. His abili-
ty to give them divine protection was based on the idea that 
his powers also allowed him to dispense evil on would-be at-
tackers and assasins. However, this did not prevent armed 
conflicts from occurring between groups, for each banked their 
success on the greater power of their maraboat. In southern 
Morocco where the marabouts were not always greatly respected, 
their presence with a group did not prevent attack from nomads 
who did not have a saint-protector. When performing this 
~unction, however, the marabouts received compensation. 
The marabout, during the course of his travels, either 
as protector or in his role as head of a brotherhood with 
branches in several communities, also engaged in business 
activities. He was usually quite successful at this since 
his baraka was thought to be in his wares. There were also 
many pretenders living under the guise of marabouts, and some 
corrupted marabouts who took advantage_ of their position to 
further their own ends. There were even so-called robber-
saints. 
Marabouts often advised individuals in personal problems 
ranging anywhere from family ltro,smusi:ne:?:B@pre:hl:ems. In addi-
lM0ntagne, "Le Regime", P• 313. 
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tion, a marabout, or one or two of his representatives either 
served on the djemma or acted in the capacity of advisors 
and/or consultants with regard to community problems. It 
must be indicated that this role was a rare privilege. At 
any rate, his quasi-political role was never a fonmally 
structured one. 
His role as head of a brotherhood was perhaps the most 
~mportant. It was his ability to organize and gain adherents 
in this capacity that could predict all things being equal, 
the degree ~d extent of effective participation in other 
roles. Not all marabouts were able to establish whole brother-
hoods, but each organized at least one lodge, zawiya. What-
ever the case, maraboats lived at the head zawiya with their 
families~and local followers. 
The marabouts able to establish religious brotherhoods, 
were called "sheiks of the way" or of the "countryside 11 • A 
-
marabout was the grand master of the order, but was assisted 
by a number of aides called moqaddem whom he chose to run his 
order under his guidance. The moqaddem ~~eli&thaoshrtnes and 
tombs of ·previous marabouts of the order. The brothers at• 
tached to the order were called faquirs (Arabic, poor men). 
All participated in religious fetes, prayers, physical contor-
tions and scarifications in order to achieve the ecstatic 
state of joining with Allah. If the marabout and his moqaddem 
had propagandistic acumen, a number of branch zawiyas under· 
moqaddems chosen by the marabout wase added to the order and 
the marabout's power. Meetings were held regularly in the 
" __,_., .. .--- T-- ..,_ __ ~-,. "'---- -··· -~~--- ...,_ -: ___ ..___...., .... ~-.... .-. .. -·~ .,.. _ _,,_,__•_•_.._...__--._p- •-r .,.....__.,,...~ ~.-.-
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individual zawiyas; and occasionally the marabout involved 
would call a meeting of all his moqaddems. He also visited 
each zawiya at various inter~als. There was, as previously 
noted, intense and sometimes violent rivalry between brother-
hoods. 
On occasion, when a brotherhood becrune rather large, 
some of the distant branch zawiyas began to elect their own 
moqaddems, and acted independent, to all intents and pur-
poses, from the mother zawiya. Note here that this tendency 
was not unlike what occurred in the socio-political structure 
of the Berbers. 
When a marabout died, his sueeessor as head of the brother-
hood was not necessarily one of his progeny, but could be a 
moqaddem whom the late marabout designated as his heir. In 
this case, the saintly baraka was believed to have been trans-
mitted by the marabout to his successor upon the former's 
death. Among some groups, where no successor was designated, 
a moqaddem who had become popular for various reasons, was able 
to exert his authority over the order. In both cases, off-
spring of the late marabout then established themselves in 
other areas. 
The brotherhoods were primarily supported by the visits, 
ziarat (pl. Arabic, sing. ziara), made by community members 
to the zawiya. Visits to the shrines and tombs of marabouts 
also brought in funds from offerings. In addition, faquirs 
had to pay a membership fee. And last, protection services 
and commercial activities brought in supplemental funds. 
-9.5-
In conclusion, though mystical sufism had been brought 
into the ranks of Islam by the twelfth century, the populari• 
zation of the movement had degraded Orthodox Islrum. Further, 
sufism increased its reliance on magical rites to such an 
extent that a number of orders were quite strictly outside of 
even the broad base of Islam. Prayers were still said in the 
name of Allah, however. Ramadan was always observed. 
Islamic savants increasingly criticized these inadvertant 
sufist heretics without much noticeable success. The savants 
sought a general religion and were not satisfied with fraction-
al sufist doctrines. 
Sufist popularity and acceptance were so great among the 
majority of individual Berbers that the French felt obligated 
to take them into consideration in their North African plans. 
As Bel notes: 
Au point de vue politique nous avons certes 
raison d 1exercer une surveillance etroite sur les 
confreries religieuses, sans s'exagerer d'ailleurs 
1 1 importance qu 1 elles ont audourd 1hui et en se 
gardant surtout-de leur en donner. On saura ainsi 
prevoir toute explosion de fanatisme qu'elles 
pourraient preparer dans l'ombre. On ne saurait 
perdre de vue que bien des.agitateurs sont sortis 
des confreries musulmanes contre nous ••• .1 
Therefore, the French gave marabouts and/or some of the members 
of their brotherhoods for.mal roles in the social structure. 
For example, they gave them Islamic titles and functions such 
as qadi, though they were by no means originally Islamic 
judges. Instead of their community roles being based on their 
lBel, croup d 10eil, p. 31. 
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own abilities, they becmne part o~ the cognitive ~or.mal 
structure. Many served the French well, and a·s a result they 
were considered lackeys by their fellow countrymen. No long-
er did they serve to rein~orce fractionalism o~ Berber groups, 
but rather were major instruments in drawing the Berbers into 
obedience to French centralization. The French seemed to be 
masters at retaining traditional institutions, accenting his-
torical divisions between Berbers and the Makhzen, while at 
the same time undermining the very basis o~ the ancien struc-
ture. 
Gradually, the brotherhoods with their religious leaders 
fell into disgrace by their inability to check the Franco-
Spanish encroachment into various spheres o~ Berber li~e. 
Those who resisted were crushed by superior French ~orces. 
Somehow, su~ist baraka was not working. Loss of the presti-
gious meal ticket meant loss o~ entrance into the theatre o~ 
Berber respect.l 
Orthodox Islam as well as the Sultan's (new King} baraka 
also suffered a crushing blow, but these were mere remote and 
less meaningful to the Berbers. As such, they had more of a 
chance to gain respect than did sufism. This is not to say, 
however, that marabouts and their brotherhoods have complete-
ly vanished ~rom the Moroccan scene. Though many were dis-
dredited, others were able to survive and prosper. They eon• 
tinue today to attract the ~aithful. Shrines of dead marabouts 
lLewis, "Morocco; the Impact," PP• 42-44, has an 
interesting and informative discussion o~ this. 
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also continue to be venerated as well as any objects thought 
to contain baraka. 
Orthodox Islam, though it lost face, regained and ex-
panded its influence through its King, Mohammed V, and through 
the major nationalist party, the Istiqlal. Islgm is being 
used today to play a complementary role in integrating the 
various Berber-Arab groups into a single ·society.1 Isl~ now 
has a better chance to perform this function because of two 
facts: (1) the basic segmental structur~ng and orientation 
. 
of the Berbers has been weakened; and (2) the sufist movement 
has been discredited and serves no longer to reinforce seg-
mentation. 
Again let us reiterate, however, that strict ~raditional­
ism is waning, but it is not yet dead; unity is sought, but 
it is not yet achieved. 
lso true is this that Benjgmin Rivlin, .,North Africa Meets 
the Modern World," Commentary (October 1956), p. 346, 
quotes and comments on a speech made just after inde-
pendence by King Mohammed V which points this up: "Our 
people have placed themselves in the shadow of Islam and 
will not permit any discrimination between Arabs and 
Berbers • • • • 
"But to make this strong profession of faith in the 
Islamic unity of Morocco was also to declare it for what 
it was: a goal--a difficult one--and not a reality. 
As a correspondent puts it in Le Monde (July 13, 1956): 
'The sovereign is anxious to unite his country, but as a 
shrewd politician he has to be sure to say Lfn an address 
to Berber tribesmenJ: "It is our sincere intention to 
send you only competent officials acquainted with your 
ways and customs and distinguished by their integrity, 
whose duty it will be to favor your own interests and 
earn your confidence and respect.-" 1 In this same spirit 
of deference to local interests and tradition, Mohammed V 
reappointed as a tribal leader one of the very same men 
who had conspired with El-Glaoui and the French to bring 
about his dep0sition in 1955." 
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KNOWLEDGE AND ITS DISSEMINATION 
All peoples everywhere have some system of knowledge, 
i.e. a body of ideas and facts about the world and its at-
tendant problems. In non-literate and proto-literate 11 soci-
etiesn, kno1rrledge was often developed about the world in as-
sociation with or as a derivative of religious and magical 
beliefs. Materialistic knowledge, i.e. to sew, plant, deliv-
er a baby, shoot an animal, etc., in order for it to be ef-
fective was usually, but not always dependent upon non-mate-
rialistic knowledge. For example, it was not sufficient for 
the Berbers to know how to prepare land for seeding. They 
also had to know the correct magical formulae to produce suf~ 
ficient rainfall, to make the land fertile, etc., as well as 
how to exorcise evil djoun to prevent them from destroying 
their potential crops. Failure of crops was almost never 
blamed on deficient materialistic knowledge or on the vagar-
ies of climate. It was rather blruned on Berber deficiency of 
non-materialistic knowledge, or on greater evil spirits. 
Benedict has pointed out that religion and its related 
components were developed among groups such as the Berbers as 
a technique to cope with the unknown.1 Religion plays this 
role in moder.n societies also, but on a more residual and de-
tached basis. However, as a technique, it was a body of know-
l,edge by which one planned and lived his life. As a result, 
·f\ lRuth Benedict, "Religion," ed. Franz Boas, General 
Anthropologz (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., c. 1938), 
pp. 627-665. 
materialistic knowledge was at times considered as a 
quasi-subsidiary of religion in its broadest sense in 
forming the whole system of knowledge. 
Non-materialistic knowledge in Morocco during the 
pre-Islamic period was associated with paganism and con-
sistent with it. Knowledge continued its association 
with religion even after Islam. At first, Islamic know-1~~ 
ledge in Morocco was centered in urban areas and pursued 
by scholarly men. It led to great intellectual achieve-· 
menta and scientific gains. However, because it was limited 
to specific areas, such gains did not take root in the 
population at large. Only when Islam became vulgarized 
through the ~ movement did it become generalized 
throughout the population. It had by then, however, 
blended so well with the pre-Islamic pagan~sm, and had 
lost its association with intellectual pursuits. Conse-
quently, it represented a substantial continuation and 
reinforcement of the traditional non-materialistic body 
of knowledge in that area. 1 
Non-materialistic, or non-scientifie••if one wishes--
knowledge focussed in Morocco on such things as the creation 
1Even when scholarly pursuits lead to more.materialis-
tie information, desire for causative knowledge may 
not allow the circumvention of non-materialistic 
knowledge, particularly when the social and physical 
environment remain harsh. For example, to know that 
certain cloud form.ati ons and their relationship 
to particular temperatures produce rain, is not to 
answer who or what causes this phenomenon. 
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of the world--showing a Judaie-Christian influence--, nature 
of the sky, causes of rain, dryness, illness, death, barren8 
d h t . . 11 l It . . th ness, an ow o cure var~ous ~ s. ~s ne~ er necessary 
nor practical here te detail what Berber thoughts on these 
matters were. Suffice it to say that they attempted to 
interpret and account for phenomena as well as provide 
means to deal with these. Such interpretations and means 
varied from group to group in accordance with local particu-
larisms. Berber knowledge, materialistic and non-materialis" 
tic, was handed down from generation to generation and 
demonstrated amazing endurance. 
Dissemination of knowledge was accomplished primarily 
through informal channels rather than threugh a complex of 
educational institutions. Perhaps the only formal struc-
turing of education was through the medersa and sometimes 
through the zawiyas. Boys were sent to the medersa to 
learn the Koran and some reading and writing, though these 
skills were rare in Sousi. As for the zawiyas, only those 
attached to it in a participant role could gain the 
11specialized11 kn0wledge of how to deal with particular 
problems, such as illness and barrenness. 
Knowledge with regard to everyday problems was given 
by parents and other adults to children. Boys were taught 
their father's occupation as well as their future masculine 
1see Legey, 2£• £!E• Also see Appendix A for a 
sampling of some of these cures. 
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roles in society by their fathers and other male members. 
Girls were taught domestic activities by their mothers and 
other female members. Awareness of the evil agents involved 
in the everyday events of Berber life, as well as methods to 
manipulate and to control these agents were passed on by 
parents and the community at large. But as implied above, 
certain problems, dif~ering from area to area, could only 
be handled by the 11 specialized" knowledge of sufis and/or 
other practitioners. 
Certain individuals, groups of individuals, or 
families were particularly known for their "kn0w·ledge"· 
in handling certain ph~nomena. These people could be, but 
did not have to be marabouts. But marab0uts were deemed 
particularly useful because of their powers. For example, the 
Berbers having no knowledge of medical science, believed, 
according to their system of knowledge, that illness was 
caused by dj0un, the evil eye, a curse, or some magieal 
operations--especially of the homeopathic type--of malicious 
individuals. One then called upon some marabout, or one 
of.his associates, to have him utilize his saintly know-
ledge on behalf of the victim. What the· Berbers did for 
the same phenomenon in pre-~ days is not quite clear. 
It is assumed that magical practices were used to eliminate 
the ailment. This example shows clearly that sufism only 
blended into the existing state of knowledge rather than 
significantly broadening it. Sufis were thought to possess 
divine knowledge and divine power, but this was only an 
extension o£ the traditional system rather than an increase 
in scholarly and objective thought. 
A moqaddem o£ one of the brotherhoods of southern 
Morocco was particularly well-known in that area for the 
curing of possession by a devil. He also used aides, male 
and female. All the descendants o£ the marabout Sidi Abd 
el Aziz Ben Yafou of Doukkala, were supposed te be great 
healers o£ anything from headaches to hysteria. There 
was also a belief that evil was associated with blood, and 
that the djoun often injected illness in a person's 
bloodstream. Thus a whole school of blood-letters developed 
and could be seen in any market, particularly in Sousi. They 
developed a method of draining blood £rom individuals in 
sufficient quantity t0 "remove" the illness. Unsterile 
instruments were used, naturally, and "operations 11 took 
" 
place in the open. On the other hand, the Berbers alsG 
seemed t0 have £ound some things which were medically 
usefu1. 1 
Numerous events were in the hands of the average 
person. For example, the midwife and the new mother not 
only had to know how to deliver a baby, but also what 
magical rites were involved in protecting the child £rom 
the djoun. A child never died because of unsanitary con-
ditions, birth injuries or malnutrition, ~or these were not 
lsee Bryan Clarke, Berber Village (London: Longmans, 
1959), P• 69, £or an example of this• 
a part of Berber knowledge. 
Another form of disseminating knowledge remains to be 
discussed--the story-teller. St0ry-tellers were either 
professionals or non-professionals. Professionals were to 
be seen in almost any souk, and especially famous were the 
- . 
ones of the Djemaa El-Fna ~ in Marrakesh. Non-professionals . 
were usually represented by elder members of local communities 
who delighted in relating the events of the past and color-
ful stories of various real or fic~itious individuals. 
Story-tellers represented the carriers of oral history and 
literature. 
The stories told by these people were usually of wars, 
lives of marabouts and their miracles, love stories, and 
hardship tales of various individuals} Each teller often 
changed names of characters for local purposes and added 
his own personality to the tale toattract listeners. 
Though, as Meakin notes, the stories were often ficti-
tious,2 they reflected and buttressed the Berber ethos 
well, while serving as a means of entertainment. 
Knowledge of this type could not be literally classi-
fied as mate~ialistic or non-materialistic, though both 
were discussed and related with regard to characters in 
the stories. It was, rather, esthetic kn0wledge to· charac-
terize the social milieu--much as any fpr.m of written 
1see Appendix C for a smnpling of short stories of 
Sousi Berbers. 
2Meakin, ££• ~., P• 140. 
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literature does. Also much as the latter, but even more 
significant in Sousi, the stories were used to justify an 
individual or a group's action and/or to act as a moral 
force. 
A change, however, is 0ccurring within the ranks of 
the story-tellers, especially among professionals. As 
literary men everywhere, they related the environment about 
them. I~ that environment changes, the! change also. Many 
stories are now to be heard or Frenchmen and o~ the drive for 
independence. All the same, new stories go through the 
process o~ traditional events and endings. The change has 
not been complete. 
With the advent of European influence in the area, a 
new system of kn0wledge and educational structure began 
to develop. For example, some schools were opened; urban 
areas, ·alleged corroders or traditionalism, grew and 
attracted numerous Berbers; and medical units were estab-
lished. 
While some Berbers absorbed the new system of under-
standing and coping with the world, they s till clung to 
much o~ their traditional beliefs. This was particularly 
true in Sousi where the Berbers were not brought under 
control until the 1930's. What is more interesting, 
Sousi women, as well as Moroccan women in general, yet 
remain the great r~our~s of previous beliefs and 
superstitions,. This is perhaps true because women upon 
entering the European-created structure, did so in a 
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traditional manner. That is while men participated in the 
new structure through jobs, ror example, women were still 
relegated to their minimally-participant existence. 
In summary, European influence created a basic frame-
' 
work ror the development of a new system 0f knowledge. 
The Meroccan Government is continuing to nurture that 
framework to include the national population. However, 
the old structure, though mueh hampered, is still function-
ing; zawiyas--now outlawed--, story-tellers, community 
folklore all persist. Medersas are slowly being reorganized 
under refor.med Islam, and orfer an education to boys and 
girls more suited to present developments in, and needs or 
Morocc0. 
MARRIAGE AND KINSHIP! 
Kinship as other aspects of Berber social structuring 
varied from group to group. All Berbers followed the 
extended consanguine family pattern; patriarchal authority; 
patrilocal residence; was an economic unit of production; 
relegated the female to a position of so·-called 11inferiori ty"; 
practiced monogamy for the most part; and recognized obli-
lor all the ethnological material available on Berber 
life, information regarding their kinship structuring, 
and even the more narr0w areas of family life, are 
not well represented. Most of the data for this 
section had to be gleaned from studies focussed on 
other aspects of Berber "society". Even in Berque, 
2£• ~., PP• 34-40 where a section is devoted to 
the family, little is written regarding composition 
of the ramily, extra-kin relations, and roles of 
individual kin members. 
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gations to at least some individuals beyond the extended 
patri-lineage. Within this common Berber rr~ework, their 
were numerous possibilities or role derinitions and 
linkages. 
When a young man wanted to marry, 1 or when his parents 
desired it, negotiations were carried on between the 
rathers or the prospective spouses. Sometimes a remale 
intermediary was used. The girl was usually rrom the 
community, and was orten the boy's cross-cousin. In many 
parts or Sousi, the boy would see his ruture bride around 
the community, i.e. berore negotiations were carried on. 
This dirrered rrom the Arab counterpart situation. 
Sousi women were not always veiled and kept away rrom 
male compan,y.2 This was not to say, however, that male-· 
remale socializing was as permissive as in western society. 
Nonetheless, a Sousi male had at least made the acquaintance 
or the girl he intended to marry. 
Once the girl was selected, and the boy could select 
ror himselr usually, his rather was informed. The rather 
invited the rather or the girl along with other men in the 
1There is more inrormation available on marriage than 
on any other sub-heading or kinship. There is no 
lack or inrormation on rinding a spouse, negotiations, 
marriage rites, .etc. However, even in this most-
studied element or kinship, basic data such as in-law 
relationships are lacking. See the rollowing works 
ror discussions or marriage and marriage rites: 
Bourrilly, op. cit., PP• 59-74; Legey, !E·~·' 
PP• 177-·196; E. Westermarck, Marriage Ceremonies 
in Morocco (London: MacMillan and do., 19lij); an~ 
Doutte,.. "Haha", pp. 3-8, has an excellent summary. 
2Montagne; "Massat", PP• 375 ... 376. Massat women wore 
veils and were quite strictly kept in line. 
community, and attempted to ascertain his feelings on the 
matter. Direct requests with the prospect of refusal were 
avoided, since this could lead to tension between the 
families. If a positive answer was felt to be forthcoming, 
the other men served as intermediaries for drawing the 
request to a head. This done, the fathers carried on 
their negotiations for the bride price before members of the 
djemaa or a taleb (Arabic, Islamic scribe). Half of the 
"price" was paid by the father of the groom at that time, 
and this constituted official recognition of the marriage. 
The other half was 0nly paid if the marriage was dissovled 
because of something the bridegroom did. Among some Berber$, 
the period between the agreement and the payment could be 
as long as six months. During that time, the couple were 
considered to be engaged. Uonsequently, the girl was never 
to be seen by her future husband. This tvas to prevent any 
pre-marital indiscretions or suspected indiscretions. It 
served t 0 protect the honor of both families. .Also in the 
pre~arital interim~ gi~ts were exchanged, but most of them 
flowed from the prospective groom to the bride and her 
family. The marriage rites and ceremonies were complex and 
drawn out. The complete process could last anywhere fr0m 
three to ten days depending on the group. Purification 
rites for the girl and boy were performed. Each was 
surrounded by friends and rel,atives of their own sex. After 
a period of a few days, the girl was brought to the home of 
her future husband by one or a group of his male relatives 
or friends, but not before a simulated battle was fought=· 
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between the latter and the girl's family. Finally, she was 
mounted on a mule and brought to the boy's home. Here 
again she was subjected to purification rites performed by 
female relatives of the male. Finally, she was led to 
her husband's bedroom, immediately followed by the groom. 
The gathered guests awaited the traditional consummation 
of the marriage and proof that the girl had come to her 
husband a virgin. For a few days after, the man could 
not see his wife during the day, but frequented her at 
night. During this time, she would remain enclosed in the 
bedroom. After this, she took on her for.mal duties in the 
household, and was incorporated in the family. 
The new wife eame under the tutelage of her mother-in-
law or the eldest female member of the household. While 
she and her husband usually had separate quarters from the 
rest of the family, she still had to function with her 
female in-laws in domestic activities. Sometimes her 
life was extremely difficult because of her new family. 
Nonetheless, she usually accepted her junior status in her 
new home. She helped cook, clean, wash, sew, fetch water, 
carry goods to and from the market for her husband, and 
raise children. 
The man worked with the rest of the male members of 
his family to make a living. This was usually in agricultural 
pursuits. Women often helped in certain aspects of the 
agrarian process, e.g. harvesting. In addition, the man 
occupied himself with local politics, i.e. especially in 
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the djemaa; served the community as a potential armed 
recruit; sold and beught in the markets; and perfor.med 
,other masculine duties. 
Whereas in pre-puberty ages, Sousi boys and girls 
mixed freely with each other in many aspects of life, after 
puberty they were separated. Females ate apart from males; 
did not accompany men on visits, except to markets in which 
they did not participate; did not dance in public with 
their husbands or any male; and did not even sit near their 
husbands in public. Women lived in their own little world 
with well dilineated functions. It was believed that 
their quasi-seclusion was a result of Islam rather than 
traditional to the Berbers as such. 1 All the. same, Sousi 
women seemed better off in many ways from their Arab 
counterpart. 
On the surface, however, it still appeared that Sousi 
women had "inferiorn positions and roles in their communi-
ties, but quite the opposite was true in many instances. 
The Berbers considered their women to have the ability to 
dispense a great deal of potential evil, but also some 
good. Numerous Berber women, particularly elder women were 
considered as quasi-sufis, though the majority did not take 
the title or claim baraka. Rather, their npowers" were 
more closely akin to the traditional Berber spirits, espe-
cially the djoun. Some women were so evil, they were 
lBourrilly, 2E• cit., PP• 69-70. 
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believed to be djinniyas in human £orm. Wom~n were per-
haps best described as sorceresses. It was believed that 
they had knowledge of formula~· to cause impotency to their 
husbands or lovers if they so desired, as well as numerous 
other infirmities. Women were also considered to be partie-
ularly adept in the evil eye. Women known to be especially 
able were sought by traders for protection in their commer-
cial activities. They would usually put together some 
fGrmulae, oral or material, on behalf of their clients. 
In the smne way that women were feared by the men, they 
were also revered--perhaps partly from fear. In some areas 
o£ Sousi, e.g. Haha, women had their own private markets 
where men were not to disturb them. If some male attempted 
this, the women cried out for help, and males standing by 
as protectors in the distance rushed to their aid. The of-
fender in Haha was usually punished by the local marabout, 
interpreted by Doutte to indicate the almost sacred status 
of women.l A further indication of this sacred "esteem" was 
-
the fact that a man never spoke of his wife in public. If 
he had to refer to her, he spoke of her as a child. 
Women, though "isolated" from the male community, were 
very influential in this sphere also. First, they were out-
spoken to their husbands and sons with regard to particular 
issues on which the djemaa could decide. They were thus able 
to influence male thought on these matters. Sons were usually 
dutiful to their mothers and showed them great respect. This 
lD<:>utte', "Haha", PP• 1-3. 
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respect was demonstrated by a willingness to listen to 
maternal advice and opinion. Some wives and mothers showed 
a particular adroitness in matters of business. When once 
she had proven her success to her husband or son, she was 
able to play an increasingly important decision-making role. 
Second, the women were also solely responsible for male 
children until they reached the age of puberty. ~onsequently, 
they were in a position to 11orient" the thought processes of' 
males in the formative age, as well as to create a linger-
ing attachment of son to mother. However, some of this was 
counteracted when~the boy moved in strictly male company, 
post-puberty. He then identified with his father and other 
elder males; learned to bear arms for the common good; and 
fulfilled the masculine role in general demanded of him by 
"society". He also attended the medersa, a masculine pre-
rogative, which was one way to show his "superior" differ-
entiation from the ninferior" sex. Islam, a primarily male.,. 
oriented religion, was counterbalanced by the magical-mystie~l 
nature of Berber women. 
Girls were not received with joy when they were born. 
Boys were preferred in this 11 soeiety". However, they were 
much loved as they grew and began to play their complementary 
role in the family unit. Since they were not initially se-
cluded f'rom male companionship, they became quite familiar 
with male 11societytt. One is almost tempted to relate the 
early male•female association, with female ability at later 
ages, to ttmanipulate" males. Primary female indoctrination, 
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both domestic and magical, was received ~rom elder ~emales. 
Is is easy to see here in the role o~ women a blending 
with the Berber social struc~uring in general and the religi-
co-magical structure and process in particular. One thing 
especially stands out--the sometimes ambivalent Berber ~eel­
ings toward marabouts and pagan spirits were also expressed 
toward women. 
The above discussion o~ women should not serve to under-
estimate the role o~ men in Berber nsoeiety" and their au• 
thority over women. Rather it should serve to place in re-
lie~ the woman's achieved in~ormal and in~luential roles here-
to~ore hidden by the maze of Islamic veils. Nonetheless, the 
ideal wife was an obedient one. She was o~ten beaten by her 
husband for any display o~ insolence or lack o~ domestic acu-
men. Divorce was the sole prerogative o~ the husband acquired 
through the Islamic method o~ renunciation. Incidentally, 
both marriage and divorce had to be recorded in civil registers 
under the French. 
When the French pacified Sousi, the lott o~ the woman as 
well as the structure in which she had participated did not 
alter greatly. While some Berber males were entered in what-
ever schools became a~ailable to them, ~emales were still held 
in physical seclusion. Even when ~amilies moved to the cities, 
women were most o~ten locked to their traditionally prescribed 
/ 
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roles.1 Censequently, they retained their religico-magical 
character and beliefs, frequented marabout shrines, and wor-
·shipped living saints as they had always done. Sufism was 
especially significant to women since fer them, it was and 
is structurally more attainable and satisfying than official 
Islam. They were and are, as previously noted, in great 
measure the l~p~b~~s of much that is traditional in Berber 
life today. And because or their pre-puberty control over 
their sons, and their contfunnus tutelage of daughters and 
daughters-in-law, they still serve today to sustain in Sousi 
a measure or traditionalism.2 This was felt even by males 
participating in the burgeoning European-type structure. 
And though the nuclea!' European structure was nat even 
sufficient for males, the French had not provided the ele-
mental structural base for extensive feminine participation 
lsee Jean D'Etienne, 11Une Famille.Marocaine" Cahiers de 
1 1Afrique et l'Asie, I (Paris), pp. 7"51, indicates a 
11 typical 11 Moroccan family moving from rural to urban 
life which does not bear out the interpretation set 
forth above. However, upon reading it, one can easily 
see that the family described is not "typical". It 
also indicates that the present author's views are not 
absolute nor are they intended to be. -
2Glora Wysner, The Kabyle People, (New York: by the 
author, 1945), p. 77 notes with regard to the Kabyle 
Berbers, who are not unlike Sousi Berbers in many re-
spects, that: ttThe mother molds the.character of her 
children as she.cares for them day by day. In this way 
her influence upon them is important. Uneducated, a 
slave of custom, an enemy of progress, she builds into 
her children a resistance to change which is disast~ous. 
Her inferior position has made her a blind force which 
resists progress i·n her race." 
in the non•tradi tional. n society" .1 ' The limited involvement 
- -
o:C Berber women in the present "society" is a source o:C con-
~ 
cern to the Moroccan Government, since modern society neees-
sitates literate and participating women. Female roles must 
be provided in the new structure. It is not only a matter 
o:C changing people's attitudes away :Crom traditional thought 
-
which may be.hindering modern development, but it is alsa a 
matter o:C creating an adequate structure which will produce 
that end. 
With regard to obligations within the traditional Sousi 
kinship structure, there were no :Connal or uniform defini-
tions. One thing was clearl~ defined, however. Members of 
the extended patri~lineage were all obligated to each other. 
~bst everything owned was corporate property. Only very 
personal things such as jewelry were individually owned. 
Beyond the patri-lineage, the range of :Cew to many obliga-
tions was recognized both to kin and non~kin. However, we 
lThis is not to say that the French provided no outlets 
for :Cemales in the developing structure. After 1935, 
it was recognized that girls should have primary and 
secondary education and some schools were made available 
to them. Female Youth Service Centers were also opened; 
various jobs were made available to them, etc. However, 
as with much of the structural evolution with regard to 
masculine roles, the feminine roles developed unevenly. 
It must be remembered here that much of the social 
structure under the French took its own impetus and 
orientation. As in any society, a great deal that de-
veloped was unplanned, unintended and unforeseen--
whether the results were good or bad. For a most ex-
cellent and interesting discussion on women and their 
problems vis-a-vis the "modern" society, see Jean and 
Simone Lacouture, Le Maroc a l'Erreuve, (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1958), pp. 31 -335. 
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do net rind in Sousi, ror the most part, the type of clan 
obligations round in other areas or the world. The ramiliar 
pattern or a needy clan member coming to the community or one 
or his clan, and calling out their common name to receive 
hospitality, was net found in Sousi. Rather, what was usual..., 
ly found was that on the smaller segmental community levels, 
i.e. villages and hamlets, the community as a whole recog-
nized obligations to any needy member. It was coincidental, 
rather than planned, if members of that community were nclan" 
members. 
The djemaa or elder members or the community usually de-
cided on whether or not a person was a welfare case. He 
• 
could be provided with rood rrom the common agadir, or if there 
was a moqaddem (political or religious) or a marabout who had 
means, the unfortunate person would receive aid from one or 
them. This for.m of accommodation was especially practiced in 
communities which were either too poor to aid their welfare 
cases, or were unwilling to recognize such obligations. 
Given the above, one would almost expect to find little 
recognition of non-l~eage kin·among the Berbers. However, 
the opposite was more often true. A wide range of relatives 
was recognized--even those living in other communities were 
cognizant or their distant relatives. Kin terms were of the 
definitive type--e.g. mart-umi (Arabic) means the wire or my 
rather's brother; bint-khalti (Arabic) means the daughter or 
my mother's sister; etc. 
Recognition of obligations to various men-consanguine 
kin did not seem to concentrate on any particular category of 
relatives. A Berber guided by such things as his personal 
values, conscience, wealth, and fmnily precedence, could choose 
to aid or not aid various relatives. Even if an unfortuaate 
person received aid from his community, he could seek further 
aid from a relative.· 
When a man moved from one community to another, he was 
no longer obligated to former commumdty members, but rather 
to his new community members. In the e~ent, however, that he 
moved to a city aria-was asked for help by a for.mer community 
member, he could or could not agree, depending on the above 
mentioned factors. In the srune way, when a family moved to 
the city, it or its indi~idual members were not obligated to 
non-consanguine kin except if they desired to be so. A 
family member was able ~o draw on any of his lineage kin. 
Beyond local kin and communities were the larger segments. 
We have already discussed how segments were meshed together 
and what types of obligations were expected from the compon-
ents. Some of the categories were of the type discussed above, 
but they were primarily af a politico-juridical nature. 
' Tribes or sub-tribes bearing the prefix of Ait or Oulad (both 
meaning children of--the first being Berber, the second 
Arabic) were not kin units or necessarily larger community 
' 
units. Obligations were rare between the majority of tribal 
members. 
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Kin and nonNkin obligations draw.n from a pr~arily 
agrarian and menial labor economy, obstruct the accumulation 
of savings to be used for investments in developing the 
country.l Here again, structural provisions both in terms 
. 
of job supply and welfare needs must be made to accommodate 
the situation if "modernism" is to be evenly minimally achiev-
ed. Certainly the framework of an extensive economic and 
welfare structure was initiated by the French. The Moroccan 
Government is maintaining t~t structure. The complexities 
of economic development in their relationship to kin obliga~ 
tions will be discussed in the next chapter. 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE.2 
Sousi Berbers were primarily engaged in agricultural-
pastoral activities as their means of livelihood. Among them 
was also a group of artisans. The artisans were of two types: 
the rural and urban. The rural artisans were either migra• 
tory or settled. They were, for example, the saddle~makers 
lAttachment to extended family living and community life 
in general also serve to retard the potential rate of 
economic development. See, for example, Roger LeTourneau, 
"Social Change in the Muslim Cities of North African 
American Journal of Sociology, LX, no 6, (1955), PP• 
527-535. 
2Next to the traditional kinship structure, the material 
available on the traditional economic structure is the 
most scarce. Most of the studies tend to feature items 
of climatic difficultie~, types of goods produced and 
grown, a mentioning of the inefficiency of the tradition-
al structure with regard to modern techniques, and 
problems the for.mer poses for development. Little 
material is available on property rights; production, 
distribution and who performed what function. 
and blacksmiths who moved about from village to village at 
a particular time each year, and the individual artisan set-
tled in an area as a participating member of the community. 
In both uases the profession usually ran within the family 
line. In addition, non-artisanal rural individuals perfor.med 
so~e of these functions. Berber women regularly weaved dloth 
and made family clothing. In some areas, they also provided 
the pottery needs of the family, particularly for waDer re• 
cepticles. 
Urban artisans were usually furniture makers, blacksmiths, 
rug weavers, etc. They housed themselves in small workshops 
in which they may have had an apprentice or two working with 
them. Jewe1::JtW makers were most often Jews, though Berber women 
frequently made themselves cheap jewelry, i.e. non-metallic. 
The urban artisans were for.med in guilds which were kept under 
the scrutiny of city officials. Guilds continued to exist 
under the French. 
Trade between rural and urban areas was carried on either 
directly or through agents. The two sectors of the tradition-
al economy--agrarian and nindustrial"--complemented each other. 
But there was also a third factor which played a role in the 
traditional Sousi economic structure--the southern nomadic 
groups, "pr0tectors" of' the sedentaries and plunderers of 
goods-bearing caravans. They represented a drain on the sub• 
sistence--and often below subsistence--economy of the ~r0vince. 
Add to this factor the vagaries of the weather and lack of' 
efficient techniques, and one can readily understand the pre-
daminant concern with means for daily livelihood evident in 
the various sectors of Berber life.l 
Agriculture as just noted, was the major employer of 
the Moroccan population, It was primarily a family function. 
Land was owned by the family who worked it for their common 
welfare. In pre-French periods, land. was not demarcated, but 
each member of the community knew the borders of his and his 
neighbors' lands. The eldest male of the household was the 
director of activities as he was in strictly family life. 
When he died, land was inherited by the family as a whole, 
with the next eldest male becoming the director. 
Me~ ploughed the ground helped by boys. Both men and 
women planted, and women, their daughters and pre-puberty sons 
did most of the harvesting. All these functions were associat-
ed with numerous rites. 2 Wheat and barley were the primary 
crops and were utilized as staples in the Berber diet. Women 
often had their own small gardens Which they worked by and 
for themselves. They sold these products, as well as home-
made clothing, cheap jewelry, pottery, and baskets, in their 
own private markets. 
The regular market places in which major trading was 
carried on was, as previously noted, the domain of men. Souks 
lone should not misinterpret the above to indicate an 
economi~ determinism. Rather, within the various sectors 
as they became constituted, an area is particularly 
concerned with economic matters as is true, but to a 
lesser degree, of more developed societies. 
2see Appendix A for some of these. 
most often took on the nwme ~f the day on.which they were 
open. Each community withi~ their radius was aware of tham, 
but usually attended the one closest to it·s1 location and/or 
within its own bounds.l 
With regard to olive, nut and fruit orchards, ownership 
rights were quite complicated. One could own the trees, but 
not the land. In this case, the land-owner could receive a 
S:Jme of the crop or acquire ownership of part of the arbor 
holdings. Berbers much treasured their tree cultures since 
they took less care and were not as susceptible to the harm-
ful effects of dryness which often plagued the wheat crops. 
Moreover, Berbers treasured'o2ive oil for it was their basic 
cooking element$ It also provided them wit~ a nutritious 
staple in their usually ill-balanced diet. What oil was not 
used for family needs was sold or exchanged for other goods 
in the markets. 
Sometimes, a man could lose his land due to a bad year 
or two. If for exgmple, his crop failed because 0f weather, 
it also meant that seeds for the next year would be scarce. 
So that even if the weather was good, and the land as well 
prepared as Berber knowledge permitted, seed Shortage caused 
by the previous year could still cause a deficit crop. As a 
solution to this problem, some Berbers sold their land to 
others. The new owners often employed the sellers as share-
lsee Supra, PP• 46-47 for a discussion 0f markets, and 
problems of transportation and communication. 
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croppers. Usually, the sharecropper received one-fifth of 
the cr?p, and this was why he was called a khames (Arabic, 
five) in some areas. Other arrangements were also made. One 
man could provide seeds and the other land. In this case, 
the crop was divided in half. 
With the advent of 'the French, land had to be registered, 
and any transaction with regard to it had to be officially 
handled also. Numerous problems occurred regarding land 
claims, arbor claims, and false bills of sale. Nonetheless, 
such formal regulations were a necessary part of the basic 
foundation of a modern unitary structure. 
Livestock in small quantities was kept by ~ome sedentar-
. 
ies, and in larger quantities by semi-nomads. Adol~scent 
boys usually tended any livestock possessed by the family. 
Animals were only slaughtered on special occasions including 
religious holidays. The actual meat intake was quite low. 
This, added to years of low wheat yield and non-vitamin 
balanced diet, assured a chronic sta~e of malnutrition. How-
ever, the condition was not as pronounced in Morocco, in 
general, as in other areas off~frica. Lack of formal clan 
obligations coupled with rights in most communities to draw 
from the common agadir when necessary, avoided the severe 
loss of energy and inability to perform daily functions. 
However, the threshold of energy needed for participation in 
a modern economic structure is lacking. 
Currency was utilized on a part-time basis in the tradi-
tional structure, but transactions were primarily of a bar-
ter-in-kind type. The Moroccan dirham (Arabic, currency), 
~ . 
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filtered down from Makhzeni areas, particularly to urbanites. 
UrbanMrural trade provided the means of its transportation 
t~roughout Morocco. Still, one could hardly define Sousi 
as having been a cash economy. Even to the present, exchange 
in kind is still significant. 
The French, as other colonial powers, built an infra-
struhture" in Morocco. It is a necessary part of any success-
ful colonial enterprise. The one in Morocco was not only ade-
quate put quite good as c~mpared to other areas in Africa. 
With the development of the infrastructure came an infusion of 
modern industry and agriculture primarily borne by French 
colons. Medical programs cut down the death rate and increas-
ed the percentage of live births. Pacification slowed down 
to an almost complete standstill the plundering opportuni• 
ties of nomads. The disequilibrium of development, however, 
of the various sectors of the social structure and its basic 
component, the infrastructure, disrupted the traditional eco-
nomic structure without providing an adequate replacement for 
its nvictims.nl 
Colons bought som~ of the most fertile land in 
Morocco, which they began to parcel together in large holdings. 
However, their total acreage reached only nine per cent of 
land brought under cultivation by 1950 in all of Morocco. Some 
Berbers worked their fonner lands for the colons much as they 
did for other Berbers before French hegemony. Never had such 
•' 
lThis is of course true of other sectors of the social 
structure. 
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superior buying power been witnessed in the country nor 
. 
such large far.ms assembled. More and more, the Berber's 
traditional for.m of employment was bestowed upon him by 
the nasrani (Arabic, Christian). This was less true in 
Sousi than in the Casablanca, Rabat and Fez areas. 
With a fairly good infrastructure developed, i.e. 
ports, transportation facilities including a good network 
of roads, hydro-electric power, communications, education, 
disease control units and hospitals, private capital was 
attracted to the area. It was not only in agriculture 
but also in fields which the Moroccan "entrepreneur" had 
not ventured~-mining, canning and machine product~on! 
Industries familiar to the Berber artisan were replaced 
by machines. A modernized and heavil~ industrialized 
ca·sh economy developed in the urban areas of Morocco to 
complement its cousined colon ag~arian devel0pment. So 
rapid and so extensive was the development that Morocco · 
now ranks, according to du Jonchay, as one of the three 
. 1 
African nati0ns that can be called industrialized. 
This development was on the.periphery of the tradi-
tional economy, and in many ways it chastised the func-
tionmng of that economy. Artisan groups were completely 
c~allenged by manufactured products. Their products were 
1Ivan du Jonchay, "L'-Industria.lisation de l'Afrique 
et les Possibilites Marocaines, u (reprint from a 
conferenee,held in Casablanca, 1955). 
no longer as marketable. Good roads and transportation 
brought the wares of the modern sector to the remotest. 
areas. The French attempted to counter this--as a part of 
the policy of maintaining traditional society--by displaying 
artisan products in international .fairs. This was to 
obtain new markets for these hand-produced products. But 
the artisan either became a laborer in factories or changed 
the s tyle and quality of his work to meet different tastes. 
Such products as continued to be produced by artisans 
were more of a decorative nature rather than utility pro-
ducts. Those who became partially mechanized were able 
to develop a small business+status. 
Agriculture continued as it does today to be the major 
economic activity of the Berbers. Seventy-five to eighty 
per cent of the Moroccan population engaged in this. Though, 
in Protectorate days, the colons with smaller total land 
holdings produced proportionately more, traditional 
agriculture was a vital part of the economy. Under the 
French, its methods remained much the same, and the 
consequent results of poor crops also continued. The 
French established agencies to disseminate knowledge of 
modern agricultural techniques as well as to provide·some 
tractors and short-term operational loans.l However, this 
only affected approximately five per cent of the total 
Moroccan farm holdings. Medical achievements were greater 
Lu.N., Structure and Growth of Selected African Econo-
mies, Document No. E 3137/ST/ECA/57, 1958, P• 128. 
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than were economic achievements vis~aMvis modernizing the 
traditional economy. The net result was to have an increased 
population to support, without a subsequent increase in 
Moroccan food production. 
Another problem had to be faced--what to do with the 
ROmadS WhO neither owned fertile land nor possessed even basic 
agricultural knowledg~. They had to somehow be absorbed into 
the 11economyn. Many of them remained pastoralists, yet their 
livestock needed to be improved. 
Individuals from all the challenged groups turned in• 
creasingly to the city to seek employment. There they found 
jobs as menial laborers, dock-hands, and domestics. Yet the 
psychological jolt from rural traditionalism to urban 
sophistication along with sustained hours of labor unsuited 
to their malnutritioned condition caused much frustration. 
This was even more true because public capital was unable to 
provide suf£icient housing and sanitation for these people. 
Numerous bidonvilles (shantytowns) developed. The modern 
industrialized sector of the economy was not able to absorb 
the mass of illiterate people into its still limited structure. 
The cities becrune overwhelmed with migrants. Sousi Berbers 
were primarily drawn to the magnetic field of Casablanca. 
Today, economists view the Moroccan economy as being 
essentially two economies--the traditional and the modern--
which are enmeshed only by weak fibers. 1 The present Ge~ern­
ment is committed to ec0nomic development. Consequently, it 
must devise a single structure which will produce that result~ 
in both the agricultural and urban industrial sectors. The 
modern sector as it now exists is the prime source of d0mestie 
public revenue, and the Government must take care not to over-
burden it in its drive for generalized development. 
libid, .• P• 80, explicitly states this as does Paul Ripoche, 
Problemas Economiques au Maro~ (Paris: 1954), P• 12, 
who says: ttcette situ,ation de_. sous-developpement est a 
la fois cause et consequence de la coexistence de deux 
economies qui se justaposent mais s'interp~netrent peu. 
D1une part, une economie monetaire economiquement indus-
trielle, techniquement mod~rne, socialement individua~ 
liste. D1 autre part, une economie plus O¥ moins amone-
taire ou de subsistance, economi~uement agricola et 
artisanale, techniquement arrieree, socialement tribale, 
aveQ toute la force que l'encadrement traditionnel con-
' ' , " fere a la fwnille patriarcale. La necessite d'une 
adaptation de l'economie traditionnelle ne fait pas de 
doute pour nous... • ~ 
"Mais cette indispensable adaptation se heurte a de re-
elles difficultes. / , 
n_ .. difficultes d'ordre economique parce que l'activite 
economique des deux groupes de population limite encore 
les zones de contact •••• 
"--difficultes d'ordre social egalement. Les stru~tures 
sociales et politiques traditionnelles s 1opposent a cet-
te adaptation. Le reg~e foncier, llorganisation SOCia-
" .... le, le regime politique tendent a consolider et a main-
tenir les structures traditionnelles. 1 
"--enfin, difficultes d'ordre psychologique que l'on ne-
glige trop souvent. La brusque mutation que nous.deman-
dons aux Marocains d'accomplir lorsqu'ils sont en rela-
tions avec nous ne va pas sans heurts et sans difficul-
tes, parfois m~e sans dechir,ements. Tirailles entre 
deux civilisations, sollicites chaque jour par de nou-
... , ,. , 
veaux problemas, en partie detaches du passe mais en-
core incertains de l•avenir, ils sont en permanence a 
la recherche d'un compromis toujours remis en question 
entre le respect des traditions ancestrales et la ne-
cessi te d tune rapide evolution. II 
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SUMMARY 
The traditional social structure of Sousi has been out-
lined above as close to it·s.r reality and not its ideal as pos-
sible. The pattern o~ variability was noted. This was felt 
to be necessary to capture the essence of Berber ttsoeiety". 
Generalization of the structure beyond the degree maintained 
here would have of~ered us a non-generalized Weberian ideal 
type--neither useful here as one extreme of an analytical 
polar scale nor suited to our purposes of comprehending struc-
tural change. 
Without getting involved in a discussion of causative 
faetors, it was seen that the sectors of the traditional 
structure were consistent with each other~ The Berber way of 
life appeared to be based on the theme of segmentation in 
practically every form of social aetivity.1 It was indicated 
that the specific array and arrangement of institutions were 
not the only ones possible of evoking what has been vaguely 
called the Berber "ethos". 
The structural developments and changes inadvertantly 
made as well as consciously planned by the French rrave also 
been indicated. It has been seen that in spite of the original 
lThe problem of the chicken and the egg is still a factor 
in this assumptive statement. It is, however, unneces-
sary to be drawn into a polemic here. Whether or not 
this statement is true, the results with regard to the 
social structure of Sousi are the same, and it is the 
latter which is being examined here, and not its cause 
or causes. Second, the above does not represent a favor• 
ing of Ruth Benedict's ideas on patterns of society, nor 
a negation of Opler's multi-theme conception of society. 
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French policy of maintaining the traditional social structure, 
effective control necessitated an infrastructure and bureauc-
racy. The establishment of a bureaucracy side by side with 
the traditional structuring tenderlgto undermine that structur-
ing. The opening of the area coupled with ability to exert 
authority over the populace, forced Berbers to operate within 
the embryonic and quasi-unita~y structure. To date, this 
structure has been insufficient to provide a complete basis 
for an integrated society in Morocco. 
The present Government of Morocco is committed to the 
development of a modern unitary society. It is n0t simply a 
question of completely reducing traditionalism, for much tradi-
tionalism may coexist and/or wed itself to the new structure 
without hindering ~he minimal functioning of that structure. 
In some instances, aspects of traditionalism may even aid 
that development • Nor is the problem one primarily of achiev• 
ing the acceptance of people of the new order. That is cer-
tainly a main ingredient, but not the only one. Too often 
social studies have focused on problems of tribal breakdown 
with its alleged effect of social disorganization,l along with 
the reluctance and/or inability of the population to accept 
modern for.ms of society. These analyses are often accurate, 
but they usually neglect a very basic problem--that much of 
the 'aisorganizationu is due to a lack of a social structure 
lAidan Southall, (ed) Social Change in Modern Africa~ 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961), P• 26, rebuts 
this common equation also, though he recognizes the 
tentativeness of many of the transitional Upatternsn of 
behavior. 
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aole to aceomodate people in the transition. Just as it is 
necessary to influence people to accept the new social order 
and thus to abandon that part of the traditional order which 
obstructs the functioning of the· former, it is also very 
necessary to have that social order sufficiently equipped to 
absorb the people as effective participants. For it is the 
social structure wlrlch provides the variables affecting ac• 
ceptance or non-acceptance in c0njunction with the psycho-
cultural elements of the people. 
Continuation of divisive Berber traditionalism in spite 
of the foray of modernism can be accounted for by one of two 
factors, but most often by a combination of the two: (1) 
Berbers may continue to find greater satisfaction in their 
traditional way of life where the rules and expectations are 
known, and thus refuse to accept the insecurity and "brazen-
. 
ness 11 of the new order; and (2} traditionalism may continue 
. 
because the social order, i.e. its structure, is not itself 
generalized. The present study focuses on the second while 
taking into account and recognizing the necessity and legiti-
macy of the first category of studies. 
One must continually be conscious of the fact that the 
modern structure is not equated with urbanism. The new 
structure must envelope the majority rural population as 
well. Rural areas must be brought into the cash economy, under 
codified laws, etc. Consequently, the anticipated structure 
must be brought to these people and their roles within it de-
~ined and sufficient to insure their effective participation. 
The process seems almost prohibitive when one again recalls 
the extensive physical and social variability of Morocco as 
a whole, and keep in mind that only one area of it, the tradi-
tional Sous Province, is being dealt with here. 
The next chapter is a review of the present status of the 
modern unitary structure in Morocco. It is followed by an anal• 
ysis of the embryonic structure's effectiveness or lack there-
of for creating an integrated and stable society. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EMBRYONIC MODERN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MOROCCO 
GENERAL REMARKS 
In a st~dy of this nature, elaboration of many ele-
ments which influence modern structural growth and accept8 
ande is necessary to comprehend the complexities involved. 
However, in order not to lose sight of the focus of the 
study, such elaboration must be delimited. Therefore, 
various elements appear in the form of statements which 
give recognition to them as essential ingredients of the 
total dramatization of Moroccan structural development. 
When Moracco received its independence in 1956 from 
France and Spain, it was immediately faced with many prob-
lems. Among these were: the flight of capital from the 
country--already suffering an economic recession; the inte-
gration and development of the for.mer Spanish zone; con-
~ling the Liberation Ar.my; determining the status of the 
previous international city of Tangier; purging the disloyal 
and "collaborationists"; defining civil rights; establish" 
' -ing a national and codified body of law; mass education; 
lack of trained personnel in every field; political reorgani-
zation, particularly in rural areas; economic development; 
and welfare pr0grams. The high expectations of the primari• 
ly illiterate populace could not be immediately fulfilled, 
and disenchanted groups created great concern for the central 
Government. Political party demands for larger cuts of the 
political pie caused mueh friction in the upper echelons of 
Government. Disputes within single party ranks, especially 
the leading Istiqlal party, diverted energies from societyM 
building.1 
King Mohammed V immediately set down the fra:melvork of a 
multi-faceted social plan which recognized the necessity to 
move forward in all sectors of the embyronic structure. 
Lewis summarizes the goals of the plan: 
• • • (1) the integration and unification of all 
for.mer Moroccan protectorate zones as a national 
unit; (2) liquidation of all former obstacles to 
national cohesion through a reorganization of ad-
ministrative boundaries, a program of detribali-
zation and the standardization of educational and judicial systems; (3) stabilization of rural pop-
ulation through modernization programs intended 
to increase agricultural productivity and augment 
standards of living; and (4) the introduction of 
representati~R institutions ca~able of clarifying 
rural opinion and local needs. 
Other Moroccan officials and people involved in Moroccan af· 
fairs ~cognized the necessity of the multi-sector effort.3 
lThe best single study of these various problems is 
Douglas E. Ashford, Political Change in MGrocco (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961). It is impossible to 
analytically disc~ss all the twists and turns of party 
and union politics. There are others who have focused 
on these matters. Ashford's book is particularly help-
ful with regard to party politics, rural administration, 
and development of interest groups. See also Lacouture, 
~· cit., PP• 127-169, for a fine review of party forma-
tion and politics in Morocco. 
2Lewis, "Rural", P• 47• 
3Mehdi Ben Barka (former president of the National Con• 
sultative Assembly), "L'Instruction au Maroc", Confluent, 
No. 20 {March, 1958), PP• 76"79, states this view but 
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They realize that development of one sector is meaningless 
without the development of other sectors. For example, a 
modern political structure requires at least a minimally lit• 
erate and politically articulate populace as well as laws 
governing procedure and behavior. 
Without parallel efforts in related sectors, greater 
propen~ity for discontent may develop. It is often true that 
the traditional way of life is disengaged before a new way of 
life is suffici.ently developed to re ... engage people. Frequently, 
what results is the use of traditional institutions to demand 
achievements of modern goals. Witness, for example, the Riff 
and Middle Atlas tribal upr~sings in the winter of 1958·59. 
A survey of the problem areas by a Royal Commission indicated 
that the areas, and p~rticularly the Riff, had acquired a 
taste for the modern world; were suffering great economic hard-
ships which they expected the Government to alleviate; were 
aware of the role they played in the independence struggle--
which they felt entitled them to greater care by Rabat; and 
yet were still entrenched, by necessity and perhaps desire, in 
sufficient particularism so as not to comprehend the complexi-
particularly emphasizes the necessity of mass education 
as the cornerstone for structural development, compre-
hension and popular participation. J-P, c., "Travail et 
Questions Sociales," Confluent, No. 21 (April 1958), P• 
227 notes: nEn effet pour attffln.dre ce but supreme des 
, r A eleme~ts de tous ordres devront etre mis en oeuvre: 
eeo~omiques, sociaux, politiques, educatifs, car c•est 
sur tous les plans et avec la participation active et 
volontaire de chacun que finalement le progres se 
realisera. 11 See also Mehdi Ben Barka, Probl~mes d' 
Edification du Maroc et du Maghreb (Paris: Plon, 1959). 
ties involved in achieving such goals. The blrume was placed 
• 
squarely on the Central Government. Riffians refused to pay 
taxes, avoided local market towns, and retreated to mountain 
areas from which they had offensive and defensive advantage. 
In short, they did what they tradit~onally did against a roe.1 
Governmental realization of the problems facing it in 
the constructmon of modern Morocco does not assure solutions. 
' 1 
Morocco, as other newly independent countries of Africa, has 
nGt had the luxury or gradually acquiring and becoming ac-
climated to a modern unitary ·society. It must be developed 
whole and rapidly from a limited structural base. Demands for 
it, and all that it implies in terms of social justice and 
higher standard of living, have been stimulated in the masses. 
Their low threshhold of patience is intensified by their cul• 
tural inability to comprehend the intricacies involved in de-
veloping modern society. The re·sult is that the Government 
must bear the greatest burden for its construction. In other 
words, this means social planning. Though the Government is 
well aware of the sociological facts or the matter, they ane 
still h~pered by two major considerations:2 (1) capital in 
lsee Lewis, "Morocco; '];he Impact," PP• xv-:x.vi, for a dis-
cussion of this. 
2It is very interesting to note that government planners 
in most underdeveloped areas have realized the need of 
having the great~st sociological and anthropological 
knowledge possible in devising their plans of socio-
economic development. For example, Jo~o Goncalves de 
Souza in his article "Skills for Tomorrow", Americas 
(Dec. 1961), PP• 5~8, notes that of 100,000 trained 
professionals needed by Latin America in the next five 
years, 10,000 of these should be sociologists and 
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real and monetary terms to develop the ~oundation is not suf-
ficient to keep up with the demands of the people; and (2) 
social science knowledge is not .so advaaced that social plan• 
ning can be designed with precision. As a matter of fadt the 
unforeseen and unintended circumstances which arise from the 
most caref~l social planning can often'be more det~imental 
than the plan helpful. 
Briefly, to knQW that all sectors must be developed to-
gether as an interrelated whole,l and to be able to plan it, 
finance it, carry it through with lirdted personnel and be 
relatively successful are som~thing else. The Moroccan Govern~ 
ment recognizes these facts, and has attempted to devise mod• 
est plans which will give the maximum benefits. But there 
are two factors which limit the possible benefits: (1) the 
classic problem of the rate of population increase surpassing 
the rate of social and economic development; and (2) anti-
colonialist feelings juxtaposed against extreme nationalism 
have limited Moroccan acceptance of foreign aid. Inde~end­
ence to Moroccans and, properly speaking, is also non-reli-
anthropologists. Unfortunately, Morocco has very few 
social scientists as yet, but its planners seem to 
have sophistication along these lines. Lewis, "Morocco: 
The Impact," passim, makes particular note of this. 
lThe author recognizes that even if the whole structure 
could be developed at one time (a practical impossi-
bility), there is still the psychological factor 
which could undermine the unitary structure from 
becoming the unitary society. 
1 
ance on other countries. Such dependence is thought to be 
an affront to Moroccan dignity as well as to Moroccan sover8 
eignty. 
GENERAL SEGMENTATION 
Unlike traditional segmentation where the units were 
usually weakly threaded, if at all, modern segments operate 
within the framework of nation. The units are no longer 
units in themselves, but are being forged, primarily by 
governmental efforts, into a unitary structure. 
The new segments are too numerous to list completely 
here. The segments which provide for general participa-
tion in the society are the ones of most interest to this 
particular study. 2 National segments will be discussed 
first, followed by a discussion of the various territorial 
segments which theoretically relate local members to the 
wider society. 
The central Government with its network of agencies 
and commissions in conjunction with the Palace and its 
1see A. Assouline, 11Prtsentation du Plan Quinquennal, 
1960-1964," Bulletin Eeonomi ue et Sociale du Maroc 
(BESM), XXV, No. 9 August 19 1 , PP• 2 -30 1 for 
an expression of this view as well as some of the 
other problems noted above. 
2It is obvious that the various nation-wide segments 
are not open to universal participation, since such 
participation is not always appropriate for each 
individual--e.g. one would hardly find a middle-aged 
man joining the youth progrrun. 
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advisors are primarily respansible for the planning of the 
anticipated social development. Their efforts have not 
always been coordinated, especially in the initial phase of 
independence. However, under the present five-year plan, 
a very conscious attempt at a coordinated and balanced 
attack on the development of and participation in a modern 
Moracco is evidenced.1 Various agencies of the Government 
create other national units, e.g. youth group mavements. 
Second, political parties had their beginnings under 
the French and Spanish Protectorates. The Istiqlal party 
ranked first at the time of independence. Since then an 
effective opposition party, the Union Nati.onale des Forces 
Populaires (UNFP) has taken root. It contains many for.mer 
members of the Istiqlal party. There are other parties: 
the Partie Democratie Oonstitutionelle (PDC--the former PDI}~" 
popular in the traditional cities of Morocco; the Movement 
Populaire (MP)--a rural Berber-based party drawing main 
support from the Riff area; and the Idbereaux Independants 
(LI)--a party attempting to appeal to the spectrum of 
-Moroccan "society." 
Each party, some more than others, has its various 
agencies operating throughout the nation. The agencies, 
through local cadres attempt, for exgmple, to develop 
lMinistere de 1 1Economie Nationa~, Division de la 
Coordination Economique et du Plan, Plan Quinquennal, 
1960-1964 (Rabat: 1959). 
political sophistication among the masses; educational and 
vocati0nal programs; and programs for the emanicipation 0f 
women. The Istiqlal has the most extensive program to date. 
The various programs of these parties at times dovetail the 
efforts of the Government, and at times contradict and even 
conflict with the work of the Government. 1 Instilling the 
idea of political participation through party membership; 
the meaning of elections; party philosophy; policy and 
methods, for example, are all very difficult for Moroccans, 
I 
especially rural Moroccans, who have p,erh~ps never con-
ceived of them previously as issues or possibilities. 
Third, the unions of Morocco are very active in re-
cruiting members. They too have their various programs of 
worker education and indoctrination. The two major unions 
are the Union Marocaine des Commercants, Industrialists, 
et Artisants (UMCIA) representing business interests to a 
great extent, and the Union Marocaine de Travail (UMT), 
lFor an interesting example of party complementation of 
Government efforts, read an interview cendueted by E. 
DePirey of Madame Fatima Hassar on "L'Emancipation de 
la Femme, 11 Confluent, No. 21 (April 1958), pp. 210-213. 
Madame Hassar works both for the Istiqlal feminist 
movement and for the Entraide Nationale, i.e. the Mutual 
Aid Society, presided over by Princess Lalla Aicha, 
which does much to emancipate the woman through basic 
and trade education. 
A note of caution should also be made here. It is not 
necessarily true that the Government programs are the 
most effective, and that a hindering of them will ~e 
disastrous for the society. But since the Government 
is primarily responsible for social development, 
obstructions it may meet are noted. 
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representing industrial and agricultural labor. The former 
was allied with the Istiqlal party until 1958, while the lat-
ter is allied with the UNFP. At an earlier period the UMT 
supported the Istiqlal, but broke with it when the UNFP devel-
oped im 1959-1960. In 1960, the Palace in tacit support of 
the Istiqlal gave its permission for the establishment of 
another trade union under Istiqlal auspices, the Union 
Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM). Each party, then, 
had a labor wing which allowed them means of organized sup-
The UMT claims to have the largest labor membership raDg-
ing between 600,000 to 1,000,000 m.embers. It, along with its 
party ally, favor an activist leftist approach to general 
soeial development and foreign pol~cy. On the other hand, 
the Istiqlal and the UGTM are more conservative in some ways. 
The Istiqlal itself, however, is also "leftist-orientedu to 
some degree, but not as "Marxist" as i; its opposition.1 
lQharles Gallagher in "Observations on Moroccan Political 
and Economic Problems, tt American Universities Field Staff' 
Reports Service (North Africa Series), V, No. 2 (1959), 
p. 6 says: 11It is more questionable if they can be des-
cribed as being farther to the left, for the spectrum 
of politics in a country'like Morocco is far more vari• 
able in this regard than in Western states. In terms of 
international politics, neo-Istiqlal (as the UNFP members 
were initially known,. mine) attitudes betray an even 
firmer orientation toward the doctrine of 'nondependence' 
and an increased trend away from lingering-vestiges of 
French, and Occidental, protectivimn. The comment on 
international events found in At Tahrir (opposition 
paper), for example, often hews rather closely to the 
Communist line. But the pressure upon any group in pow-
er in a neutralist, ex-colonial country, to show itself 
free of any taint of subjection to its former ma.sters 
must be taken into account. 
The Istiqlal has always had more representation in the 
Government than any other party. Its members, particularly 
after the birth of the UNFP which absorbed former Istiqlalian 
activists, were for maintaining the status quo in certain 
spheres, and for allowing change on a more gradual basis in 
other spheres. UMT-UNFP members have accused the Istiqlalians 
of attempting to establish a neo-colonialist regime, of in-
dulging in political nepotism, corruption,.and of holding up 
grass roots development.~ 
"Internally the rather general suppert which the new 
movement has from the urban proletariat and union members 
tends to confirm the convential view of its as leftist. 
But it is really doubtful if most Moroccans themselves 
think of the neo-Istiqlal as a 'radical' group opposed 
to a 'conservative' party element. Socializing ter.ms 
are in fashion politically: the first opposition move-
ment of 1958 called itself the 1Mouvement Populaire,' 
or Harakat ash Sha'biyah, and the rebels of the Rif is-
sued a manifesto describing themselves as 'Islamic 
Socialists'. In all events the reader of Al 1Alam, the 
daily of the old Istiqlal, would hardly get the impres-
sion from its diatribes against feudalism, privilege, 
illicit accords with foreign capital, spoliation of the 
people's property, and so on, that he was reading a 
right-wing newspaper attacking a left-wing government 
(the former Government of Ibrahim, mine) • " 
lThis view was strongly expressed by Mahjoub Ben Seddiq, 
Secretary-General of the UMT, at a seminar discussion 
held at the Boston University African Studies Program 
in February 196lo It is most interesting to note that 
the recent Government formed by King Hassan II provides 
ministerial positions for the leaders of the various 
political parties except that of the UliFP. It is no 
secret that the Palace disapproves of the latter• It 
is an open secret that the Palace has tended to yield 
more to Istiqlal demands while suppressing the operations 
of UMT-UNFP members and media. Further evidence is 
brought to bear on the matter when we note that in 1957, 
King Mohammed V had publicly supported the idea of one 
trade union, which was then the Istiqlal oriented UMT. 
Yet in 1960, he allowed the UGTM to be formed under 
Istiqlal auspices. 
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The pressure for more rapid political, social and eco-
nomic re!C&rms from the UMT-UNFP on the one hand, and the con• 
servatism of the Istiqlal-UGTM on the other, joined by assusa-
tions from and in all directions make it difficult for the 
central Government to formulate policy. Such polemics also 
confuse the population at large who are not yet, in many 
areas, able to distinguish the Government from the Istiqlal 
pa~ty. Often the situation deteriorates to a battle for mass 
support of Unions and Parties based on propagandistic acumen 
of various members supported by their socially particularistic 
knowledge of various areas. 
This fact was one of the reasons why the Government 
played down party politics in the May 1961 local elections.1 
It was thought best to stress the elections as administrative 
elections and not connect them with party membership. None-
theless, such elections were thought meaningless without party 
identification. This situation could and perhaps did have 
adve~se effects on the growth of modern political life in 
Morocco. Gonsequently, the parties and even the Government 
in tacit manner attempted to assess the strength of the 
lsee Douglas Ashford, "Elections in Morocc0: Progress or 
Confusion," Middle East Journal (Winter 1961), PP• 1-15, 
notes in this article the tact that even though this 
was not to be a political election, the Istiqlal was 
allowed more flexibility in identifying its candidates 
to the populace than were the other parties. In an 
as yet unpublished study by Willirun Zartman~on the 
organization of elections and the problems attendant 
thereto, he presents a very fine analysis of the 
situation and expresses some of the views presented 
above. 
respective parties. They were mnazed to find that while the 
Istiqlal remained on top, the UNFP had made significant in-
roads in industrial areas. This, of course, is where it was 
best erganize~given its recent and difficult birth as well 
as its urban labor base in the UMT. 
There are other unions and quasi-unions in Morocco. 
Among them is the U~on Marocaine des Agriculteurs (UMA} 
formed under nationalist auspices in 1958. Its late formation 
attests to the complexities of the rural situation, the offense 
against which was postponed during the hectic first days of 
independence.1 There is also the Union National des Etu-
diants Marocains (UNEM) which attempts to define the role 
of the youth in Morocco. 
The national government headed by the King, along with 
its numerous. commissions and agencies, political parties, 
and unions for.m the main nation-wide segments. But, terri-
torial segmentation is also nation-oriented, since the 
local units are units of administration tied to the central 
system. 
Morocco is divided into approximately sixteen provinces~ 
which are themselves divided into French-type circles, ·and 
finally into about 800 urban and rural communes. The communes 
are broken down into approximately 10,350 electoral districts •. 
lAshford, Political Change, P• 376, expresses this 
view. 
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One of the most pressing demgnds upon newly independent 
Morocco was a reorganization of the country's territorial 
arrangement. In 1951, the French had begun communal reorgani-
zation, but the little that was done was oriented to the 
needs of the Protectorate administration.1 In order for the 
Moroccan Government to plan econondc projects, to set up 
modern administration geared to nation rather than traditional 
I 
segments, such reorganization was thought to be a necessity. 
The primary criteria were geographic (including ecology and 
demography), economic, and ethnic factors. An attempt was 
made to rely chiefly on the first two and play down the 
latter, since a tacit goal of the reshuffling of borders was 
to break down ethnic particularism, particularly in the 
political sphere. 
A Gommission Itinerants de Decoupage of the Department 
of Political and Administrative Affairs of the Ministry of 
the Interior was established in 1957 for the ptlrpose of 
territorially defining the communes.2 It was made up of 
French and Moroccan specialists. Most often, they were not 
able to use all the criteria listed. They sought to es-
tablish areas with a ttco:mmunity of interests, 11 located near 
lBremard, loc. cit., discusses this. He complained of 
too much centrSiization, and not enough local flexibility 
of action. Much the same situation obtains today. 
2Tb.rough the kindness of Dr. Douglas Ashford, the author 
was able to read his copy of the unpublished report 
of the Commission. 
communication and transportation lines sufficient to meet 
the particular needs of that area. One prime economic 
criterion was religiously upheld, that of building the 
commune around a ~· The reasons are obvious. Neverthe-
less, many communes were recognized that were traditionally 
ethnic socio-political units. Ashford notes: 
• • • There are many instances of coincidence be-
tween tribes or sections of tribes and the new 
communes, but the overriding criteria have been 
to include an area where the people may convene without 
undue hardship, have some common economic and social 
problems to encourage cooperation, and have suffi-
cient inc0me to enable small local projects of their 
own choo sing.l 
The members of the Commission claimed that for about seventy-
five per cent of the communes: 
Le t~avail entrepris etablit do~~ une carte des 
communes rurales extremement differente de la carte 
des fractions et, m~me, des anciennes tribus.2 
However, 
.... / 
Il restera a determiner par la pratique si ces 
regroupements ont pu effacer perta~ns particularisme 
ethniques et constituer de veritables communautes 
d'inter~sts.3 
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF PRESENT-DAY MOROCCAN COMMUNITIES 
In spite of the fact that Morocco has perhaps one of 
the best infrastructures of Africa, it is still lacking 
lAshford, Political Change, P• 357. 
2From the Report of the Commission Itintrante de , 
Decoupage, page number unknown. 
3Ibid. 
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with regard to connecting the various areas in easy flow. 
The result ~s that many areas, particularly the mountainous 
localities, are as yet relatively inaccessible. In some 
oases, the physical rel~ef is much as the traditional relief. 
Nonetheless, the areal reorganization has wrought many changes. 
This study is particularly interested in the rural changes 
which affect the Berbers. 
The focal point for the new rural agglomerations is the 
souk, as previously noted. In some cases, there were several 
souks in a concentrated area. Though many were allowed to 
continue as trading areas within a newly established commune, 
the major or most convenient one was selected to become the 
economic, social, religious, educational and administrative 
center. In other areas, there were none or at least no 
significant ones. 
The Government wanted each commune to have some means 
of achieving economic viability. It hoped that in reorganiz-
ing the country territorially, each commune would have local 
resources of at least a million francs, and that the annual 
transactions of the ~ center would figure at 5001 000 
francs. Some areas had much more, others much less. In 
several eases where the best border demarcations could be 
made, there were no souks for the new co~unes. As a result, 
Commission members and local officials had to carry on 
fairly careful negotiations so that a number of local soukless 
communes could share income from a ~ commune. 
The communes are no larger than an area covering a twenty 
kilometer radius from the market centers, and many are smaller. 
This enables each of their members to have access to the 
communal centers. In terms of population, the average commune 
has between 10,000 to 15,000 people. Some have more, some 
have less. 1 
If the area was a farming area, the Commission attempted 
to set up the communes near a water supply. If the area was 
a mining area, each commune was thought to need the maximum 
transportation and eommunication conveniences available. 
There were other considerations which played a role in 
the reorganization. The Government of Morocco envisages a 
growth of industries devoted to processing the raw materials 
it now ships to other countries for manufacturing.2 Thus, 
the need for areas of potential hydraulic power around 
which factories could be built, is essential. The situation 
would, after initial investment, have to be of such convenience 
so as to control the cost of production in order to compete 
with other countries producing the same products. Trans-
portation to port cities is an imperative consideration in 
this anticipated development. Furthermore, equity of 
actual and potential sources of income had to be considered 
in the redistricting.3 
.. lst...,.,~--4l,~. ~' .. $f~ 
lsee Appendix D. 
2Assouline, !2..£.• &.:!!.•, and Plan Quinguennal, .!!£.• ill• 
3Ashford, Political Change, p. 358, accurately describes 
some of the difficulties entailed in sectioning the 
In some cases where the population was sparse and/or 
isolated, the Commissi~n recommended a regrouping. Regrouping, 
however, immediately suggests numerous psychol~gical problems 
as well as problems of basic reality, e.g. the need to furnish 
housing for the regreuped individuals. In some areas, sec-
tioning was recommended, which meant that groups previously 
related in the traditional structure were broken off and 
reattached to new groups in accordance with the criteria 
listed above.l To break traditional habits requires more, 
country into viable communes: "The structure of the 
communal system can best be judged from the reports of 
the Itinerant Commission, which met with the high 
officials of each province to prepare a statement oD 
the division of the communes. The reports from the 
provinces of Fes and Tafilalet were selected because 
they reveal the bewildering variety of problems in 
planning communes. The northern province has a 
relatively rich and modern agricultural econ~my in 
open plains. In the more primitive and arid southern 
province the people struggle along with mountainside 
flecks or are scattered along the eroded valleys 
running through the pre-Sahara region. The commission 
noted that the division in Fes province was facili-
tated by the local officials' familiarity with the old 
system and by the open plains. The t~sk was more dif-
ficult in Tafilalet where little had been done to 
modernize the economy and where the tribal structure 
was stronger. The communes envisaged by the Pro-
tectorate were too small to be helpful and not well 
implanted. The small souks could not support a commune 
and the dispersed occupations did not encourage central 
projects. Both the livestock and rich olive groves of 
Fes supported active, large souks where income could 
be derived f~r the c~mmune. .~e problem was, nevertheless, 
complicated because much of the income was controlled 
by large landowners living in Fes while many of the 
local people had only the small wages of rural laborers." 
lsee Hassan Zem:m.ouri,. "L' Operation Oo:tnnlllne~" Confluent, 
No. 22 (June 1958), pp.-242-247• Mr. Zemmouri was one 
of the Co~ission members, and gives anC excellent sum-
mary of the various problems involved in defining the 
communes. Also see Lacouture, 2£• £!i., PP• 222-233. 
however, than a simple reshuffling of communal borders.1 
Through the reorganization, whereby each area was grouped 
to exploit the resources available to it and to make it as 
accessible as possible under present conditions obtaining in 
Morocco, the physical basis for a unitary structure was be-
ing laid. Participation in the new communes with their 
souk centers slowly developing profiles of public buildings 
are the chief hope of the Government in orienting the populace 
to national life and away from particularistic segments. 
Even where the traditional segments were left intact, the 
institutional foci of the areas involved are planned as in 
the reorganized areas, and to serve the same purposes. 
To state the hopes, aims and desires of the Government 
for the new communes is not to say these communes are func-
tional as yet. Even the borders of the communes are not 
completely settled. No map is available to the public of 
the reorganized communal areas. Continuous work toward the 
fulfillment of the stated goals--hampered by lack of funds, 
material, and personnel--is pursued, but much is left to be 
done. 
In summary, the new relief of rural Morocco is a 
pattern of more eq~itable sized communes, built around 
1zartman, op. cit., P• 32, notes election returnswere 
often given in ter.ms of traditional segmentation though 
the latter had been replaced for the areas involved. 
However, one should be cautious in attributing this to 
a desire for traditionalism. Habits of for.m are not 
always accompanied by habits of content. 
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traditional ~ sites, a~d connected to urban counterparts 
by a network o~ roads and mass media. Enclosed within each 
commune are the maximum sources possible for its existence and 
p@tential -development. Within the communal market center, 
the institutional matrix of a modern unitary society is 
being erected, but the realities of Moroccan life greatly 
condition its rate of growth. 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
During the first three years of independence, the Moroccan 
political structure did not change significantly from the 
one formulated by the French Protectorate. The French system 
had been based primarily on the preservation of the tradi-
tional institutions, but reoriented to French authority. We 
have already noted some of the French mechanimns of political 
control iR Sousi. 
The French had divided Morocco into regions, terri-
tories, circles and local communities. The regions o~ 
Oujda, Casablanca and Rabat were under civil control while 
the others, Fez, Meknes, Marrakesh and Agadir ~ell under 
military control. French civil servants, i.e. civil control-
lers and indigenous affairs officers, were placed on the 
territorial and circle levels, ~or the most part. The qaid, 
who was historically the representative of the ~ultan in 
Makhzeni areas, with his various assistants, the khalifet, 
along with the positions o~ sheik and moqaddem were retained 
under the French syste~ under close supervision and 
scrutiny. The qaid, assisted by the khalifet, administered a 
tribe or two for the French, while the sheik supervised a 
sectional division of a tribal area, and the moqaddem hgndled 
matters on the village level. In Berber areas, the djemaa 
was allowed to continue, and local men if not already holding 
one of the above listed titles, were appointed by the French 
to do so. In'mast cases French civil servants were also 
operating on the local levels not only to handle the needs 
of bureaucracy but also to keep a check on the areas. 
In the larger towns, whether in civil or military areas, 
there was some semblance of a civil municipal structure 
under French civil controllers and the traditional pashas. In 
the urban areas, there were French managed municipal councils. 
With the advent of independence, the whole structure was 
in disrepute. Officials from qaid to moqaddem were thought 
to have been collaborationists and lackeys of the colonialists. 
Nonetheless, they could not be immediately replaced, and some 
of them along with most of the structure were retained. 
Slowly, the ranks of these minor officials were purged of 
11disloyaltt and 11Undesirable" characters, though there are 
. 
a number of them still inc irculatio:n. There is still a 
tremendous shortage o~ qualified men willing to fill the 
positions available in rural areas. 
Upon his return to the throne, the King appointed 
governors--primarily Istiqlalians and/or military men--over 
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hastily demarcated provinces. They were to be the liaisonal 
cont~ol over the minor o~~icials on behal~ o~ the central 
Government. T-he latter wanted centralized e0ntrol to be 
recognized immediately. There were several cases o~ abuse 
by the governors, and the inexperience o~ some was also 
marked. At most, the situation was tenative and unstructured. 
There~ore, little accountability could be maintained with 
regard to these individuals and their minors. 
On the national level, the situation was, structurally 
speaking, less di~~icult. A Souneil o~ Ministers had been 
~ormed in pre-independence days to plan ~or independence. 
It lasted ~rom December 1~55 to October 1956, at which time 
a new Government was ~ormed. The King also maintained a 
Royal Cabinet which advised him on various matters. Intention 
to make Morocco a constitutional monarchy was announced ~or 
the near ~uture. A constitutional committee was established 
in 1960, and a completion date o~ mid-1962 was set. 
In addition, a National Consultative Assembly was 
~or.med in October 1956. Its ~ormation was part o~ a plan to 
institute structural ~orms ~or popular political participa-
tion. (The rest o~ the plan included development o~ an 
electoral law, and the ~ormation o~ rural communes). The 
Assembly was made up o~ seventy-six members coming ~rom 
political parties, economic and social organizations, recog-
nized but non-political leaders, and various pro~essional 
groups. The King selected the twelve non-political members 
of the Assembly. They were representatives of the legal 
profession and oulemas (~, sing.), i.e. the religious 
scholars. All other members were nominated by their indi-
vidual groups subject t0 the approval of the King. The 
nondnees were prominent men who were not already holding 
national offices. The Istiqlal was represented by ten 
members; the PDI (i.e. the PDC now) by six; the UMT (then 
an Istiqlal supporter) by ten; agricultural associations 
(primarily large landowners) by eighteen; commercial and 
industrial associations by nine; and other professional 
associations by eleven. In 1957, a member representing the 
.UNEM was also admitted. The composition of the Assembly 
heavily favored urban and landed interests with the regions 
of greatest social and political develo~ment carrying over 
half of the seats. Although the Assembly was not intended to 
be a representative body, it decidely neglected the less 
developed rural areas. As Ashford notes: 
The selection testifies to the advantage of organized 
interests in a new country and to the mechanical dif-
ficulty of giving means of expression to the socially 
retarded segment of the population. The King had no 
illusions on this shortcoming. He acknowledged that 
the delegates had been selected on the basis of 
"competence and experience" and frankly admitted that 
the method of designation was improvised.l 
The Assembly was consulted on a wide range of domestic 
and foreign problems facing the nation. The debates were 
public, and the Council of Ministers was to be present when 
lAshford, Political Change, P• 348. 
the King requested it. Otherwise, the minister about whose 
department a debate was being held, was to be present. 
Ass~mbly members could pose questions to various ministers 
with regard to the work of their ministries, and the latter 
were required to r e spend. 
The structure of the assembly took on the form of a 
western-type parliament, with a president and vice-president 
elected by the members, and a number of specialized commissions. 
The King, however, was the source of all authority, and he 
could remove a member when he pleased, end a session, and/or 
dissolve the body. ~or the most part, however, he did not 
utilize these powers initially, and gave the members freedom 
of speech. He guara:n.teed them imm.uni ty from arrests for 
comments they may make in the Assembly debates. With the 
exception of· a few members who, ·in early 19.58, were removed 
from their positionfbr non-attendance, the delegates were 
quite active and vocal. Often, they did not hesitate to 
criticize the Government, even if members of their own 
groups were involved. 
The president of the Assembly was Mehdi Ben Barks., at 
that time an Istiqlalian, and the vice-president was Mahjoub 
Ben Seddiq, Secretary-General of the UMT. Both these men 
became increasingly critical of their fellow party members in 
the Government for their conservatism in rate and efficiency 
·in handling the nation's social, economic and political 
development. Ben Barka and Ben Seddiq strongly represented 
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the activist wing o~ the Istiqlal. Shortly therea~ter, a 
split occurred within party ranks. Out of the split emerged the 
UNFP. Ben Barka became the leader of the latter and was 
supported by Ben Seddiq and the UMT. 
In order to circumvent the stalemates often created over 
certain issues by party politics, the King would appoint 
commissions to mudy a particular problem. Some commissions 
were completely made up of non-political individuals. How-
ever, most commissions included members of the Ceuncil of 
Ministers, the National Consultative Assembly and non•political 
personages. These commissions would write their reports 
and submit them to the King ~or examination. The commissions 
attam»ted to work as closely with the ~inistry involved in 
their study as was possible. 
Party disputes and claims of popularity along with 
domestic and interRational problems kept the Government in~a 
constant state of crisis. T.he result was that since the 
establishment o~ the ~irst Council o~ Ministers in December 
1955, there has been a total o~ six Governments. As the 
situation became increasingly critical, King Mohamed V ~ound 
it necessary in May 1960 to disband the Assembly and for.m 
the fifth Gove.rnment under his presidency and his son Prince 
Moulay Hassan's vice-presidency. A few months a~ter his 
father's death, King Hassan II for.med a new Government under 
his ~remiership. 'Though it represents every party in Morocco 
.except the l:JNFP, ·it heavily favors the Istiqlal. This was 
so even though the UNFP had made a significant showing in the 
May 1960 local elections. A calculated favoring of the 
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Istiqlal combined with Government policy or eclipsing UNFP 
demands' is pursued today. In essence, it attempts to check 
the disturbing iDrluence or the UNFP by stealing its initiative 
in certain roreign and domestic matters. In addition, the 
Government has moved gradually to make it dirficult for the 
UNFP to operate. The UMT organ, L'Avant-Garde, was suppressed 
for a while. Ben Barka was driven into exile. Though the 
civil liberties document which preceded the elections had 
guaranteed freedom of the press, association, assembly, etc., 
a broad clause allowed for the denial or these rights to any 
person or persons threatening "the integrity of the nation 
or the monarchical form of Government.n 
All the above factors combined with others not here 
discussed in a country attempting to develop a democratic 
form or representative government, produces a seeming 
contradiction. An analysis of this situation will be pre-
sented in the next chapter. 
After the country was more carefully reorganized terri-
torially into provinces, circles and about 800 rural and 
urban communes, the political structure emerged more clearly. 
The present state of the National Government has already been 
reviewed. The provinces were still administered by Palace-
appointed governors. Governorships were much sought by 
political parties becau~e of their importance. 
A new office known as superqaid was established which 
was simply a domestic replacement for the French civil 
\ 
controller and indigenous af£airs officer. The supergaid, 
also appointea by the King and/or the provincial governor 
involved, was in charge of the affairs of a circle. His 
duties involved supervision of qaids and other minor officials 
within his jurisdiction. 0n the average, a supergaid 
managed £our qaids. The qaids were usttally appointed by the 
superqaid and/or governor of the area. The qaids each 
1 
administered, generally, two communes. To cut down the 
inefficiency and lack of capabilities of qaids, a school 
was established to train them for their duties. 
Each o££icial was, theoretically, a representative of 
the central government and was subject· te its directives. 
Those who attempted to pocket government money as in the 
traditional Mahkzeni system were purged. 
As part of the government-sponsored national integra-
tion program, o£ficials, particularly qaids, from one area 
were appointed to administer other areas. This was not 
always favorable to either the qaids and other of£icials who 
were involved, or to the communities themselves. Distrust 
and accusations of abuse were hurled at many.2 
Each rural commune elected via universal sufferage a 
local council in May 1960. Its functions were more o£ an 
advisory nature than a directly responsible one. Matters 
had to be cleared by the central government and/or its 
1see Appendix D. 
2Lewis, nRural11 , p. 51, discusses this problem. 
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local representatives. 
In the large modern cities, governors were also appointed. 
In the more traditional cities, the pasha and his entourage 
performed the soore functions. The newly elected municipal 
councils are al·so subject to the same restrictions as their 
rural counterparts. 
The communes were to provide institutions ~hereby the 
people could reach up and influence their national administra-
tion. They were to translate through their councils and minor 
appointed officials,·the legitimate needs of the communities. 
The limits placed on the councils not only inhibit the 
development of democratic processes and weaken the potential 
development of local leaders, but also adversely affect 
governmental social planning. The need to delineate com-
munal potentials and aspirations to give greater precisian 
to the central planning agencies is checked by the narrow 
framework given the councils. If the structural for.m 
exists without the necessary flexibility needdto function 
effectively toward the goals for which it was constructed, 
then its existence can be more detrimental than helpful. 
AshfGrd counsels w~ when he notes that precedent has an 
inherent danger of becoming institutionalized.! 
The "permanent" structural form of the anticipated 
pGlitical system is embryonic. The constitution, when 
completed, will provide greater clarity of the political 
!Ashford, 11Elections rt 1 passim. 
framework. The functions and powers of the proposed 
national legislative body are not known, but are expected 
to be a variation of the western-type parliamenbry system. 
1inat powers and roles the King will retain are also not 
settled. The organization of elections for national officers, 
the situation with the· communes, and other matters are all 
in a fluid state. 
At best, the present strueture contains many tentative 
arrangements, while a steady effort is being made to develop 
the forms noted above. The problem of developing a viable 
political stracture and system is influenced by the often 
hasty replacement of ~ropean civil servants on the lower 
levels of government with incompetent and/or inexperienced 
nationals. The lack of personnel has farced the Government 
to man seventy-five per cent of civil service positions under 
the level of under-secretary of the national government with 
Moroccan Jews.1 This group as a who~e represents a greater 
percentage of individual education and facility with the 
modern structure thmn its Muslim counterpart. Thi~ situation 
is interesting mecause of the manifold complexities of the 
position of Jews in Morocco. 
Such, then, is the present status of the political 
structure ·in Morocco. 
lLewis, 1'Moroccc;>: The Impact," P• 128, notes this 
fact. 
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RELIGION AND LAW 
One of the most pressing and basic·problems faced by 
newly independent Morocco was the problem of establishing a 
nationally codified corpus of law to replace the hodge-podge 
of French, Spanish, Berber, and unreformed Muslim law in-
herited from the past. Because present Moroccan jurispru-
dence is based on the spirit of Islam, it is best to discuss 
the tw0 together. The reformation in both sfi;>).P,eres was 
designed to orient the populace to a uriitary system while 
meeting at least the minimal needs of modern society. 
The religious brotherhoods in Morocco had become dis-
c~edited during the Protectorate period, as previously dis• 
cussed. For some, the means of sustaining their lifeline had 
been to collaborate with the French. The ultimate degree of 
collaboration was witnessed when many of the brotherhoods s~p­
ported the French in sending King Mohammed V into exile in 
Madagascar (Malagasy) in 19.53. During the interim period be-
fore the King's return, the Istiqlal worked long and hard to 
popularize the plight of the King and his sacrifices. Even the 
most isolated village had traditionally recognized the King as 
religious head of Morocco, and his forced departure was felt 
, 
to be an offense to the Divine. The confusion of the time. 
focused Moroccans on the person of the King as their leader. 
The Protectorate period had succeeded in undermining the tradi• 
tional way of life while replacing it with a rather narrow 
and regionally pragmatic system. As a result, traditional 
leadership was not clearly defined, and nasrani control had 
become increasingly abhorent to the politically awakening mas• 
ses. The King, who had been championing the nationalist cause 
for several years and demanding a recognition of Moroccan dig-
nity, was suddenly the outstanding and only leader visible. 
His status as a sherif was also an important factor, for the 
extent of respect for shorfa in Morocco kas gi~~t~ya~en~t~as­
cp.:oe.:v;tqusly. 
When the King was returned in 1955, he.was wildly acclaim• 
ed by his subjects. His prolonged humiliation was handled 
with great ~kill by the nationalists, and his perso~al appeal 
made him into a national hero and symbol. Perhaps never in 
its histary had Moroccans paid such unified tribute to their 
monarch and to the faith of which he was imam. 
The King took to his people via mass media and personal 
appearances, the spiEit of Islam. ·In essence, he was defin-
mrlg for each Moroccan Muslim what his real faith and duties 
were. The masses turned Rabatward to their newly recognized· 
traditional leader, and found it a very natural process which 
had been delayed by history and media insufficiency. As Lewis 
well notes, 11 ••• the King has come to represent the spirit-
ual and secular bridge between the rural peasantry and the 
mQdern world. nl The Monarch urged respect for the true Islam, 
-
and took parallel measures of arresting those sufist leaders 
lLewis, nMorocco: The Impact,tt PP• 120-121. 
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who had conspired against him. Revival of the brotherhoods 
was considered a crime against the State. In the developing 
school system, Islmn as it emanated from the recognized Muslim 
scholars and Rabat was installed. Zawiyas were closed down 
or utilized for the purposes of the new structure. In the 
present Government, there is a Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
charged with insuring the generalization of acceptable Islamic 
doctrine, mnong other things. 
The King's popularity was further tested when the poli-
tical disputes previously mentioned had reached such intensi-
ty that the nation was virtually crippled politically. He 
re~urned to his place of. exile in a dramatically understated 
move to reawaken the nation to the miseries of the past and 
to score the bickering of the present. He was again acclaimed 
with great ovations. This was an obvious indication that the 
voiced discontent of the ~asses did not involve the King. 
Rather, it was directed at the ttcity politicians" whose claims 
and counterclaims not only confused them, but seemed to hinder 
the progress expected. The King remained the one solid leader 
in their eyes. He was blameless for the various. ills .con-
tracted by the nation. Thus, his prestige untarnished, his 
position as religious and temporal head had become reinforced.1 
His son, Moulay Hassan, now King Hassan II, has seemed 
to maintain a decent modicum of popular support, predictions 
lsee Lacouture, op. cit., pp. 98-126, for a discussion 
on the King and the nation. 
to the contrary.l In a sense, the monarchy in Morocco under 
Mohammed V becrume so popular that Hassan benefitted from this. 
The continued use of mass media haa aided the Islamic faith, 
and made it a unifying symbol which replaced the particular• 
istic bretherhoods. Second, the Islam of present·d~y Morocco 
is perhaps more--though not as much as in Tunisia--in keeping 
with the desired modeFhity st~ulated in the masses in Pro• 
tectorate days. However, much of Islgmic traditionalism re-
mains. One negative aspsct of this ~act for the functioning 
of the modern structure is the continued recognition of 
Ramadan. Adherence to the demands ef Ramadan considerably 
c~ts down production in a nation ill able to afford it. Even 
in Tunisia where the popula~ion and its leaders are more 
westernized, suggestions to ignore Ramadan were not well re~ 
ceived. 
The comparatively aocile acceptance of the new body of 
law and juridical structure was itsellif facilitated by the 
lit is to be recognized that Hassan does not carry as 
much popularity as did his father. He is particularly 
repugnant to the aetivis~ in both Morocco and Algeria. 
See the New York Times, (Dee. 25, 1961), p. 5, for an 
interesting article on this. The article notes that: 
"These Algerians describe Ring Hassan's regime as 
feudal, corrup~ and identi~ied with the Islamic faith, 
whereas the Algerian republic, they say, will be social-
ly progressive, if not Marxist, austere and secu.lar. 11 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
uThe nationalists here appear to be convinced that King 
Hassan's regime will soon be replaced by a Leftist 
government with which the Algeria of tomorrow could 
c0operate.u 
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popularity o~ the King in great measure.1 Though undoubtedly, 
Berbers continued in many places to clandestinely adjudicate 
their local members according to their customary law, resist-
ance to the new system was comparatively negligible.2 
Serious work on the codification of Moroccan law sho~~d 
resul~in 1958. A Governmemtal Commission headed by the then 
Ministe~ o~ Jastice, Abdelkrim Benjelloun, set about the first 
task of writing up the new code of personal status. Benjelloun, 
in an official pronouncement in 1957, indicated that the task 
of the Commission was to understand original Islamic law and 
to work within its spirit for present-day needs.3 Orthodox 
Islam as personified by the King was clearly on the ascent in 
Morocco as a unifying symbol. To utilize this fact was of 
lAshford, Political Chang~, p. 116 notes, however, that 
"While the influence of the King, both among the more 
advanced nationalists and among the citizens still 
attached to other customary legal procedures, undoubt-
edly did much t~ enable the harmonious transition to 
reformed Muslim law, it should also be noted that it 
was probably not a significant source of differentiation 
in the peri0d being considered in this book. 11 
2Lewis, ''Morocco: The Impact," pp. 131-132 notes that 
"Some rural oppositi<i>n has crystallized to the imposi-
tion of the Shariah (shraa, mine) law and, reportedly, 
the azref, or customary law, is still quietly pursued 
in many communities. However, such opstinacy is the 
not unnatural product of centuries of usage which can-
not be ~xpected to evaporate through the fiat of govern-
ment alone.n . 
3Abdelkrim Benjelloun, uta Codification du Dreit Musulman," 
Conflueht, No. 18 (January 1958), PP• 4-6. See also 
Simon A-Herve, "Codification et Renovation du Dr0it 
Musulman au Maroc," Confluent, No. 23 (July 1958), Pfr• 
277-280; and Paul Buttin, 11La Reforme de la Justice, ' 
Confluent, No.21 (April 1958), PPo 205-209, for am ad-
ditional discussion of this topic. 
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benefit to the Commission. Second, the need to manifest 
Moroccan character as a reaction to the former colonialist 
rule was also a consideration in this sector as in other~ • 
• Consequently, Moroccan jurisprudence was not being so much in-
novated as renovat~d and reinstated in a written standardized 
for.m. The Commission felt that Islanuc law as practiced by 
unqualified Islrunic qadis and semi-recognized by certain Berber 
groups had been compro~sed. Thus a two-pronged attack was 
made: (1) codification of the law ; and (2) the development 
of a juridical structure staffed by competent people. 
Refor.mat~on of the legal system was one~part of a grand 
multi·-commissioned effort which included a review of all legis-
lation in each sector bequ~tled by the Protectorate. Much 
stress was placed on reforming the legal system. Upon it 
hinged the reorganization of the governmental structure as 
well as +nte-rnational respect for Morocco·. As such, all ,Poli-
tical colorations were united in facilitating such reforms as 
soon as possible. 
The nationalists had always co~plained about the French 
restrictions on the application of Muslim Law to all Moroccan 
Muslims. Further, under the French, a great deal of the judi-
·cial powers weEe increasingly given to local administrators 
when convenient. Twa of the first acts of the new Moroccan 
Government were to rescind the Berber Dahir (the French insti-
tuted decree to retain Berber institutions) and to proclaim 
the "principle of separation of powers." All MorGccan Muslims 
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were to be subject to "purified" Muslim~law practiced by the 
judiciary.l 
During the first two years of M~rocean independence, much 
of the basic judicial refor.ms were initiated. In late 1956, 
the first two hundred judge-delegates--most equivalent to 
/ justices of peace--were appointed. Over a twa-year period, 
there were 600 judge-delegates and eighty-five lower coarts 
established. The courts were limited, however, to dealing 
with criminal cases requiring not more than two-year sentences 
to jail and not more than 90,000 francs fine in eivil cases. 
Organization of higher courts to handle more serious cases, 
and appeals thereto, were slowed d~wn until the Government 
concluded a judicial convention with France. The Algerian 
situation was the direct cause of delay. One hundred and 
seventy French judges were ~hen loaned to Morocco in late 1958 
to staff some of the higher courts. Again the problem of 
qualified personnel, particularly in lower courts, is as acute 
in this sector as in others. As a result the "principle of 
separation of powers" could not be as immediately implemented 
as had been hoped. 
The new judge-delegates were not to be as the qadis of 
old. The qadis used to dispense justice and pocket much of 
the fines they levied. This was no longer to be the case. ·Nor 
lcharles Gallagher, "New Laws for Old: The Moroccan Code 
of Personal Status't, a letter to the American Universi-
ties Field Staff, (June 20, 1959), P• 10, notes that· 
some of the laws are not applicable to non-Muslim 
Moreccans. 
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was the arbitrary adjudication of quasi-legal matters to be 
within the scope of the new judge-delegates. 
With regard to the refor.ms in law, a review of the code 
of personal status exemplifies the meaning of "working within 
the spirit of Islam." Each element of the code was legiti-
mized by referring to the section in basic Islamic sources rele-
vant to it. Marriage is defined in article one of the code asa 
••• compact (sic) of legal union between a man and 
a woman, concluded on a dttrable basis and having as 
its aim a ~ife of fidelity and purity, joined to the 
desire of procreation, by the foundation, under the 
direction af the husband, of a family and permitting 
the spouses to bear their burdens in security, peace, 
and mutual respect, and affection.l 
While the male w~s still granted a privileged role i~ the fam-
ily, a basic element of the new code is to Thr.mit the tradition-
al ruler role of the male and to base the marital and family 
relationship on affection. Polygamy, unlike the-situation in 
Tunisia where it has been banned, is still recognized in the 
Moroccan code. However, its practice is circumvented by a 
number of qualifications. First, plural marriage cannot be 
_ consummated if ''inequality in treatment is feared. 11 But, as 
Gallagher notes: 
••• the vagueness of the text does not indicate 
whether this fear is left to the discretion of the 
husband or to the decision of a judge.2 
The traditional right of the wife--though seldom exercised in 
earlier periods--at the time of marriage to stipulate that her 
libid., P• 6. 
2rbid. 
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husband shall take no further wives is written into article 
thirty-one of the code. If he does tak~ a second wire in 
violation of this stipulation, the rirst wire can ask the 
judge for a divorce. Even if the wife does not make this stip-
ulation at the time of marriage, She can mtill appeal to the 
judge if her husband marries a second wife. The prospective 
second wife must also be informed of the first wife's existM 
ence before marriage takes pla~e. 
Further regulations regarding marriage are a fixing of 
the minimum marriage age of fifteen years for girls and eight-
een for boys. Girls must give their consent to the marriage 
and cannot b.e forced by parents as in former periods. Marriage, 
while not yet a civil ceremony in Morocco, must, according to 
the code, be witnessed in its negotiation stage by two nota-
ries, and verified and recorded by a judge. A copy of the 
marriage contract must then be sent to the office of civil 
status along with identification documents before the contract 
is validated. Up to this point the girl or boy may change 
their minds about the marriage. Previously, once the agree-
ment waa made by the negotiating parties and the first chapter 
of the Ko~an read, the marriage was considered binding. 
The man is obligated to support ~d organize the house-
hold. The support of the children by the wife is only manda-
tory in cases :where the woman is weal thy and the husband un-
employed. This is somewhat new to Muslim law. Another quasi-
innovation is the provision in the code for the huseand fo-r 'Lo 
provide medical care for his wife if she needs it. By rar the 
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most interesting provision regarding the woman is the right 
to indicate at the time of the marriage contract her intention 
to "engage in activities relating to the political affairs of 
the country. " 
Divorce is still obtainable by the man by repudiation. 
However, male repudiation rights are qualified and more diffi-
cult than in earlier days. Second, the man must pay a fixed 
amount, designated by a judge, to his former wife based on 
the finances o~ the couple. 
An age of twenty-one solar years was established as the 
age at which both male and female could enjoy full civil rights. 
Inheritance fellows much the same line as traditional 
Muslim law. The woman, while she is able to inherit, does not 
receive as much as male co-inheritors receive. If there are 
no blood heirs, the state, and not a subsidiary heir becomes 
legal owner. The provision whereby a Muslim does not inherit 
from a non-Muslim and vice-versa is retained in the new code. 
These rulings a~plied to all Muslims of the country and 
partly to Moroccan Europeans. Polygrunywas, for example, pro-
hibited to Europeans. Moroccan Jews continued to be governed 
by their own code of personal status. The reasons for these 
exclusions are quite obvious. Since the laws of personal 
status are based on Islam, a religion, it would be difficult 
to apply them to non-Muslims. 
Briefly, Moroccan jurisprudence is at the same time tra-
ditional and modern. Its traditionalism is not Berber tradi-
tionalism, but rather Islrunic traditionalism which the Arab 
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monarchy or Morocco had attempted to generalize in pre-
Protectorate days. What Moroccans, and particularly Berbers, 
are being told is that ror a long time they had violated the 
Islamic roundations of their ttsocietyn, and that nc:>w the 
~ 
accumulated wrongs were being righted after the prolonged 
intermission of European contro1.1 With~the emergence of 
Orthodox Islam and the identification of the King as the 
champion or the faith and its adherents, the illusion or a 
return to what was the true character of Morocco rather 
than innovation was created. Berbers are called upon to 
follow the path, rrom which they and others might have 
strayed during the course of history, that was originally 
intended in Morocco. Gallagher gives some substance to 
this interpretation: 
• • .Their conservatism (i.e. the leaders', mine) 
is shared to a greater extent than might be supposed 
by large numbers of the rural masses and many in 
the cities who look upon themselves as members of 
a vast family, of an equally religious and national 
character, watched over by a paternal ruler.2 
Here is an evident situation where traditionalism, although, 
as noted, not Berber, is being utilized not only as a symbol 
of unification, but is also embodied within the developing 
structure to give legitimacy to it. 
Recognition of modern needs in the new legal system is 
also made, but within the broadened context or Islam. For 
lBenjelloun, loc. ill• 
2Gallagher, "New Laws," p. 10. 
/ 
example, monogamy is indirectly favored by placing great 
restrictions on polygamy. A monogamous marriage is usually 
recognized as less detrimental to the growth of individual 
savings in an underdeveloped country. As previously noted, 
savings are necessary for increased investment. A greater 
recognition of woments rights is a recognition of the neces-
sary and useful role of the female element in the new 
nation. Greater flexibility in the definition of female 
roles in society is indicated from the data as the country 
develops a greater semblance of unity and socio-economic 
advancement. 
While some traditionalism is perhaps quite useful in 
the process of society-building, it may also be a source 
of conflict in the future. As Moroccans become acclimated 
to a unitary society and no longer need to be convinced 
' 
of its legitimacy, they may find some aspects of traditionalism 
as too restrictive and archaic. Even now there is a rest-
less urban lower-middle class which feels that the conserva-
tism of traditionalism and those who advocate it fail to 
produce the dynamism needed to translate the political 
achievement into the socio-economic spheres • 
• • • The gap between tradition and innovation within 
the society seems to be widening at the moment; 
the partisans of these two tendencies are finding 
it harder1to speak a mutually comprehensible language. 
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The uneven exposure of the Moroccan population to modern 
society makes the task of the Government very difficult. 
On the other hand, lack of capital and personnel do not allow 
a rapid rate of development. The solution does not lend 
itself to standard rules because of these factors. 
Another difficulty involved in the development of the 
legal system ~s the problem of educating lawyers. The 
difficulty takes form in the traditional legal curricula 
of Islrum, and the modern training under the French system. 
Thusfar, both systems of training are still operative. The 
modern legal system as· other sectors is not in its final 
fer.m, but rather in an expedient form working toward 
stabilization. 
EDUCATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Much as in the other sectors of the newly developing 
social structure, the foundation of the educational struc-
ture is being laid while a number of temporary and expedient 
measures are being taken to meet immediate ends. Naturally, 
the ultimate goal of universal public education was immediately 
adopted.l To this end, the Government recently embarked on 
" one of it.s many "Operation" projects titled "Operation Ecolesn. 
lFor a good discussion as well as facts and figures on 
Moroccan education see, Lacouture, ~· cit., PP• 
234-2.54, 283-293; and Mcmhamed ben Bachir;-"Les Progres 
de 1 'Enseignement Public Musulman au Maroc," Confluent, 
No. 21, (April 19.58), ·pp. 196-204• 
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Within the past year or more, this project has yielded over 
11 000 rural classrooms. W2rk was done by volunteers, most 
of whom were unemployed at the time, aided by the National 
Army and under the direction of specialists supplied by the 
National Government.l 
On the higher levels of education, the University of 
Rabat was created from the fermer French Insti tut des Hau.tes 
, 
Etudes Marocaines. It carries a number of faculties particu-
larly in the physical sciences, medicine and law. The 
Islamic University of Kairouan at Fez2 is being reformed, and 
great stress is placed on replacing incompetent oulemas. 
The former French-established engineering, administrative, 
and art schools, for example, are also operating under 
Moroccan auspices. The recently abandoned u.s. fighter 
base at Beni Slimane has been converted into a school fer 
training 400 girls as rural social workers. A former 
French base at Fez is being cenverted into a university annex. 
The physical plants of ether future abandoned bases may also 
be used for such purposes. More schools are foreseen for 
the future. There are also private European and Jewish 
shhools which are being worked to capacity today. 
lsee Le Petit Marocain (Casablanca), a daily Moroccan 
newspaper in li'rench, for the Summer 1961 period, for 
a discussion of 110peration Ecoles." 
2The ~eader will recall from the previous chapter 
that this University was at one time a great center 
of education. 
At the time of independence, a number of school systems 
were operating in.Morocco: French, Spanish, Jewish, Islamic, 
and a few mission schools. Proportionately speaking, there 
was a higher percentage of Europeans and Moroccan Jews 
receiving an education than there were Muslims. 
The complicated tasks facing the Moroccan Government of 
standardizing the school system are: r~vamping the curricula 
to meet new needs; developing new texts; providing physical 
facilities for.edueation; Moroccanizing the coursework; 
providing sufficient and competent educators; establishing 
the goals of the new structure in conjunction with the 
rest of the developing social structure; and developing 
plans to mass educate adults in basic elements as well as 
explaining the anticipated functioning of the modern struc-
ture to them. 
A commission was establiShed which represented the 
various pre-independence educational systems to study the 
situation in conjunction with the Ministry of EducatioD. 
One of the main retarders in the educational effort was the 
argumentation that was carried on over the orientation of 
the school system • .AJmost all leading nationalists on the 
commission ~ere agreed that Arabization, i.e. Moroccanization1 
of education Should take place, but the degree and rate 
were and still are the points of verbal conflict. Three 
major schools of thought developed. The first believed in 
rapid Arabization with a few hours of French. The second 
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adv0cated teaching in Arabic with French being considered as 
the primary foreign language. And the third opted for 
bilingual t~aching, stressing sc~~nces in French.1 The out-
come has been one of increased but gradual Arabization when 
and where possible with retention of French on a pragmatic 
basis. The Government has had to recognize the handicaps 
of Arabic for certain types of academic pursuits.2 The 
Arab League, of which Morocco is a member, has set up a 
committee to attempt to adapt the Arabic language to handle 
modern scientific concepts. The next step is to find 
competent people to write Arabic texts for the various 
fields and levels. 
A second area of consideration was the view that the 
educational process sh6uld be utilized to instill national 
pride and unity as well as to make Moroccans aware of iheir 
religious and social heritage. Here again, the disagree-
ment occurs over the degree and time for such studies. In 
a country which needs many ttachnieal skills immediately, 
the activists of the nation are not always convinced of the 
lsee Mohamed Larbi Al. Khatabi, llLe Probl~me de 1 'Edu-
cation!let de l'Enseignement au.Maroc,n Confluent, 
No. 2 (June-July 1959), PP• 181-188, for a discussion 
of the schools of thought on education. Al Khatabi 
advocates the first view and conceives of it as a 
way of regaining and safeguarding the Moroccan person• 
ality. He makes suggestions for developing teachers, 
curricula, etc. in fast order based on Arabization, but 
his program is not realistic. 
2Mohamed Belqziz, "Problemas de l'Evolution de la Langue 
Arabe," Confluent, No. 8 (June-July 1960) 1 PP• 416-
422. 
equality ef' 11 cuJ.tural heritage". Nonetheless, given 
Merocean history, such efforts are most useful to socia~ 
integration. Education is not only a development of the 
thinking processes of' man, but also a means ef' indoctrination 
f'or national purposes.1 
Third, members of' the Cemmission and Ministry were 
agreed that the educational structure should be geared to 
the modern needs of Morocco. A problem aeveloped in de-
fining these needs and which were to have priority. As 
indicated previously, the rural element was the least 
represented in government during the first few years. Be-
cause of' the immensity m d complexity of' the rural situation, 
there was a tendency to postpone action in this area. The 
various interest groups represented in Rabat tended to for-
ward urban and business needs. This is not to say that the 
rural areas were totally neglected. The rural areas and 
their people had to be c0n.sidered by their sheer numbers and 
importance to the economy. There are two levels, however, 
Gn whieh th:ts rural-urban question must be examined. First, 
one could d~al with the fields of' education stressed. For 
example, engineering was most desireable and useful f'or both 
rural and urban projects anticipated by the Government. 
Training is primarily acquired in urban areas where the 
facilities f'or it exist. On this level, rural needs were 
lMohamed Al-Fasi, 11Le Service de l'Education <ie Base,n 
Confluent, No. 21 (April 1958), PP• 220-223. 
well reeegnized. With regard to the development of public 
schools, rural areas were less recognized. This should be 
qualified. At the inception of independence, the urfran 
areas already had the physical plants available for education-
al purp0ses, and many that could be converted easily. For 
exgmple, the Mlnistry of Education took over the Youth and 
Sports Centers in Casablanca established under the French 
and turned them into centers for basic education. They 
also wanted to revamp the educational institutions already 
operating. It was expedient to do this, and did not re-
quire as much planning and funds as it would to embark 
immediately on a rural program. 
Efforts in rural areas e entered on a day to day mass 
education program with very little being done initially to 
establiSh a network of standardized public schools. Not 
until the "Ope'ration Ecolesn had li'I\lCh been dane in the 
11permanent" structure field for rural areas. ·The need for 
immediate rural mass eaucation to orient the population to 
the new nation was well recognized. But regarding the 
"permanent" level, it was most difficult to transpert 
supplies for the building of schools in such areas. Second, 
basic facilities such as water supply and school trans-, 
portation were alsQ requisites. Third, it was most diffi.cult 
to find enough competent people willing to work in the 
hinterland. Thus the complexity of initiating what Morocco 
hopes to be its actual educational structure in rural areas 
helps to explain in great measure the concentration on 
, areas which could be handled with most ease, bene~it the 
nation, and not extend the Governme~t in its early days. 
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The pro~ile o~ the permanent educational structure is 
taking shape. The present ~ive-year plan summarizes the 
present status 0~ educational progress, and lists the areas 
~or which ~unds have been allocated ~or its continued pro-
gress.l 
Since 1956, Morocco has almost doubled the number of 
children receiving primary education in public sch0ols.2 
The total is approximatley 8oo,ooo. However, when the 
private segment is added, the ~igure reaches slightly over· 
l,ooo,oeo. Assouline summarizes the expectations o~ the 
Government in education: 
En c~ ~ui concerns 1 1 enseignement pr~aire notamment 
le plan se propose d!atteindre un taux de scolari-
sation de 70% en ~in-de periode. A partir de 1963 
tous les e~ants en age d 1etre scolarises cette 
ann~e la trouveront place dans les etablissements 
scolaires. La scolarisation sera totale dans les 
~ ~ 3 10 annees a venir. 
The length of primary education covers a ~ive-year 
period which may be spread into seven. Secondary education 
consists of six years. The first three years are ~ent on 
general culture and the last three on a specialization. For 
those who will ~ill the ranks o~ the average man, the three 
lSee the Plan ~uinquennal, passim; and ~ituation de 
l'Enseignement;• BESM, XXIV, Nos. 86-87 {November 1960-
February 1961), PP• 265-266. 
' 2see Appendix E for a chart o~ students in Morocco. 
3Assouline, ~· £!!., P• 26. 
years of specialization will not be necessary.l The faeili• 
ties with regard to higher education have been indicated. In 
addition, foreign education is an increasing factor on the 
university level. Moroccan students studying abread are pri-
marily located in the Middle East and France. , 
Since 1960, the curricula has made great advances in. 
standardization. Progressive Arabization is being witnessed 
in the educational system. However, the lack of teachers as 
well as the problems of the Arabic language necessitate con-
tinued use of French as a teaching language. Teachers from 
the Middle Eastern countries are continuously recruited. 
Though the five-year plan has included provisions for the 
training of teachers, the Government recently found it neces-
sary to send an urgent plea to France for teachers. Regional 
schools have been established for the training of student-
teachers, and more schools are anticipated for this purpose. 
In 1959, 450 student teachers were graduated and more than 
double that number in 1960. These students receive one year 
of specialized pedagogical training in these schools.. The 
lnsituation de l'Enseignement," p. 265 states the 
r~tionale for this: "L'enseignement secondaire ~ui­
meme offre deux formulas: d 1une part un enseignement 
dit 'long' reparti en six annees (trois annees de 
culture generale et trois annees de specialisation), 
d'autre part un enseignement dit 'moyen•, qui donne un 
.. ... .,. . , .. 
complement de formation aux eleves destines a consti-
tuer les cadres moyens de la nation, et qui ne comporte 
que trois annees q1etudes.n 
ti • • • • • • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • n , ' ~ Ce qui caracterise ce systeme, c•est done a la fojs son 
~xtr~e souplesse et son adaptation aux besoins reels 
du pays. En ce domaine plus qu 1 en tout autre, il faut 
eviter 1 1utopie. 11 
plan gives greater emphasis to imbuing the student-teachers 
with problems o~ the religious, social, cultural aad economic 
.. 
li~e o~ new Morocco which these individuals in turn are to ex-
plain in more digestive ~or.m to their students. Such e~~orts 
are a part o~ the c~paign to ~oster unity and modernism 
through education. 
This, then, is the present •educational structure in 
Morocco. As the nation goes through the many spasms o~ its 
social and economic development, adaptations and changes will 
have to be made in what is n0w anticipated as the "per.manentn 
~orm. In the meantime, Morocco is educatin~ its masses who 
will never attend school, and yet must bear the initial burden 
o~ modern Mor0cco. A review o~ the techniques employed ~or 
mass education will complete the di scus"sion o~ education. 
One o~ the main agencies o~ the Ministry o~ Education was 
and is the Service de l'Education de Base.1 To it was assign• 
ed the Government's e~~orts o~ mass education. The stress was 
placed on teaching the people to read and write as rapidly. as 
possible, while explaining to them the new Morocco. The ~unc-
tions and purposes o~ the communes, elections, governmental 
agencies available to citizens, development o~ community lead-
ers, and extending technical information, ~or ex~ple, were 
all a part o~ the program. The program covers~ a period o~ 
one year, at the end o~ which each student receives a Govern-
ment certi~icate i~ he success~lly completes the course o~ 
,., I '\ 
studies. The Government relies heavily on mass media in this 
immense undertaking. Radio and audio-visual aids are most 
helpful. The Ministry is continuously working on new educa-
tional films which will be meaningful to Moroccans and in 
their language. They are forced to utilize many Europeans 
films presently. Television~ which is just beginning in 
Morocco~ is also anticipated as a major means for mass educa• 
tion. In addition, the Government has developed a phonetic-
Arabic newspaper for newly ~ducat&d Morcc9ans. 
As a part of various econ01ni e nopera tion n projects of the 
Government~ evening schools were carried on by the Service. 
The goals of these sChools were not primarily to teach reading 
and writing~ but to carry on discussions and lectures on the 
country's future. Ben Hima indicates three main goals of the 
short-term schools: 
1) Mettre en lumi~re la situapion 
souligner les responsabilit{~s de 
edification de notre independence 
solides. 
, 
reelle du pays et 
chacun pour 1' 
sur des bases. 
) , ..... { 2 Definir l'effort personnel a deployer pour aider 
..... "' au relevement economique et social. 
3) Developper le sens de l'effort eollectif.l 
He further describes the education received during these 
projects: 
" , , ' C'etait un veritable cours d'adultes, une veritable 
ecole du soir. Au lieu de commencer par apprendre 
aux ~leves 1 1A.B.C. afin de les elever peu a peu 
aux phrases et aux idees, on les plongeait brutale-
ment dans le bain des problemas et on les obligeait 
lMohamed Ben Hima, "La Route de 1 'Unite~" Confluent~ 
No. 21 (April 1958), P• 216. 
, 
-t 
..... ~ , 
a y reflechir. Ce Pt9"s,...n'a point de temps d'attendre. 
For.me~ la nouvelle generation par les voies longues 
de 1 1ecole, du lyc~e et de la faculte, d'accord pour 
l'avenir. Aujourd'hui il faut aller vite, ne pas 
perdre cette generation dont les epaules portent la 
respon~abiljte d'une independance a laquelle rienne 
l'a preparee. Il faut la mettre rapidement au tra-
. , ~ , , ' 
vail, en lu~ revelant 1~ realite des problemas et 
en lui montrant que les solutions ne tombent pas du 
ciel.l 
"Schools" of this type were, then, a means of indoctrination 
in favor of the unitary society, and also an attempt to inform 
the people of the complexities of its construction. They re• 
presented a quasi-appeal for patience, and a definite plea for 
all to participate in the construction. 
The noperation" projects also offered technical knowledge 
to the populace. These projects presently cover a small por-
tion of the population, but the number is increasing. 
Again, it should be noted that other Government agencies 
as well as political parties and unions have their various pro-
grams of basic education.2 The Istiqlal feminist program has 
cadres in Rumerous areas which te~ch women how to read and 
write, hygiene practices, and child care, for example, as well 
as establishing workshops to train them in sewing, rug-making, 
and other trades.3 
M;Ibid., p. 218. 
2Lacouture, ~· cit., PP• 294-313, expresses the view that 
the unions will be the veri table "universities" of the 
people. 
3Hassar, 12£• £!i• 
..,.. t (A 
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In concluding this section, it is clear that the pulk of 
knowledge being disseminated through the structure in Morocco 
is no longer co-terminous with sufist and pre-sufist magico-
religious beliefs. The spirit of Orthodox Islam pervades 
education by direct study of it and by identification with it 
as part of the nat·ional charac.ter, but education is more than 
Koranic knowledge and philosophic pursuit. Knowledge is based 
on mants researched Rnawledge. Nonetheless, it is doubtful 
that the type of knowledge which is based on the traditional 
magico-religious beliefs of a people are ever rooted out. 
They are still obvious among peoples the world over. Kept 
within limits, they do not prevent the development of new 
, knowledge and beliefs. The majority of the zawiyas may be 
outlawed, but that does not destroy the sufist and pre-sufist 
beliefs of the people. The new structure will educate and in-
doctrinate, but will not immediately annihilate previous be• 
liefs including those which could betard the growth ~f a 
modern, unitary Morocco. 
KINSHIP STRUCTURE 
It is impossible to dwell in length on the changing fami-
ly and kinship relationships, fon it is difficult to say any-
thing definite along these lines. Mo~eover, the discussion of 
Moroccan jurisprudence has outlined the official view on mar-
riage and the f~ly. Many of the traditional practices and 
emotions are yet operative among the populace, however. 
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It has always been contended that the generalization o~ 
the nuclear family is a part o~ the industrialization process. 
While it is true that a great n~ber of the industrialized 
societies are re~lected in family structure by the nuclear 
type, Gree~ield notes that one is not £unctionally contingent 
upon the other. He exempli~ies this with various indust~ial­
ized societies which carry on some sort o~ family structure 
beyond the nuclear unit i~ not a ~lly extended kinship struc-
ture, and vice-versa. He contends that these are, without 
~ocietal collapse or severe strain, ~unctional alte~atives in 
different types of societies.! In present-day Morocco, the 
extended family has witnessed an increased fatality in urban 
areas. But as previously motea and Gree~ield reiterates, 
industrialization is not a simple synonym·~or urbanization. 
Industrialization is g0ing on in rural Morocco also, and here 
the family structure has predominantly remained extended. 
Those who migrate to the cities come alone or bring only 
their immediate ~amily members. The problem o~ housing, 
European in~luence, cost o~ living, and mobility, ~or example, 
are all con~iderations in this matter. Consequently, o~~spring 
o~ urban settlers tend to ~ollow the nuclear pattern. Those 
who remain in the rural areas are yet able to maintain the 
traditional kinship structure. For them, the social and 
lsidney M. Greenfield, "Industrialization and the Family 
in Socielogical Theory, n American Journal of Sociology, 
LXVII, No. 3 (November 1961), PP• 312-322. This article 
covers a number of ~amilial-societal combinations and 
makes provecative reading. 
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physical situation has not changed appreciably. 
The Government is attempting to encourage rural residents 
to continue their rural residency and not to stream into al• 
ready overcrowded urban areas where jobs are scarce for them. 
To motivate them to remain, the Government offers technical 
agrarian assistance, low interest and long-ter.m loans to far.m• 
ers, and agrarian reform where needed and possible. 
As the situation exists now, the extended family may well 
continue in rural areas for many years to come. In the short• 
run, this aids the Government who would otherwise be faced 
with an even larger unemployed and unabsorb.ed older group which 
would require extended welfare support. 
On the other hand, as rural Morocco becomes increasingly 
involved in the cash economy and becomes increasingly reliant 
upon it, the continuation of consanguinity and recognition of 
other kin may act as retarders to economic development. The 
average acreage of the Moroccan far.mer is quite small. No 
matter what increase in production he may witness because of 
technological ai&, it will not, generally speaking, be suffi-
cient to insure steady savings if extra-nuclear obligations 
are regularly recognized. Since approximately eighty per cent 
of the Moroccan population is involved in farming, the reason 
is easy to see. As a. result, investments will also be hinder-
ed. 
In the urban areas where the nuclear family is more pre-
dominant, the workers have recently been brought under a manda-
tory social security system. Through social security, families 
receive funds when they cannot work and when t~ey reach re-
tirement age.l This replaces the "social security" provided 
for in the traditional structure. There is an inherited elderm 
ly group which is not always able to provide for itself, how-
ever. While there is an increasing number of public and pri-
vate welfare agencies, their funds are limited. As a result, 
these elder citizens must negotiate support from their younger 
relatives, a move which draws its legitimacy from the tradi-
tional structure. This fact plus the continuous purchase of 
import-consumer goods weaken investment from urban-derived 
sources. 2 
There is frenetic motion in Morocco in all spheres of 
life~ eonsequently, it is most difficult to delineate kinship 
relationships in definitive formie The kinship structure is 
primarily of the traditional pattern as yet, though the bonds 
and obligations may have diminished. For those who attempt to 
disassociate themselves from the traditional consanguine pat-
tern, a certain amount of guilt and psychological dislocation 
1M. Gagnier, "La Securite' Sociale au Maroc, 11 ~~ XXV, 
No. 89 (1961), pp. 59-70. 
2Williams, 2£• ill• ,~ PP• 496-497 furth.er notes, "Kinship 
ties, like many other forms of established social rela-
tions, can constitute a very definite obst~cle to the 
economic rationalization of production, as when in some 
cases, family rights and obligations have so penetrated 
business enterprises that inefficient relatives may be 
given crucial jobs, or capital needed for technological 
changes may be siphoned off into consumption within 
the extended fmnily. We have already suggested that 
values or obligations developed in the family can re• 
tard economically adjustive mobility." 
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occurs. Welfare agencies cannot replace the type of security 
derived in the extended family, but it is hoped that they 
might one day be able to afford the financial security of needy 
members. 
In many ways, the new official definition of the founda-
tion and ter.ms of marriage and the frunily is outmoded before 
it is universally accepted. While the definition takes into 
account the increased role and rights of the woman in society, 
much traditionalism which is not consistent with the direction 
of the society is evident in it. The increased education of 
women, the encouragement to participate politically, the 
numerous positions in government, business, education, and 
other fields are all factors which will make the woman in-
creasingly discontent with the "inferior" status yet assigned 
.to her. There will be a period of grace, however, since as 
Ashford notes, " • • • the feminist movement has progressed 
less than any othe:r: national effort since independence."l 
Males, reinforced by the code of personal status, yet rule the 
household, and many prohibit their women from participating 
in the new structure. Lacouture notes that even in urban 
··areas, but admittedly moreso in the traditional urban areas 
such as Fez and Marrakesh, middle-class Moroccan males attempt 
to retard social eqaality of women.2 Oriented to traditional 
lAshford, Political Change, P• 401. 
2Lacouture, QE• cit., PP• 314-335 for a most interesting 
chapter on this matter titled 11la revolution passera la 
femme." 
symbols, they insist on maintaining their women in traditional 
dress and behavior patterns. The result is, as previously not-
ed, that women are often the retainers of traditional beliefs 
and practices which conflict with and/or hinder modern develop• 
ment. Ashford reinforces this view when he says, "the L"'the" 
is capitalized in the original since it begins the-sente~ci7 
country will not be able to pay the price o~ keeping its women 
under retarded conditions indefinitely • • • ,.nl As the woman 
increasingly participates in the growing number of positions 
and programs fo~ her emancipation, marriage may be looked upon 
in the western-type companionship form. A number of Family 
problems may develop with her emancipation. On the other hand, 
female emancipation will not develop equally in Morocco, and 
the present rulings on the matter will perhaps be ~eemed a 
tremendous gain for some--when sufficiently literate--while 
archaic relics to others. 
A rapid growth of nuclear families in urban areas with a 
limited retention of extra-nuclear kin obligations is envisag~ 
ed for a number of years. 2 In rural areas, a very gradual 
rate of growth of nuclear families would seem, at this point, 
to be anticipated in the future as farmers acquire individual 
1. lAshford, Political Change, P• 402. 
2For an informative discussion of worker families see a 
reprint of conference notes by Anne-Marie Baron, nLa 
Famille Prole'tarienne", Faits et Idees, No. 20 (Rabat: 
1954}. See also Southall, £E• cit., pp. 31-45 for a 
discussion of kin obligations and its diffuseness in 
urban areas as well as a discussion of fandly authority, 
tribal associations and obligations in urban areas. 
land-haldings. However, a stronger retention of extra-nuclear 
kin obligations will probably obtain for a number of years if 
not ttpermanently. 11 Industrialization, as Greenfield has not-
~ 
ed, may not necessarily by the cause of these trends, but cer-
tainly other variables implicit in our. above discussion may 
bring on the same consequences once attributed to industriali-
zation. In a word, the kinship structure is in an unpredict-
able state of flux. 
ECONOMIC STRUCTUREl 
When Morocco received·its independence, its economy was 
already suffering a recession. 2 Problems in this sector in" 
creased as so often happens in newly independent nations. A 
very heavy flight of private capital and European businessmen 
occurred, further burdening the domestic cash economy. An 
inter~ational loss af confidence in the future of the Moro~can 
economy was also evident.3 In order to attract investment 
capital, the country had to prove its political stability and 
assure prospective investors that it had a sufficient base for 
business operations, liberal financial policies, and eliminate 
lThe best single coverage of this topic is the U.N., 
Structure and Growth. See also L. Gray Corm, "The 
Economic Development of Moroccon (Santa Manica: mimeo-
graphea by Rand Corp., 1958). 
2Assouline, .2E.• cit., p. 25, notes, nL 1 economie marocaine 
eonnait depuis 1954 une certaine stagnation ••• 11 which 
he fe+t was due to the dual economy of the country, the 
association with France, and the problem of ·imports. 
3see Lacouture, 2£• ~., PP• 255-282 for a fine discus-
sion on the search for confidence in the Moroccan 
economy. 
fears of nationalization. Economic woes in Morocco were also 
' 
compounded by the fact that, as previously noted, the domestic 
economy itself was not an integral unit. 
There are extra-economic factors which make economic 
solvency and development a most difficult task. First, the 
birth rate of Morocco is about three per cent ann~ally or rough• 
ly more than 300 1 000 people a year. This rate outstrips the 
rate of increased production, with the result that an overall 
improvement in the standard of living is not felt. 1 
Second, as noted in the ~reface, Moroccans are a young 
population. In the long-run this will be most helpful, but in 
present terms, it means an energetic group without sufficient 
opportunities for employment. 
Third, foreign aid has been rathenalltmiil.edt s a£ ... pt7s_·c.~ .. uo 
due to various international considerations. France was to 
continue giving financial aid to Morocco after independence,, 
but the Algerian rebel leaders' incident and the whole Algerian 
question have hindered the flow of' this aid. United States' 
lAssouline, lee. cit., after noting that the five-year 
plan carries-a tmtal budget of' 715 billion francs, 
hastens to squelch any false illusions about rapid in• 
creases in the standard of living. He says: "Mais si 
un tel effort d'investissement est a marne de suseiter 
• ; • '" ~J 
une repr~se de 1 1 econom~e, il demeure tres modere et 
represente un minimum au-dessous duquel il est diff'icile 
de descendre. En ef'f'et, si l'on tient compte de 1' 
.. 
accroissement demographique de la population qui se 
of ~ ; 
situe autour de 3~ et de la necessite de maintenir 
une difference. de .2% entre 1 1 evolution d~ la produc-
tion et celle de la comsommation pour creer !'accumu-
lation de capital indispensablea la poursuite du 
developpement, il apparait que le niveau de vie de 
la population serai t a peine mainten'l:l· tt 
aid to Morocco has been rather limited in deference to France. 
Communist military and economic aid has been forthcoming 
without the delay and hesitation Characterizing western aid. 
Fourth, Moroccan policy is one of attemptiBg to gradually 
limit the extent of foreign aid it accepts to lessen the 
alleged danger of infringement of its sovereignty. In the 
present five-year plan, the Moroccan Government hopes that 
there will be sufficient increased production to allow the 
tax rate to rise from thirteen per cent to eighteen per 
cent.1 And recently, the Government established a manda-
tory investment fund to create capital not now being formed 
by voluntary savings. 2 
Moroccans touched by modern desires during Protec-
torate days were unable to satis~y them. A cure-all for 
the various economic.problems was expected with indepen-
dence.3 When the demands of the people were the highest, 
the economy was at its lowest ebb. It was most difficult 
for the Government to communicate to this inorganic and 
illiterate mass the numerous difficulties involved in 
!!.Ibid., P• 29• 
2The New York ·Times (December 28, 1961), P• 3, summarizes 
this· :new fund: 11The state plans to 'mobilize savings' 
by the creation of a national investment fund. All 
companies will be obliged to invest 3 to 15 per cent 
of their profits in the fund as of Jan. 1. 
"Other taxpayers will be required te participate in 
the national investment progrmn at a later date, 
according to M'hruned Douiri, Minister of the Economy. 
He said at a news conference that guarantees on re-
patriation of foreign investments would be maintained." 
3See Paul Dubois, "Aspects Economiques des Problemas 
de 1' Em.ploi au Maroc, 11 BESM, XXII, No • 60 (April 
1959), PP• 489-500, for-a-discussion of this situatien. 
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establishing and developing a viable economy. The King's 
influence had a steadying, though not completely tranquiliz" 
ing, affect on controlling popular outbreaks for economic 
fruition. 
The various requisites of economic ••progresstt such as 
political reorganization, legal refor.ms, education, establish-
ing work condition standards, and health and welfare progrrums 
were impossible to expedite immediately.1 Two basic mechanisms 
were devised to cope with the situation. 
The first mechanism has already been mentioned in 
connection with education, i.e. the various "Operation" pro-
jects. A review ·of two of these is sufficient to illustrate 
the functions of this progrmn.2 The first project was 
called "la semai ne de 1 t arbre. 11 Mom ceo has a good lumber 
industry, but it was diminishing because.of rapid deforesta-
tion. DUring the course of this project, over aoo,ooo trees 
lAbderrahim Bouabid, "Imperatifs qui Commandant le 
Developpement de l'Econli>mie Marocaine," Confluent, 
No. 6 (March-April-1960), PP• 185-197. 0n P• 185, 
he notes, 11 ••• tout effort serieux de develappement 
rencontre rapidemant une limite dans 1 1 inadaptation 
des structures economiques, sociales et administra-· 
ti ves.c" On P• 195, he points out two majer requisites 
af the economy: (1) basic education suited to the needs 
of the·society; and (2) professional people to set 
up cadres in the variaus areas of other sectors 
impinging on economic matters. Also see J-P. c. 2.E.• cit., 
PP• 224-227• ---
2Mohammed Tab.iri, "Le Sens Givique et Social de Deux 
Operations Techiliqu.es, 11 Confluent, No.· 21, (A;>ril 1958), 
PP• 228-232; and Francois Olerc, "Rentabilite de !'Opera-
tion Labour,u BESM, XXIII, No. 82 (October 19.59), PP• 
165-172. 
were planted on local collectivities and state property. 
The work was done by youths primarily in their upper teens. 
Tools for the project crone from various public ministries. 
The second project was longer in duration and is now 
carried on regularly each year. This is the "Operation 
. 
Labour"• It deals with problems of agricultural developll1-en'tj .. 
Its first effort covered a modest area of 150,000 hectares. 
It was plowed by volunteers with government tractors, planted 
with selected seeds, and supervised by government engineers 
in cooperation with local far.mers. Private land ownership 
in Morocco had divided the land into inefficient plots 
in some parts of the country. The Government was not to 
deny the rights of private ownership. As a matter of fact, 
the Government has distributed land deeds to individual 
farmers in various areas of the Kingdom. Private ownership 
was still recognized, then, but local residents were en-· 
couraged to work their land collectively and to develop a 
monoculture where advantageous. The progrrun of enlightenment 
with regard to collective production that was a part of the 
project, helped to make it a success. After the land was 
pl0wed, each of the owners would again demarcate his~lands. 
But the allowance of standard preparation of the soil for 
the product or products thought best by the various advisors 
was a step f·orward in more efficient use of Morocco 1 s re-
tarded agric~ltural sector. Continued efforts along this 
line would appear to be most helpful. 
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One problem resulting from the improvement of agricul-
tural techniques is that the traditional khames is not al-~ 
ways absorbed as an agricultural proletarian. In many eases, 
he moves to the city where he meets even more difficult 
problems in obtaining a job. This further complicates 
governm~nt efforts to provide adequate facilities for the 
present urban residents. 
In the past two years, Morocco has also instituted 
another type of project program. This program is designed 
to absorb unemployed and some underemployed individuals 
as well as those who have suffered recent crop failure. 
Public projects are designed which utilize this labor with 
only a mini~ of meehmnieal aid. The workers receive 
little actual pay, but they do receive supplemental pay-·in-
kind. The pay-in--kind is United States surplus wheat which 
the Moroccan Government contracted specifically for this 
purpose. It also insures a minimum caloric intake for the 
workers. Individuals inv@lved in this type of project are 
being fed, indoctrinated, educated and given some purchasing 
power in one package, while achieving some basic public 
projects. 
The second mechanism designed'to create the "permanent" 
structure necessary for sustained economic progress, was 
government planning.l This took many for.ms. First, a 
" 1M. Benkirane, "Les R§cents Developpements de la Poli-
tique Ecanom.J.que et les Per~ectives d 1Avenir," 
Confluent, No. 21 (Apri·l l95tj), PP• 129-131, discusse,s 
this topic. 
provisional two-year plan was drawn up for 1958-1959 after 
a review of the economy was made. Its function was to 
pave the way for the first five-year plan. It concentrated 
on the expansion of the infrastructure necessary for certain 
types of industries and on agricultural facilities. The 
first natio'nal five-year plan came into operatie>n ln 1960. 
A· review of some of its contents will be given further 
below. 
Second, in 1958, a new decree relating to private invest-
ments was drawn up. Its policy was as follows: 
The policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to 
private investment in thi.s country is based on the 
principle that while all sound investment is welcome, 
encouragement should be afford~d to enterprises which 
promise to bring a steady support and rapid expan-
sion to those sectors of the economy which could 
particularly benefit from such capital contribu-
tions, and which, consequently, further the objec-
tives of the general economic plans mentioned above. 1 
A foreign investor was obligated to buy his materials in 
Morocco if available and if they were as inexpensive and 
of the same quality as he could get them elsewhere. A 
liberal customs and tax policy was instituted to encourage 
private investment. 
And last, the Government extended some of the public 
institutions established by the French, and created others. 
These were necessary to facilitate economic investment and 
1 11The New Decree Relating to Private Investments," 
repr~nted from the Official Gazette of Morocco, No. ~ 
2395 (September 19, 19SB). 
and development. Among these institutions are the banks 
and finance agencies; the Office·National des Irrigations; 
Office de la MOdernisation Rural; Office Che~ifien'de Controle 
.. 
et d'Exportation; Office Cherifien Interprofessionel des 
" , Cereales; Bureau des Vins et Alcools; Central de Travaux 
Agricoles; Bureau de Recherches et de Par~icipations 
Mini~res; Bureau d 1Etudes et de Par~icipation In~ustrielles~ 
Office National des Transports; Office National Marocain du~ 
. 1 
Tourisme; and La Maison de 1 1Artisan. Through the CTA~ for 
example, the Government disseminates technical knowledge 
to' farmers and offers financial credit for agricultural 
. 
development. The BEPI is the governmental agency which 
works with private capitalists to build viable industries in 
the country. The MA is the public agency which regulates 
artisannl production and insures its quality for export 
sales. It is through these agencies and others that the 
Government hopes to aehieve tbe aims of its five-year plan. 
The five-year plan itself contains many allocations 
f0r temporary measures to initiate the "permanent" struc-
ture, but it is basically long-range planning.2 Its budget 
is 715 bill~on francs (about $1,400,000). Two hundred-three 
billion francs are allocated for agriculture and irrigation; 
240 billion for industry, mines,·energy and artisan&l works; 
110 billion for housing and administrative equipment; 57 
billion for rural and urban management; 52 billion for the 
i~ lConfluent, No. 21 (April 1958), PP• 132-162. 
2plan Quinquennal. 
infrastructL~e; 44 billion for the social sector, including 
education; and 9 billion for tourism. 
In the field of agriculture the plan hopes to increase 
production to meet the needs of the growing population; b'e 
able to export certain crops in exchange for equipmen~ needed 
by the country; reduce food imports; and be able to support 
the needs of industry. These pLapne~§~hope to accomplish 
by agrarian reform including the establishment of public 
" and private collectives; expansion of the "Operation Labour" 
program to 700,000 hectares a year; improvement of irriga-
tion; research;.and improvement of livestock.l 
In industry, mining operations and establishment of 
manufacturing plants to convert domestic raw materials are 
. lsee Paul· Buttin, nL•Evolution du Fellah et la Moderni-
sation de l'Agriculture Marocaine,." Confluent, Nc:> • .5 
(February 1960), PP• 30-74, in which he expresses a 
e0ncern about excessi'lve government control in this 
area of agricultlV'e• He says on PP• 30-31:: "Si des 
mesures approp~iees n'interviennent pas dans les 
prochaines annees, le Maroc risque de se trouver 
· bient8t en face de difficultes, sources de desordres 
sociaux et politiques. Une experience communiste 
ne serait pas exclue. Notre propos est precisement 
de savoir s'il est possible de developper l'economi~ 
agricola du Maroc dans le respect de la personnalite 
du fellah et sans recourir h des mesures dictatoriales 
imposees par la force." 
For a good discussion of efforts being made under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture to train and/or 
adapt its experts to the physical and human envi~on­
ment of Morocco, see Mohamed Messaoudi, "La Coopera-
tion au Maroc dans le secteur Public Agrieole," 
Confluent, No. 2 (June-July 19.59), pp. 218-221. 
Another interesting and informative article on this 
to;>ic is ,by Pierre Wertheimer, uL 'Agricl:ll ture Sous-
developpee et les Interventions.de l'Etat," Confluent 
No • .5 (February 1960), PP• 84-93. 
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stressed. In this manner~ it is hoped that imports can be 
reduced. 
In the artisanal professions~ a policy to continue dis-
playing pr0ducts abroad was adoptedo The plan also pro-
poses to regroup 10,000 traditional-type artisans int0 mod~rn 
werkshops to guarantee a standard quality of work. 
The _planners rec0gnizedthe need of ed~eational programs 
to help facilitate the long-range goals of the plan. Sixty-
six million dollars were allocated for the five-year perio'd 
for developing the educational structure.l The planners 
realized that their efforts in this field as in others w0uld 
not be sufficient~ but they were the best ~hat could be done 
for this period. 
Another limitation to the success 0f the plan is also 
erwi.delll.t~o6 ... llZ, d. In order for the plan to achieve the 
maximum success possible, local areas w0uld have to orient 
lAssouline~ .21?• cit.~ p. 2p~ summarizes the situation 
well: "Les pro~es de la formation des hommes sont 
;,; ' egalement des plus difficiles a cause de leur ampleur 
et de l'urgence des solutions requises •. 
"Il s!agit d 1 accomplir en un temps relativement 
r • " court· ce que la plupart des pays ont real~se en 
plusieurs generations. 11 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
"Dans ce secteur, une fois de plus, notre premier 
souci est de refondre l'appareil qui dispense actuelle-
ment l'enseignement et de reorienter les programmes 
en fonction des besoins du pays. L'enseignement tech-
nique et la formation professionnelle deivent notamment 
fournir au cours du plan un important effort pour 
elargir leur champ dfaetion. n 
. 
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their activities to the directives or the plan. Two major 
limitations are noted in this category: 
; ' w~D'une part la meconnaissance des problemas / , 
economiques precis qui se posent,en chaque point ~ 
£u t~rritpife f.~ permet pas de de~inir les priorites ~~~ni~selilo~a b~e~~~ ~~~celles-ci avec les priorites er1n~es g~ooa ement •••• 
-·D' au'tre part, les moyens propres a coordonner 
autour des directives du plan l'action de 1 1 eRsemble 
des ag,ents economiques demeurent tres insuffisants.l 
The restric.tions placed on the communes further inhibit the 
definition or local needs. One of the main purposes of 
the communes was to articulate these needs, but the con-
tinued centralization has check this development. 
Public planning began in Morocco in 1949 under the 
French. It is a tool ~sed by the majority or underdeveloped 
areas at present as a means of facilitating social and 
economic growth. While on the one hand, it is the most 
pragmatic alternative available, it also ha~ many pitfalls. 
The provision or public facilities is certainly within the 
natural realm or government. However, investments which 
attempt to stimulate business in certain rields are not 
always profitably exercised. For example, in the early 
1950's, public and semi-public agencies were enlisted to 
develop a8ricultural products in variety and quantity. How-
ever, insurticient investment in storage facilities did not 
permit the success or this program. The result was a 
I 
wastage or runds, already scarce. 
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Second, governmental outlays are not, as a rule, 
determined by economic criteria. Rather, criteria o£ social 
priorities are utilized. This is what Weber would call 
economically relevant behavior. While this approach may 
provide some desired £acilities, it does not afford the 
ma~impm growth o£ capital. Through more secure investment 
based on economic criteria, the multiplier effeet1 would 
perhaps have a greater chance o£ operating. 
Third, domestic public funds available to help 
finance the plan are drawn pr~arily from the small, 
private cash sector. I£ taxed excessively, its growth may 
be retarded, as already noted. 
The Moroccan Government has recognized many of these 
problems and more. In hopes of lessening the wastage, it 
attempts to work with private capitalists, where and when 
possible, to encourage their investment, while the Government 
provides the needed public facilities for these enterprises.2 
Moroccan planning is perhaps more £lexible than other 
national plans. Nonetheless, there will be numerous eases of 
. 
capital loss not only because of negligence of economic 
lThe multiplier effect simply means one industry or 
business stimulating others, e.g., shoe industry 
stimulating the growth of leather, rubber, laces, 
polish, machinery and repair services operations. 
20mar s. Elmandjra, "Les Probl~mes de Investissements 
d~ l'Emploi et des Institutions dans le ~adre du 
Developpement Economique du Maroc," BESM, XXII, 
No. 80 (April 1959), PP• 449-459. T~is an 
excellent informational article. 
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principles, but also because of the state of flux of the 
"society". The goals of the new country have ne>t yet taken 
on hard lines te>ward which effort is mobilized in the most 
efficient way possible. Rather, changing conceptie>ns stem-
ming from multi-saurces keep the Moroccan energies and 
resources dispersed.1 
Morocco is endawed with better than average natural 
resources which require much work before they can be 
converted into competitive, saleable products. Moroccan 
Unions have stated their willingness to be reasonable in 
their demands so as not to discourage business. However, 
"being reasonable" has different meanings to labor and 
management. 2 Much of Morocco's annual high trade deficit 
was absorbed by France in previous years. A break with 
.this tradition is anticipated by an increase in domestically 
produced consumer products, and a consequent reduction in 
imports. The currency divorce from France can also be 
viewed as an attempt to achieve economic independence. 
lsee R.B. Lebret, ''Les Voies d'un Pays en uourse de 
Developpement," Confluent, No. 21 (April 1958), PP• 
191-195 for an.excellent discussian of some of the 
pitfalls of planned development as well as related 
subjects. 
2The unions, particularly the UMT, have not hesitated 
to utiliz'e their movements pali ti cally • This in turn 
has economic consequenc~ Recently (December 1961), 
the UMT called a strike by public workers for political 
purposes. This strike crippled the nation 1 s communi-· 
cations network as well as placing in question the 
nation's stability. ~ 
However, this ~ove hurt the Moroccan economy though it gave 
some satis~action to non-economic emotions. 
The developing Moroccan economic structure is best 
described analogously by the image o~ an oct'O.pus:· heavily 
centralized; attempting to reach into every sphere to 
draw each into its cash economy ambit;·and in the.process o~ 
the tenacle extentions and retractions, much capital es-
capes through the ine~~icient limbs. On the other hand, the 
spheres are somehow brought together, unlike the situation 
previously obtaining under traditional segm:ental "society. n 
SUMMARY 
It has been noted that Morocco is utilizing many 
temporary measures to in some way provide a basis ~or what 
is hoped will be the Morocco o~ the near ~uture. Some o~ 
the more npermanent" structural lines have been indicated. 
The present ~ive-year plan with its long-range provisions was 
reviewed. 
Some o~ the orientations and social tools used to 
~oster the development o~ a modern unitary society seem, 
at the same time, to ~orward and to obstruct this end in· 
Morocco. At present, a state o~ :flux, S'[:.:iSnlS and sectorE,.l 
convulsions, complicated by political bickering, best 
describe the situation ~~~~~ouco. 
CHAPTER V 
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS OF 
SOCIAL INTEGRATION "IN MOROCCO 
-202.-. 
The approach taken in this chapter is simple. A 
number of coneepts which were developed in the context of 
established societies are reviewed. Their applications to 
and suggestions for the Moroccan case are explored. Where 
appropriate, the concepts are extended in relation to the 
specific data presented in this study. 
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETY 
It has been asserted that present-day Morocco is not a 
society. The basis for this assertion is clarified by de-
fining the concept,of society • 
• • • a society is a system o~ action in operation 
that (1) involves a plurality of interacting indi-
viduals of a given species (or group of species) 
whose actions are primarily oriented to the system 
concerned and who are recruited at least in part 
by the sexual reproduction of members of the 
plurality involved, (2) is at least in theory 
self•sufficient for-the actions of this plurality, 
and (3) is capable of existing longer than the . 
life span of an individual of the type (or types) 
involved.l 
lMarion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Societx (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 19S2), p. 113. Also see 
Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Illinois: 
The. Free Press, c. 19Sl), p. 19 for a similar definition. 
Parsons ~quates society with a social system which meets 
the requirements here mentioned by Levy. 
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If this definition were to be applied to traditional Berber 
"society," it would indicate that at different segmental 
levels, varying with the area and the period, Morocco was 
made up of a number of societies. Thus, Morocco as a country 
could not be called a society. History has recorded the 
existence of central authority in Morocco at various periods 
and continuously over the past few centuries. Various nation-
al institutions were als0 developed over the years. These 
institutions were never adequate, however, to foster the 
growth of spciety. As Lewis has pointed out, they were them-
selves "• • • loosely integrated with considerable contra-
diction and inconsistency being in abundant evidence. nl More-
over, they did not encompass the totality of Moroccans. This 
was in direct relation to the fact that central authority was 
never able to exert control over the entire area. 
In order to presently achieve the status of society, 
Morocco must develop minimal social integration. A modern 
society with all the advantages implied by it is desired. 
Consequently,, Morocco cannot simply develop and generalize its 
previous national institutional structures but must, for the 
most part, develop new institutional structures. This ·does not 
necessarily mean that everything traditional will be sacri-
ficed. As has been noted.in previous chapters, certain 
aspects of traditionalism are being utilized today to foster 
lLewis, "Morocco: The Impact," p. 6. 
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integration. Second, some Berber traditionalism may continue 
to exist in modern society without seriously affecting its 
functioning. 
Under the French Protectorate, a start was made in 
psychologically orienting all Moroccans to a central system. 
Some basic elements of a unitary structure were implanted. 
The need for records, the development of an Lnfrastructure, 
the injection of capital and industrial growth, for example, 
were all a part of the process. Nonetheless, Protectorate 
efforts did not produce ~society'' in Morocco. 
The task facing independent Morocco, then, is not simply 
to integrate its·various populations sufficiently to for.m a 
society, but to develop a social structure capable of pro-
ducing and maintaining this end. The focus of this study is 
on the development of the social structure and its relation 
to social integration. 
The pursuit of modern society rather than simply society 
alerts one to the double complexity of establishing a 11foreign" 
social structure in a u:wrt time periad and with limited capi ... 
tal. The p~oblems of integration appear to be more crucial 
and difficult under these circumstances. 
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
The concept of social integration is actually made up of 
several concepts. Levy, as others, provides a general defini-
tion of the concept: 
The concept of integration used here denotes 
eufunctional adaptation to a concrete structure. 
The analytic structure of integration in a society 
or other concrete structure consists of those 
structures the operations of which make for the 
eufunctional adaptation of the members and/or 
members-to-(be of the structure to the structure 
concerned. 1)1 
(1) The structure of integration is thus a portion 
of the general structure of eustructures in a 
society. 
He further notes: 
The matter is not a simple ~ne, unfortunately. 
Few, if any, structures are per~ectly integrative. 
that is, give rise to no dysfunctions whether 
latent, m~est, UIR (unintended but recognized, 
mine), or IUR (intended but unrecognized, mine). 
Therefore, specific structures spoken of as inte-
grative often have malintegrative aspects too, 
that is to say their operation results in dys-
functions as well as eufunctions. A structure 
will be considered predominantly integrative if 
on the whole the results of its operation are more 
eufunctional than dysfunctional. The difficulties 
of measurement are too obvious to require comment 
here. Suffice it to say for the p~esent that those 
integrative structures that are structural requisites 
must be predominantly integrative ones if the concrete 
structure of which they are structural requisites 
is capable of stability at a11.2 
.. 
. 
This definition assumes, quite naturally, that a social struc-
ture for the society concerned exists, and that part of the 
effob~ of that social structure is devoted to integrative 
functions. For exrunple, informal and formal education pro-
vide the society member not only with academic knowledge, but 
also with the patterns of interaction and behavior expected of 
each member. 
lLevy, ~· cit~, p. 504. 
2Ibid, PP• 504-505. 
The de~initi0n further notes that no society is perfectly 
integrated. Rather, there are always some elements which pre-
vent this. These stem from the 11naturaln process of change 
as well as from man's inability to foresee and control them. 
' This situation has given rise to what sociologists call a 
"strain for consistency," i.e. society's attempt to somehow 
eliminate those inconsistent elements which prevent the 
achievement of complete societal integration. This process 
of elimination has never succeeded in achieving such com-
plete integration, but the fact that the process goes on, 
allows society to maintain sufficient cohesion far its con-
tinued existence. In established sacieties, the various 
sectors of the structure in conjunction with their cultural 
counterparts sttfficiently acclimate themselves to each other 
over the years. Morocco does not anticipate the luxury of 
this ttnaturaltt acclimation process at present. The new, and 
primarily imported social structure and its cultural content 
·associated with modern society are being rapidly, though enM 
evenly, introduced. It is a planned society and subject to 
all the defects of planning. 
Levy's definition fUrther indicates that there is no 
way of knowing what the minimal level of integration neces-
sary for societal existence and maintenance is. Only the 
vague statement that the structure of society is integrative 
if it has more eufunctional than dysfunction~l elements can 
be made. Since Morocco does not have a generalized social 
structure, integration as an indicator of society's state 
cannot be measured by the criteria offered by Levy. 
The Moroccan Government is attempting to construct the 
structural basis of social integration and thus, society 
itself. l:Tntil this is completed, hcn-1ever, Moroccan problems 
of social integration will be unlike those in established 
societies. When a significant amount of social disintegra• 
tion in the form of deviancy manifests itself in established 
societies, investigators seek its "causes" in dysfunctional 
-
elements of the culture and/or structure. This cannot be the 
ease in Morocco and in the many countries like it which are 
now building societies. Here the problem is not-one of in• 
creased disintegration but rather one of finding temporary 
but effective mechanisms of integration as soon as possible. 
Without initial unity, the development of the structural bas-
is of social integration is retarded. 
CONCEPTUAL CONTENT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATIONl 
Symbiotic and Non-Symbiotic Bases of Integration. Social 
symbiosis can be defined as a network of human interdepen-
dencies. In essence, it connotes man's physical rel~ance on 
man. It is perhaps structurally best il1ustrated by the divi• 
sion of labor in satisfying man's basic needs. It is# then, 
a state of arrangements between men for the sustenance of the 
group. 
lsee Williems, op. cit., PP• 513•545 for a discussion of 
this. 
Non-symbiotic factors are man's social goals and values. 
They are ~lso translated into structural arrangements for their 
achievement. These are related to man's social desires as 
worked out with his fellow society members over periods of 
years, e.g. polygamy, belief in God, and preference $~r de~ 
mocraey. Non-symbiotic ~actors are also rooted in symbiotic 
factors and only separable analytically. For example, our 
societ.fb emphasis on pecuniary values has a symbiotic aspect 
beca~se of the relation to sustenance needs. 
In traditional Moroccan societies, each had worked out 
arrangements mnong its membeDs for the meeting of such physi• 
cal and social needs. The common agadir, communal projects, 
universal military service, and the djemma form of govern-
ment were all a part of the structure ttnaturally" developed 
for fulfilling these needs. 
The stru~ture emanated as interaction bec~e patterned. 
Thus, in future generations it served as the regulator of 
symbiotic and non-symbiotic relationships. Where the accept-
able arrangements were threatened by a member or members, 
various aspects of these arrangements such as law and means 
to enforce it were elaborated. These further defined the 
structure. 
While the symbiotic and non-symbiotic bases of social 
integration existed in the various local traditional Berber 
societies of Morocco, they are only being fostered today on 
a national societal level. The anticipated economic structure, 
for example, is attempting to draw the ~arious human and 
physical resources into a universal symbiosis that will raise 
the standard of living. Through specialization in the divi• 
sion of labor and the introduction of a cash economy, and 
social security, a wider societal dependency for sustenance 
is forwarded, making it increasingly difficult for one to 
withdraw from the new structure. 
New social goals and values are being introduced which 
must be translated into structural ter.ms. However, i~omS of 
the sectors ef the newly developing social structure of 
Morocco, no real group ef explicit goals were in mind when 
action was being taken. There were some rather general values 
such as democracy, equality, honesty, and justice, expressed, 
but the "patterning" within these sectm~Us seemed to follow 
' 
what Moroccan officials co~idered appropriate to a modern 
society. As a part of this haphazard process, roles were 
created without normative content being defined coincidentally. 
The result was, perhaps, to increase inconsistencies within the 
embryonic modern structure. 
Many of the traditional symbiotic and non-symbiotic rela• 
tionships still exist in Morocco today for much of traditional 
structuring is still operative • Naturally, this tends to 
reinforce traditional segmentation. How much of the tradi-
tional relationships are retained because of preference is un-
known at present. Until a minimally consistent social struc-
ture which provides sufficient actual roles for the populace 
is made available, no judgment can be made on this. 
The anticipated symbiotic and non-symbiotic relationships 
of a modern Moroccan society are not yet structural realities. 
Consequently, the development of self-sustaining sacietal 
integration is retarded. At present, only the limited edu-
cational and economic progrruns exist today as elements of 
structure devoted to integrative functions. 
Institution, Structure, System and Culture. These terms 
have been used frequently in this study. A clarification of 
them will cast our analysis into sharper relief. 
Williams notes that the term institution refers It • • • to 
a set of institutional (i.e. obligatory, mine) norms that eo-
here around a relatively distinct and socially important com-
plex of values.ttl 
Social structure is usually inferred from the regularity 
r 
of certain normative or patterned behavior over a period of 
time. That i~social structure is the actual arrangement of 
role relationships. The social structure is analytically di-
vided into complexes of institutional norms. When this is 
done, one can speak of an institutional structure. Social 
structure in this study refers to the network of institutional 
structures. The term unitary structure has also been used 
frequently in this study. It simply emphasizes the fact that 
Morocco is attempting to build a single social structure which 
will envelop the totality of the Moroccan population. 
lWilliams, .2.E.• cit., P• 29. 
A social system is composed or all those social rela-
tionships or complex of relationships which take place within 
the social structure. What is implied here, of course, is 
that social action operates within the patterned forms of 
institutions, and is regulated and/or guided by them. There-
fore, institutions are social systems, or partial social 
systems if Parsons' ter.m is preferred. The social inter-
relationships of all the institutions is a social system 
called society. It is recognized, however, that in any 
society, a number or social relationships are carried on 
that cannot be termed social systems or partial social 
systems. Such relationships consist "• • • of the numerous 
situational fields in which people are thrown together in 
relatively unstructured, new or ~ hoc situations that are 
not yet clearly defined or regulated • nl • • • The impor-
tance of this point will become clear below. 
Culture, for the purpose or this study will not be 
defined according to the classic definition by Tylor. It is 
defined rather as the non-symbiotic content or society. 
Application of these concepts to the Moroccan scene will 
aid comprehension of integrational problems there. First, 
with regard to social structure, it was indicated that it 
is abstracted from patterned behavior. What this implies, 
naturally, is a fairly long historical growth and acceptance 
of specific forms of interaction in satisfying particular 
goals. 
The Moroccan situation is almost entirely in reverse. 
While the pre-independence period exhibited a growing desire 
among the people ror some modern goals and while some informal 
n0rms to regulate the means of satisfying such desires ex-
isted, the basic situation was one of lack of nationally 
agreed upon social structure that had been fostered over the 
years. Consequently, the present Government has taken on 
the role of crystallizing patterned forms of behavior in 
every realm of life. Rather than abstracting social 
structure from normative behavior, then, the Government 
muStcreate the structural forms with their counterpart 
norms. These must be minimally consistel'ii though "unnaturally" 
developed, and have the ability to achieve the goals and 
express the values of modern Morocco. They must also be 
acceptable to the populace. It is a practical impossi-
bility, however, if for time and capital reasons alone to 
develop a whole social structure at one time. 
The present structural position of Morocco is one in 
whichthe traditional~ptructures are corroding but are not 
as yet replaced by the modern unitary structure now being 
developed. The conclusion from this that chaos is common 
in Morocco should not be dravnl. Southall's observations are 
relevant to the Moroccan situation: 
••• Even highly fluid and rapidly changing situa-
tions are r~duced to variations on a finite number 
of types of interaction and directions or change, 
rather th~ dismissed by qualitative assessments of 
cha0s, disorganization, or breakdown of norms, which 
fail to penetrate sufficiently beyond general impres-
sions to the actions of the persons concerned.! 
People somehow relate to each other under the circumstances 
described above, though the relationships are not necessarily 
regulated by a unitary social structure or by traditional 
structuring. Aspects of traditional and modern structuring 
may be combined in a pragmatic structuring 0f relationships. 
These arrangements, as implied above, are of a local nature 
and different arrangements may accrue elsewhere. What 
effects these local "structures" will have for the continued 
development of the modern unitary structure is difficult to 
anticipate. 
Although a number of partial social systems exist in 
Morocco today, many of which are based on pragmatic struc-
turing, there is no universal social system.called soci~ty .. 
Morocco seems to be more advanced in the cultural 
realm, though the effects are not necessarily advantageous 
to social integration. Cultural values and goals may be 
analytically aivided into societal symbols and societal 
preferences. 
Morocco has relatively few culture symbols which possess 
integrative 'appeal. The country was divided after inde-
pendence, as particularly exemplified by the continuation 
of the Liberation Army outside the scope of the Royal Army. 
It was the King's personal appeal which finally brought 
lsoutha11, loc. cit. 
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these elements under manageable control. The ascent or 
orthodox Islam as embodied in the Monarch has already been 
indicated. His nationalist efforts and personal sacrifices 
became well-known. Consequently, Islam and the King serve·d 
as one magniricent cultural symbol which personified M0rocco. 
Thus it was that immediately after independence, the King 
announced Islrun as an emotionaaly charged word designed 
to give all citizens a common value symbol.1 
The Arabic language'was also forwarded as a symbol of 
the ttsocietytstt character. The active though necessarily 
retarded Arabization process in Morocco ~as to provide a 
common ground for the diversified population. 
Nationalism was another symbol utilized to unite the 
people. While it was against a common enemy, it was very 
effective. The cause of rreedom was made the cause of the 
Moroccan people. With the achievement of political inde• 
pendence, residual benefits of nationali~ were still sig-
nificant, particularly when set forth by the King. Sacri-
fices were requested for the common good. Nationalists 
called, on all Moroccans to show their "stock" to a world 
yet doubtful of their ability to stand as a nation determined 
to be respected in the comity of nations. But as glory wore 
thin and the reality of. societal operation Sharpened, nation-
alism lost some of its appeal. 
lsee supra, P• 97. 
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Of the three major culture symbols identified here, 
Islmn as personified by the King seems to be the most en-
during as an integrative force. Under King Hassan II, 
this may have dwindled somewhat, particularly in urban areas. 
Among the former tribal and sub-tribal groups, however, he 
seems to have p0pularity. Hassan, realizing the value of 
his religious heritage as a national symbol is frequently 
seen wearing the traditional robes that go with his position. 
With regard to culture preferences which provide the 
orientation of the social structure, another line of dis-
cussion is necessary. As previously indicated, many of 
these preferential goals and values have been internalized 
by Moroccans during the Protectorate period, and some are 
not yet crystallized though plans for the structural 
counterparts are moving ahead. But for those already 
delineated such as a higher standard of living, education, 
democracy and social justice, the structural bases do not 
exist sufficiently for their achievement. For example, the 
the new body of jurisprudence provides certain rights and 
obligations which, it is anticipate~will allow judicial 
equity. Yet, the actua~ structure for the implementation 
of these rights and obligations is limited. Not only is 
there a Shortage of courts and judges, but also a lack of 
precedence in adjudicating certain cases. Furthermore, the 
time involved in pr0cessing a case through the embryonic 
legal structure may turn those with pressing complaints 
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back to the, traditional mechanisms for settling such matters. 
Or perhaps a pragmatic structural form is used. Although 
both these means of settling a case are outlawed, the fluidity 
of the situation does not always allow detection of such 
acti viti es. 
In some instances, structural forms exist with the 
potential of satisfying the neir cultural preferences, but 
restricted ~sage of these limits their value. This was seen 
to be the case with regard to the communal councils. To 
quell the public from demonstrating against these restric-
tions, the Government utilizes the symbol of nationalism. 
The Government expects Moroccans to accept its judgment on 
the matter as being in the best interests of the country 
aad to exhibit sufficient unified support so as not to 
threaten the development of society. The interesting thing 
ab~ut this situation is that the Government-usually utilizes 
symbols to solidify the population where structural means 
I 
were not available for the achievement of certain goals. 
Moroccans may be willing to accept frustrations when 
structures do not exist to achieve desired ends, but when 
they do and are purposely withheld, a high propensity to 
disenchantment may occur. Under such circumstances, 
I 
Morqccans may be receptive to divisive and/or extremist 
i 
inf~uences. Consequently, the process of social integra-
tic~ and therefore, society-building, may also be be re-
tarded. Ashford summarizes these points:· 
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• • • The ~ull impact o~ the ~requent appeals ~or 
continued nationalist solidarity because of past 
sacri~ices to liberate the nation may have unin-
tended and unanticipated consequences. By ~orestall­
ing the development o~ an individual's capacity to 
participate in pelitics and by setting a pattern o~ 
imposing increasingly dire sanctions based on the survi~ 
val o~ the nation, a sel~-justi~ying device ~or pro-
crastination may be created. While there may be 
justi~iable need ~or rationalization, it may also 
result in the accumulation o~ discontent among the 
nonparticipants and in their increased understanding 
o~ other for.ms o~ influence open to them. With 
suf~icient tension o~ this kind the entire political 
system may collapse in civil war or some other ~or.m 
o~ violence.l 
Summarizing the discussion of the new culture pre~er­
ences, the picture is one o~ majority acceptance o~ those 
that have been de~ined. This acceptance o~ modern goals and 
values is demonstrated by a survey conducted by the Moroccan 
Government o~ over 10,000 young rural volunteers who con-
struct~dd the Unity ~oad. They place their ~uture and 
achievement o~ the 11good li~e" squarely in the bosom 0~ 
the Rabat-de~ined modern "society".2 As yet, however, the 
structural basis is too limited to insure the ngood lif'e". 
Cued by Merton in drawing eut the implications of the 
preceding discussion, it would appear that the preoccupation 
with goals ahd values without su~ficient patterned means 
~or achieving them pressures for devianey.3 Merton's 
hypothesis deals with established societies which do have means 
1Ashfor4, ~· cit., p. 361. 
2Lewis, "Morocco: The Impact," PP• 241-242. 
3Robert Merton, Social Theor and Social Structure 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The ree Press, 19 7 , PP• 
131-160. 
£or pursuing various ends. In a society like that o£ the 
United States, £or example, particular goals and values 
become so cherished that when accepted means fail to achieve 
them, deviancy is utilized. Merton is particularly in-
terested in values and goals which cannot be achieved by all 
but are desired by all. Lack o£ achievement is not due to 
structural insuf£iciency in this case. Thus, £or example, 
he points out that the stress on winning in competitive 
sports ~n this society is so great, that often low blows, 
pushes and an extended foot are illegitimately used to 
achieve that end. Exorbitant use o£ sueh illegitimate 
means produces anomie in that sector of the social structure. 
In Morecco, it is not a matter of deviancy from an 
approved social structure, but rather deviancy £rom what is 
anticipated as the social structure. It is not that such 
actions produce anomie, for a generalized normative system 
does not exist as yet in Morocco. Furthermore, the hodge-
podge of traditional, modern and pragmatic structuring 
which does exist is suf£ieiently fluid to permit much 
ndeviancy." Only when it takes the vielent form such as it 
did in the Rif£, can it be ~ediately detected and checked. 
The Riff incident though based on traditional mechanisms was 
considered 11deviantu in the context o£ modern Morocco. As 
previously noted,. it stemmed from the impatience and dis-
content o£ the Ri££ians to achieve fulfi~lment of ·internalized 
modern goals. 
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It should also be noted here that traditional Morocco 
was corrupt. Cheating, malpractices and graft were all a 
part of the scene whether one refers to Berber societies or 
to the national 11society". Witness, for example, the eon-
tinuous problem Morocco is having with its appointed offi-
cials in local areas. Many still participate in·the personally 
beaefieial traditional practices or retaining tax funds 
for themselves. Many still feel that they are the absolute 
rulers of their areas. While the Government is attempting 
to correct such behavior now considered "deviant," the 
problem is complicated by the numerous facts discussed in 
the previous chapter. Basically, then, traditional Morocco 
has presented a foundation for present "deviancy". Lack of 
means to detect and control such "deviancy" as well as lack 
of a social structure to satisfy present-day needs, allows 
"deviancy" to be readily and "naturally" used. 
' 
Before deviancy in Morocco can be discussed as Merton 
has actually suggested it, Morocco must first have a social 
structure which attempts to regulate behavior. Deviancy in 
the Mertonian sense does not indicate social disintegra-
tion necessarily leading to the breakdown of society. It 
does indicate, however, certain structural-cultural problems 
of particular sectors of society which do "not allow the 
society to achieve complete integration. A certain rumount 
of deviancy is normal to any society, and we would expect 
to f1nd the same in Morocco if and when it does achieve 
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the status o~ society. Right now, however, the type o~ 
deviancy wnich is evidenced would seem to be an obstruction 
to the growth o~ the unitary structure. 
A second and more interesting development resulting 
~rom the internalization o~ cultural goals and values 
permeating Morocco today is the growth o~ non-o~~icial 
groups. Two obvious examples would be political parties and 
unions. Based on such values as freedom of speech, assembly, 
press, economic rights and protection thereo~, such instru-· 
ments of modern society spring up to take their legitimate 
places in the anticipated social structure. When such 
groups are in agreement with the planners o~ modern society, 
i.e. the g0vernment, their problems are minimal. However, 
when such groups are in agreement only that the society 
must be developed, but in basic disagreement with regard 
to the methods employed, the time taken, and the expected 
societal content, then the problems are naturally increased. 
The opposition UNFP party in Morocco and itsaupporter, the 
UMT, are in constant verbal clashes with the Istiqlal-dominated 
Government and the latter's union supporters. Such conflicts 
are not absorbed or regulated through an established struc-
ture. 
Because there are not patterned acceptable means o~ 
handling such conflicts, and because they threaten and divert 
the e~~orts o~ the Government--insu~~icient and ine~~icient 
as some o~ these may be--to construct the social structure, 
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a compromise o~ the values and ideals which allowed these 
groups to develop and/or continue ~rom the Protectorate period 
takes place. In Morocco, it has taken the ~orm o~ suppress-
ing the UMT organ occasionally, si~ting from civil service 
positions, supporters of the UNFP-UMT coalition, and the 
utilization of subtle means to control opposition access 
to the population at large. Out and out suppression would 
destroy the international image of Morocco and perhaps 
cause a loss of confidence in its economic future. It 
would also place more ammunition in the hands of the oppo-
sition ~or gaining greater popular support than it now 
enjoys. Third, even if suppression was contemplated, Morocco 
would find it extremely difficult. The leaders of the oppo-
sition are quite popular in parts of Africa, and this is 
a sensitive area for Morocco bent on becoming a major African 
power.l Ben Seddiq, for exmnple, is the president of the 
All-African Labor Movement.2 His domestic control over the 
majority o~ industrial workers could well hamper the na-
tional economy, if he cared to do so. His recent strike 
call (Decamber 1961) of postal, telegraph and telephone 
employees crippled postal services and communications in 
the country for several days. 
liromanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Inde-
pendence (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), PP• 165-
166, has an excellent discussion of this. 
2This name is misleading, since it represents only 
those countries of the Casablanca accord. Another 
union has been formed which embodies the more moderate 
nations of Africa~ 
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There is not sufficient social integration in Morocco 
today to channel differences of opinion mnicably, and this 
acts as a boomerang. That is, it fUrther hinders integra-
tional development. Nor are cultural symbols sufficient 
to rally all elements of the population to hold check while 
the structural basis of integration is being built. Con-
sequently, Morocco requires stronger symbols to integrate 
the totality of the population. For in lieu of an estab-
lished structure to regulate what would perhaps be considered 
a normal amount of conflicting views in established socie-
ties, they must serve the function of checking the expression 
of these until such time as they can be regulated. This 
does not seem to be the case in Morocco. 
It is true that Islam as personified by the King is 
well respected by the majority of Moroccans. For the 
activists, however, respect does not mean total submission 
of their views. Though the activistg are a minority, their 
position in Morocco as the vanguard of the anticipated 
society gives them numermcally disproportionate significance. 
I 
Their instability and potential hostility may hinder further-
ance of the embryonic social structure. What is required of 
them is unquestioning political allegiance to the Government 
during the process of society-building. This seems, however, 
to be out of the question.1 Even non-activists are not 
nendowed11 with this quality, but this lack is compensated 
libi~ pp. 85-101 1 has an excellent discussion of this. 
Especially significant for this study is the following 
excerpt from PP• 87-88: 11Loyalty to the state can be 
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in part by their emotional loyalty to the King. 
Commonly shared goals and interests are also not en-
during means or society or its development. For ir they 
cannot be achieved due to lack or structure, they provide 
sustenance to 11 deviancy. n This rurther obstruct;s integrational 
efforts. Williams, in his excellent discussion on social 
integration, states the above point well: 
• • .Interests alone are not enough, and mutual 
dependence thr~ the division of labor is not enough. 
For these factors to contribute to cohesion, two 
additional elements appear essential, as minimal con-
ditions: {1) congruent interests and dependencies must 
be linked together, and disruptive interests insulated 
from one another, through definite social struc·!iures; {2) 
there must be procedural agreement as to the rules under 
Which interests may be pursued. Under the latter head-
ing, ~or instance, falls the acquiescence of losers in 
political electio~s. Under the for.mer condition, 
must be included all those structural arrangements 
and techniques of action that articulaDe interde-
pendence and block conflictrul interactions. Such 
arrangements we will cail mechanisms.l 
measured by the sense or restraint its citizens reel 
in pursuing their opposition to speciric policies or 
the government. Ir they oppose the particular govern-
ment in power but stop at a point short or destroying 
the state or seriously weakening it, they can be said 
to be 1loya1. This kind or legitimation or the state 
rather than of a particular government is something 
that is inculcated in the population over a period or 
time• Children are taught it in schools. But Arrican 
nations have not yet had time ror this. At present many 
Arrieans cannot determine the limits of opposition,. 
do not understand the distinction between opposition 
and secession. This is what leaders of African 
governments mean when they argue that 'our oppositions 
are not constructive.' It is not that they tend to 
be destructive or the government in power; this is the 
purpose of an opposition. It is that they tend to 
destroy the state in the process oftrying to depose the 
acting government." 
2willigms, 2£• ~., PP• 521-522. 
Institutional 0onsistency. Traditional Mor0ccan 
societies possessed institutional consistency as has been 
indicated in chapter three. But present-day Morocco does 
not possess a consistent social structure. This is not to 
say that c0nflicting institutional structures and/or parts 
thereof do not exist in already established societies. 
They do, and the United States is a good example. But 
again, structural arrangements are such as to produce a 
number of mechanisms which either check potential conflicts 
or which insulate and/or isolate the interaction of such 
elements. Furthermore, a wealth of internalized cultural 
symbols aid in producing cohesion, and alleviating con-
flicting and/or contradictory elements.l Morocco cannot 
be said to be passing through a "natural n phase where its 
institutions are "straining for cc:msistency", brought on 
by various factors of change. Rather, as noted on several 
occasions, the institutions are planned and presented. 
In the previous chapter, numerous Moroccan officials 
were quoted on the need for coordinating the efforts in the 
various sectors of the social structure. Such coordina-
tion makes sense and assumes a consistency not only of the 
forms of interaction, but also their normative content and 
cultural orientations. Again, however, awareness of the 
necessity for coordination and the actual ability to plan 




Chapter four exemplifies the above points amply. Fur-
ther exploration here will aid our comprehension of inte-
grational problems in Morocco. What appears to be the situa-
tion in Morocco today is one where there are traditionalism 
symbols and goals being utilized for cohesive purposes. These 
symbols and goals ~et find structural counterparts which 
encour.~ge the continuation of traditionalist tendencies. 
Side by side with this phenomena are modernist goals and 
symbols which find their structural counterparts in as yet 
~nc0mpleted form. Further, in various sectors of the 
developing social structure, the goals are not defined. The 
situation is compounded in complexity by the fact that the 
modern structure and culture being introduced in Morocco 
are often interpreted and utilized on the basis of their 
predecessors, as previously noted. If these factors can be 
visualized as a blend rather than as separate processes, 
Morocco's source of institutional inconsistency can be readily 
defined. An illustration focussing on the relief of political 
life in part of its interinstitutional framework should 
suffice to demonstrate the situation. 
The analytical frame of reference used is what Williams 
has called "• • • disciplined speculation, recording at the 
level of hypothesis • • • La_7 sampling of possible intra-
personality cannections between family institutions and 
political authority, ttl • • • • Williams' develep~ent of 
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this hypothesis is as ~ollows: 
At the basic level or personality formation, the 
family unit is a miniature government, as Maciver, 
Merriam, Lasswell and others have pointedly reminded us. 
The primary conceptions of authority and patterns of 
response to authority are initially established in 
parent-child relations. All parents everywhere must, 
by virtue or their status, demand some conformity from 
young children. The way in which the child responds to 
parental authority supplies the base upon which success-
ively modified reactions to authority and power rela-
tions are later developed. (21) The American family 
system tends, bnoadly, to minimize parental coercion 
and unquestioning obedience, and to stress sibling 
equality. To ~ degree that this is the case, the 
fmnilial nor.ms would seem to be congruent with a 
democratic political system. (22) 1 
(21) This does not imply a mechanical or automatic 
"carry-over." The notion that adult responses to 
political figures are simple recapitulations of 
childhood relations to parents or siblings is contradic~ 
ted by the impressive evidence for the situational 
determination of conduct. 
(22) But note that the basic form of the American 
State was laid down in a period when family structure 
was much more "patriarchaln than now. 
In addition to the elements related in Williams' hypothesis, 
religion will also be included here as part or the analysis. 
First, the traditional family of MOrocco was patriarchal. 
In fact and ~s interpreted by law today, it remains basically 
patriarchal. Second, official policy was and is to work 
within the spirit or orthodox Islam. Such a policy is 
aimed directly at identifying the national character or the 
country and to make full use of the faith as a cohesive 
symbol. As repeatedly noted, this symbol is embodied in the 
King. As the ~~ the King is the "rather 11 , i.e. the 
patriarch or his people. He commands obedience from his 
"children," as the family patriarch demands from his. No 
"family" member should bring shame upon the family name. 
Third, as part of the modernist trend as well as other C0n-
siderations, Morocco has proclaimed its political goals as 
basicallydemocratic. Therefore, it is allegedly developing 
a constitution that will limit the powers of the Monarch and 
will set the tone of representative political institutions. 
On the lo'cal J.evel, it has already established elected 
c0rnmunal councils though not functiG>n!ng~,a·s;.~.originally 
intended. 
Thus, on the one hand, modern democratic goals and 
values with some structural counterparts are identified, 
while on the other hand, there is centralized control under 
the King sanctioned and supported by Islam and the family 
system. 80 much has Islam been tapped for initial 
integrative purposes that it has actually succeeded in 
many ways in reinforcing some traditionalism. The political 
centralization of today--though considered necessary in many 
~n¥tances--is, then, not consistent with the stated demo-
cratic goals and values. The continued centralization has 
distorted the structural counterparts of the democratic 
orientations. Again, this centralization is consistent 
with the rel!gious and family institutional structures as 
they exist today in that country. 
Complicating the effort to achieve institutional con-
sistency in Morocco is the fact that modern goals and values 
of the country are often interpreted through preceding 
cultural eyes. This is illustrated by a personal experience 
of the author. In the Fall of 1960, the author had the 
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pleasure of making the acquaintance of Mr. Mustapha 
El•Alaoui, Director of the Arabic Revue, ttA1-Machahid, 11 
published in Morocco. In a gathering with other American 
students, he expressed a feeling of disappointment with 
the United States' Government over a then recent incident. 
The incident in question was the boycotting of an Egyptian 
cargo ship by stevedores in New York. He placed the blame 
squarely on our Government and felt that it was something 
of which all Americans should be ashruned. One of the 
American students attempted to explain that the Government 
was not involved in this matter, and that it was an action 
taken by an independent group. The student further indicated 
that because the stevedores had violated no laws, Federal 
action could not be taken. Mr. El-Alaoui rejected this 
explanation as false. In his mind, he stated, no Government 
would allow anything to occur that would shrune it, unless 
it was part ·of its policy. Again the American attempted to 
explain that the lack of Government action was a part of 
our democratic process; and though the incident was inter-
nationally embarrassing, it could not be controlled without 
violating our basic tenets. The explanation was again 
rejected as inconceivable, since "nothing of this nature 
would ever be allot-ved in Morocco." When asked later of the 
type of political system he favored for his country, he 
responded i:rmnediately with ndemocratic 11 • He did not see 
the inconsistency of his statements. 
Also exi~ting in Morocco today is a number 0f "ad-
vanced" groups. Their family structure is veering toward 
the type consistent with a democratic for.m of government. 
Second, while recognizing the obligations of Moslems, they 
realize that Islmm is restrictive for modern development. 
Third, King Hassan II is not the embodiment of a father symbol 
to them. They are more geared to him as a figurehead in 
the promised constitutional monarchy. They have internalized 
democratic ideals, and are impatient with lack of realiza-
·tion. The beginnings Gf the structural basis for their 
realization is present but distorted. 
The problem of consistenp~ in Morocco has been illus-
trated by viewing the political 11institution~' in relation 
-
to the familial and religious "institutions". As further 
illustratio~ of the problems of consistency in Morocco, 
the economic "institution" could be analyzed in the smme 
fashion. 
The continuation of the extended family hinders not 
only savings for investment purposes, but alsG mobility. 
Mobility has commonly been functionally associated with 
economic development. Second, the new glorification of 
Islam and its duties, particularly R~adan observances, is 
not congruent with the type of modern economy anticipated 
by Morocco. Strict Ramadan observances are an anachronism 
in a modern economy. 
The hodge-podge of traditional and modern institutional 
structures in Morocco does not "produce" the social inte-
gration necessary for the continued development and 
maintenance of' society. It is not, then simply destroying 
traditional Berber segmentation, but rather developing a 
consistent social structure, with its cultural content, 
which envelops the Moroccan universe in a functional (or 
euf'unctional) social system. 
Institutional Dominancy. It is recognized today that in 
different societies at various periods a particular insti-
tution or combination of' institutions may be dominant in 
shaping the :remainder.1 It is not necessary here to indi-
cate the many problems in attempting to identify the domi-
nant institution~) in particular societies. 2 It is only 
necessary to recognize that the concept of institutional 
dominancy implies, in theory, that changes in institution 
A are always followed by significant changes in institution 
B ••• n, but not vice-versa. In actuality, such a clear-cut 
case does not exist. Nonetheless, the concept suggests that 
society already exists, and that through its "normal" 
processes, one or more institutions affect its co~rse. The 
concept also relates,~o the beginnings of' social living 
when societies were being formed. 
The concept of' dominancy does not readily lend itself' 
to application to the Moroccan scene. Because Morocco is 
planning society, no institution has come to the forefront 
through the 11regular" method. Rather it is the insti tu-
libid., p. 48.5. 
2Ibid., P• 486. 
tion controlling effective power in Morocco which is automa-
tically dominant. This, of course, is the political "insti-
tution" which is actually synonymous with the central govern-
ment at present. 
Furthermore, the concept of dominaney assumes that the 
values, goals and norms of the dominant institution will 
pervade the rest of society's institutions.1 Morocco has not 
yet worked out the forms, norms and cultural content of 
their political institution. The present state of this 
institution was r evie"Vted in the previous chapter. Thus, 
its dominancy cannot be viewed in the sense that it 
ttnaturally" influences the tone of all other institutions. 
' 
Rather the nuclear political institutional structure must 
be viewed as the "plannertt not only of its own future 
' 
shape, but also the shape and tone of all ather insti tu-
tional structures. It determines the goals and values to 
be praised as well as defines the behavioral expectations 
' 
in achieving them. The problem then becomes one of having 
the wherewithal to do this, as well as a willingness to 
release power in conformity with its own set goals and 
values. Continued centralization of power beyond its legi-
timate use--whatever that may be--could have the effect of 
defeating the achievement of the type of saciety which 
ttthe institution" purports to de sir e. 
lThis.is by no means an even process. Some elements 
are more affected than others. 
The previous chapter amply ®c1Uilents the dominancy of 
the political institution--as controlled by the central 
government--in the various spheres of life. An illustration 
of this fact will serve as a reminder here. 
In planning the modern society, economic development 
was considered essential. The planned development was and 
still is ~ub~~et to many pitfalls. One reason is that 
capital is ~nvested on a priority system rather than on 
the basis of economic criteria. This hinders capital forma-
tion and consequently development alsoo It not only delays 
achievement of the goals set for the economic structure, 
but also affects achievement of goals in other spheres. 
Since the economic structure is a major source of support 
for the other institutions, these are slowed down also. 
Witness thus, that the political sphere affects the other 
institutions. But rather than its influence being in the 
context of other institutions "straining to be consistentn 
with it, it itself may hinder this process. As a result, 
the concept of institutional dominancy is seen to be 
something quite different in Morocco than in established 
societies. 
Force and Social Integration. One of the cohesive 
instruments of society is force or the threat of force. It 
does not seem, however, to be a sufficient means in and of 
itself for social integration. As Levy points out: 
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••• Foree is a sanction, but never the essence of a 
society. A society based solely on force would be a 
contradiction in terms if for no other reason than that 
implicit in the classical question, Quis custodiet 
ipsos custodes? In theory, at least, in the absence 
of other restraints than force, it wo~ld not be possi-
ble to maintain any particular system of action let 
alone one "self-sufficient and capable of existing 
longer than the life span of an individual. ttl 
What i-s implied here is that some form of "common conscience" 
acts as a restraint to potentially disruptive behavior. 
Force is used as a secondary means of maintaining social 
integration in established societies.: 
In Morocco, in lieu of universal normative behavior 
patterns, a "common conscience" exists only to the extent 
that people are ebedient to the King. Loyalty to the King, 
in emotional terms, is quite prevalent, but obedience to 
him in ~nswer to his appeal to Moroccans to refrain from 
"deviant" and/Gr·disruptive behavior is much less than 
reality. The social environment of the individual becomes 
the basis for his social action. As a result, force has 
bee~ used by the Moroccan Government on several occasions. 
Its use was ~ to maintain social integration as in es-
tablished societies, but to control nonintegrated groups. 
Thus, in some ways, coercion has been useful in 
controlling certain elements threatening the process of 
society-building. The Riff incident serves to illustrate 
this point. But conti·nued use of force may bring on 
increased activity of opposition groups. Or, greater force 
lLevy, £E• cit., PP• 139-140. 
could bring outward obedience, but not necessarily social 
integrationo Second, a 11 society11 built on force is an 
expensive society, a luxury Morocco can ill afford. 
Most interested observers of the African scene today 
will generally recognize that force may be a necessary 
instrument to aid social integration in some countries. 
This is because Morocco and other countries like it do not 
possess populaces with ttcc::>nwon consciencestt stemming from 
participation in unitary structures. That force may become 
a permanent instrument to suppress opposition groups beyond 
the legitimate requirements of social integration is a 
possibility. What these legitimate requirements are, are 
difficult to delineate and would vary with each country. 
The fact remains, however, that the use of some force in 
conjunction with other instruments is relevant to the success 
of society-building. 
SUMMARY 
It has been asserted that Morocco is not yet a society. 
A delineation of the social facts and processes responsible 
for this was presented in the framework of social integra-
tion. The symbiotic and non-symbiotic bases of integration 
were examined. It was found that MOrocco is attempting to 
develop universal symbiosis, and already has a number of 
non-symbiotic elements available to the populace. The problem, 
however, is that in order for symbiotic and non-symbiotic 
elements to function in their integrative roles, they must 
be translated into a social structure. The embryonic modern 
social structure of Morocco is not sufficient. Even various 
national ttsymbolsn do not seem to be sufficient to integrate 
Morocco temporarily while a structure is being constructed. 
Consequently, Morocco has a difficult road ahead of 
it in its attempts to mold its population into a universal 
social system. Morocco~ i.e. its Government, has reacted 
to part of this difficulty by utilization of suppressive 
methods. These methods are directed against groups which 
seem to hinder Gover.rumental efforts. The danger then 
develop~ of·betraying some of the principles on which the 
Gover.rrment has stated it desires the society to develop. 
The problem increases in that the stopping point for such 
methods is not set. The way becomes paved for permanent 
use of them. 
To the outside world, Morocco and others may seem to 
be veering toward some form of totalitarianism. While in 
some ways this may be true, a greater comprehension of its 
rationale and patience with it may be, it is hoped, gleaned 
from this study.· Nonetheless, it is a matter of concern that 
the coercive process may become a permanent fixture rather 
than an expedient tool necessary in the initial stages of 
society-building.1 
lwallerstein, ££• cit., pp. 164-165, expresses the 
situation well when he says: "The emergence of long-
range institutional guarantees of a democratic society 
The institutional "structuringn existing in Morocco 
today is diffuse. Government planners will try to bring 
more consistency into the "system" as time goes on. In 
the meantime, the "deviancy" which is being exercised 
today in the fluidity of confusion may act as a retarder to 
a more speedy development of society. 
From the point of view of sociology, some ideas on 
the pr0blems of social integration in countries such as 
Morocco, and thus on society-building in general, may be 
derived from this study. They are embodied in the next 
chapter. 
is by no means automatic. However, it is not really 
possible at all before the prerequisites are fulfilled. 
The problem therefore is twofold: how to fulfill the 
prerequisites as rapidly as possible, and how to do so 
in such a way as to maximize the possibility that the 
authoritarian regimes (of African countries, mine) of 
the present will not stagnate and harden but will 
develop further toward the increase of personal free-
dom within the state. n 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is hoped that a number o~ ideas regarding problems 
o~ social integration, and therefore society-building, are 
suggested fii·~m this study.- Only those ideas which specifi-
cally relate to the body o~ data collected here are presented. 
First, ·the essential instruments of integration are: 
(1) the leader who is the embodiment o~ culture symbols 
old and new; (2) use of direct and indirect force; (3) 
mass education; and (4) generalized economic progress. 
That is, the newly developing society must rely upon these 
for its initial cohesion. In lieu of a social structure 
to regulate behavior "automatically", these instruments 
attempt to restrain disruptive behavior. 
It is the leader above all else who makes an appeal 
to the people to be calm and to follow his directions. His 
personal attraction to the masses must be, significantlx 
strong over a period o~ time. Force is usually organiz~d 
immediately after independence and used in conjunction with 
the personal appeal of the leader, when necessary. The 
use of force, initially, is against clearly defined disruptive 
groups. These groups have equated independence with either 
uncontrolled freedom of action for themselves and/or imme-
diate better.ment o~ their standard of living. 
The success or personal persuasion and force in early 
post-independence days in controlling disruptive behavior 
allows time for the development or mass education progrruns 
and various economic pro·jeets. The mass education programs 
are to aid the population to c0mprehend as soon as possible 
the problems of society-building. They are~o.serve as well 
to indoctrinate sufficient loyalty and 0bedience to the 
government so that the populace will maintain a moratorium 
on behavior which could threaten the "society". The develop-
. 
ment of a ncommon conscience" based on national pride is 
also forwarded. 
Economic programs are an attempt to demonstrate imme-
diately to the populace the benefits of modern society. 
Furthermore, they create a national symbiosis which makes it 
increasingly difficult for members to withdraw fpom the 
wider societal grouping. The success of these initial pro-
grams also reinforces the development of the other institutional 
structures, and.this, in turn, is reflected in increa8ed 
integrational progress. The non-success of these programs 
retards efforts in other sectors and consequently retards 
social integration. As Wallerstein notes, "• •• rapid 
economic development is tied to national integration, simul-
taneously as cause and consequence.nl 
Second, the social inequality~tthe people joined with 
the impossibility 0f making satisfactory appeals to all and 
the increased demands for more rapid development, may necessi-
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tate the increased use of force to control behavior viewed 
as dangerous to society-building efforts. Control of the 
opposition by the use of such increased force seems to be 
tempered, apparently, by such variables as international 
considerations, internal power of the opposition, and the 
status and populabity of opposition leaders. 
The increased use of force against segments of the 
population appears to be a violation of the basic democratic 
principles which inspired African independence movements. 
These principles continued to be the inspiration of post-
independence designs for society. They per.mitted or allowed 
to continue the open growth of opposition which would not 
be tempered by the initial integrative instruments. The 
forms in which the opposition was crystallized, e.g. political 
parties and unions, would be considered normal segments of 
a modern social structure. However, since ade~uate and 
evenly developed social struct~res do not yet exist in Africa, 
the protests and behavior of these groups cannot be regulated 
automatically to check threats to "society". Thus· a compro-
mise of democratic principles results. Such a compromise may 
seem to be a contradiction of the societies desired. None-
theless, it appears to be a necessary and unavoidable part 
of the integrati.onal process in these newly developing 
societies. 
The possibility exists that those countries in Africa 
·which find it necessary.to utilize force in greater pro-
proportion to personal persuasion for restraint of disrup-
tive behavior, may well find themselves with hardened authori-
tarian governments in the future. That is, the use of force 
can easily be rationalized as a necessity far beyond the 
requirements of aiding initial social integration. The 
development of an 11authoritariann trend in any new country 
of Africa raises questions in many quarters about the future 
of democracy there. While such questions are legitimate, 
it must be indicated that no formidable police state has been 
developed as yet in any of these countries. Furthermore, 
African countries have a great residue of the basic freedoms 
associated with democracy. 
Third, as the difficulties of society-building begin 
to manifest themselves, they are met on the political level 
by the development of a dominant party system (if this or 
a one party system did not already exist). While other 
parties may be allowed to function, one party becomes 
dominant and serves as the instrument of government in the 
integrational process. The orientations of the dominant 
party, then, are the ones transmitted to the masses 
through indoctrination. This appears to have a major 
value in that it has a standardizing effect on the as 
yet differentiated populations. While the standardization 
process is helpful to integration, the stated democratic 
desires of these countries are again compromised. On the 
other hand, the residue of liberalism may allow significant 
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diversification of views within the dominant or one party 
systems. The growth of such diversification may then cul-
minate in multi-party systems when sufficient structural 
bases exist to regulate their operation. 
And fourth, the uneveness of societal growth allows many 
to become, relatively speaking, over-involved with the new 
goals and values introduced under Europeans and promised 
fulfillment 'by the nationalists. The increase in goal in-
volvement exerts tremendous pressure for 11deviancy". Even 
. 
when people may be desirous of "obeying" their leader, the 
structural insufficiency reinstates and reinforces t~adi­
tional patterns of behavior or else ttcreatesn· a number of 
situational fields where pragmatic structuring occurs. This, 
in t~rn, offers obstacles to the development of the unitary 
structure. 
The above represent the major ideas which have emanated 
from this study. Clearly, the problems and processes of 
social integration in newly developing societies are quite 
different from those in established societies. While in 
specific countries the total process presented here may 
differ, the Moroccan case study along with Professor 
~ 
Wallerstein's work suggest a basis for further sociological 
research in Africa on this problem. 
In concluding the study, a few speculative statements 
based on the Moroccan case may be ventured regarding the 
trend of these "societies". 
A fluid situation will obtain for an extended period of 
time in most countries. Nonetheless, the imperfect balance 
of the various initial integrative instruments will somehow 
allow the countries to manage until such time as social 
structures are generalized and their normative content 
internalized. The structures will not, obviously, take the 
complete form known in the Western world. Rather, they will 
embody a number of domestic accomodations. They may also 
contain more formal mechanisms of social control based on 
the precenents established in the building period. This is 
not to say that the countries will be authoritarian, but 
merely to take account of a present mechanism which may 
indicate certain merits to the pl.anners of society and to 
their heirs. 
The progress made thusfar by Africans in the ef~ort to 
build modern societies rapidly from segmented, traditionalist 
populations has been impressive. It is hoped that the 
principles on which African independence was claimed will 
be predominant in the future societies of that continent. 
APPENDIX A. 
BELIEFS~ CEREMONms·, MAGICAL RITES, AND FOLKLORE 
1. Ritual Marriage -for Agricultural Productivity. One 
of the agricultural r~tes of the Berbers had to do with tne 
proper rainfall necessary for the crops to-grow well~ The 
soil was considered to·be the "motlier~ of-cereal harvests, 
but she could not proauce'tlie Iatter-~i.e. children--, unless 
fertilized by the male--i.e. the· rain. If the rain did not· 
occur at the proper time, the land would. ·be barren. As such, 
a ritual human marriage was ·performed during the planting 
season, which incited .. tlie land to accomplish its union with' 
the rain and 'yiela fruit. "Effigies· ol'l humans~ could be used • 
. In the case of humans, there were usually special men and 
women used. Their evening spent together was called either 
a "night of error"· or a "night of happiness", depending on 
the gr?UP involved.l 
2. Rituals; Beliefs' and Ceremonies ~onnected with Plough-
ing and Seeding. Among the Shloh. of Aglu a ~ig dish filled 
with tagulla, ·a 'kind of"hara porridge, is taken ·to ·the place 
where the plougbing·is about· to commence; In the middle of 
the tagulla there is a hole filled with ofl, into which the 
ploughman dips tlie'point of the plough-share (askers) three 
times, saying:--•••• "In the name of ·Goa, 0 God, ·may thou 
complete for us this good thing with which we ·are occupied". 
The ploughman then goes round the animals and plough, sprink-
ling-them with oil and repeating the following words:' •••• 
"In the name of G6dl we trust Gcd and-the Prophet, the apostle 
of God; may God complete for us this good'thing·in whicli we 
are engaged, may we· plough in peace, ·may we reap· in peace, 
may we gather in peace, may we thr~sh·in peace, may we eat in 
peace and with health.; 0 m.y Lord God"; The rest of the oil 
and tagulla is eaten by those present. 
.. ~ . .. ... . .. . .. .. ~ " "' . .. .. ,.. . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The ·most, ·prominent· feature of the ceremonies· just de-
scr~bed in the ce~emonial meal,·to which·magic efficacy is 
ascribed. It' is cliarged with supernatural energy in various 
ways: fatha·(readings from the Koran) is made ana b~essings 
are pronounced in connection with it, it is sometimes eaten 
in a mosque,. it is in certain instances especially partaken 
1Based on Bel, La Religion, PP• 77-79• 
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of by little children and schoolboys, who are ·regarded as 
more or les·s holy individuals, and in one cas·e a person with 
the holy name of.Mtiliafumed plays the ·most prominent·part in 
the ceremony,.· It is perhaps in some measure an act of imita-
tive or homoeopathlc·maglc, suggested by the ~dea that like 
produces like, that a certain effect may be brought-about by 
imitating it; the eating of food made of cor.n·will'cause the · 
eating of the same kind of food in the· future, in other words, 
the·crops-wfll prosper. It is true that r·have never heard 
this-eiplanation of the ploughing meal, but there a~e other 
instances of ce~emonial·meals which are evidently based on· 
the principle in que'stion. · Thus among· the Alt Yusi, ·wneri a 
tent is being sewn,-·food i·s partaken of on the tent-cloth in 
order that there shall ·always be food in the tent,· and on 
these occasions no fatha is made and no~ blessings are pro-
nounced. But although the ploughing meal may be partly based 
on the belief in homoeopathic magic, I have llttle.doubt that· 
the main obj$ct or it"is"to serve as a conductor of blessings. 
In order to be efficacious·a blessing requires a wire through 
wh!eh it is transmitted fram the person who blesses to the 
object blessed, and the closer the contact between them the 
more readily is the blessing transferred. Now the eating of 
a thing implies the most intimate·contact·possible·oetween 
the thing·eaten and the"person who eats it, and, according to 
tJ:ie rule of\ pars pro toto,· so commonly applied in magic, ·to· 
communicate blessings to some representative of a certain·spe-
cies is to bless the whole species. Thus by eating bread, 
trid, seksu, sersem, tagulla, or tummit, people transfer 
their blessings to the future crops.--lt is noteworthy that in 
one case the loaf of bread which is eaten on this occasion is 
made of three different kinds of cereals; and to give further 
efficacy to the blessings a portion of the ·food is often·put· 
into direct contact with the ploughing animals or the plough. 
This contact, however, may also be intended to make the work 
easier or to serve as a protection against ·accidents, as well 
as to influence tJ:ie crops~ ·As appears from certain phrases 
or formulae mentioned above,·the blessings"may expressly refer 
to the work or the ploughman' hence the latter may also be 
supposed to be benefited by the meal in which he partakes. · 
Other phrases, again, are directed against the devil {s-sitan), 
whose presence might be injurious to the ploughman, animals, 
and crops. In these cases the devil may be-regarded as a rep-
resentative of the znun (our djoun, mine), or spirits, of the 
ground. 
Besides the ceremonies already described there are var-
ious other practices which have reference either to the 
ploughing animals or to the future c~ops. • • • rn· Aglu in 
Sus the animals are protected from the evil eye by a char~ 
consH~ting of sulphur, alum,- harmel, and a· ·small piece of' 
salt, envelopea·in a black rag tied up with a red string; pre-
vious to the ploughing meal this charm is hung over the fore-
-245-
.... 
head of the animal,'if it be a bullock, or round-its· neck, ir 
it be a horse,·mule, donkey; or·camel, and is left there till 
it falls dowp of its.own accord. 
. . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· The ploughman ••• is subject to·certain'rules the trans-
gression o~ which is suppGsed to injure tne crops. In most· 
parts of Morocco it is considered necessary that he shall be 
sexnally clean;>ir he'has had intercourse he must wash him-
self before he commences his work, since otherwise there 
would be no baraka, or holiness, 'in the seed·or there would 
~row m~stly ~r~ss ~nd weed~ on t~e f~eld. • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The seed requires·special precautions. In the Hiaina· 
nobody must step over or sit on the tsellis ttwo united sacks 
used for the-transport of grain) in~whicn the ·seed is kept, 
and nothing of it must· oe mixed with otnar· grain; should any-
body eat of lt the effect·would be like that of poison; since 
there is much baraka in it·. But on the day wp.en the sowing 
is finished there should be left ih the tsellis half a mudd 
of seed to be given to the ploughman (or, if there are more· 
than one ploughman, to oe·divided between them) together with 
some milk and salt butter,· this being reg·arded as lucky for·· 
both parties; nay·even if the ploughing w.as· done by the· farm~ · 
er_him~e;f, ~e must le~v~ so~e_of ~he se~d_and_e~t_o~ ~t~ ••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
While the wheat is being sown, tliere·is supposed to"be a 
m&stic relation oetween the ftiture'crops" and the wheat'at 
home. Among-various ·Berber tribes ••• the women are during 
this· period prohibited :from ·making turif~ .t:,l' .consisting of 
roasted'wheat"with"the addition of salt-and·wa:ter lest the-
grain resulting from the sown wlieat'also should have the ap-
pearance of having been reasted. • • • 
.. .... .. .. .. .. . .. .. ~ .. .. .. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8 • • • • • • I • • • • • 
Before we leave the ceremonies connected with ploughing 
and sowing we have still to notice a custom the object of 
which is undoubtedly to promote the growth of· 'the crops .1 
Some groups promise to reserve·part of the ·grain from a·por-
tion of the field for a marabout or his moqaddem (last sen-
tence, mine} • 
. . 
3. Magic to Produce Rain. Homoeopathic magic is fre-
1~uoted from Westermarck, Ceremonies and Beliefs, pp~ 13-
20. 
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quently resorted to for the production of rain, and of all 
practices belonging to "this class none are more common· "than 
those which are·based"on the association between rain and 
water or other fluia·s. At Tangier,. ·when the· meri and boys· 
come back from the· ceremony at the muzahedin,· the people pour 
water over them from roofs and windows~ and at Mogador I was 
told that the year previous to my visit to-that town the same 
had been·done to the women and children-who ran along the 
streets crying out, nThe barley is thirsty, God give the bar-
Iey·water"; while the men~were praying to God for rain in the 
mosque. In Dukkala the schoolboys go froni t'eht to tent 
praying to God for rain; ·the women give them milk to drink 
and then throw water over them. In Andjra, while the men are 
standing round the graves and recitations from "the KOran are 
baing made, the'women fetch water from a spring or well ana 
drench-them with it; and when the scribes ahd schoolboys re-
turn from the shrine where they-sacrificed"a oallock, they 
pour water over each other as they pass a spring or river. 
on·the same day the·women dress up a she-ass like a bride and 
take it to a spring, wh'ere an old woman of the company gives·· 
it water to drink; lt has been fed on barley and straw in the 
early morning so that· it shall be thirsty. When the donkey 
has finished drinking~ the old woman passes the·vessel with 
whatever water is left in it to the other women," who fill. 
thei!:' mouths from it and spit out the water on the donkey. ·· 
This,·I am·told, has the same effect· as pouring water over a· 
saint, since the dressed-up donkey has the baraka of a·bride. 
They then go with the animal to a watery and muddy place, 
which is believed to be haunted by znun (djoun, mine). There 
one of the women, who was once a 'widow or-divorced. wife but 
was afterwards married to a bachelor ana·still remains his 
wife, is tied up· and thrown into the mud, ·and the same is done 
with the donkey after the clothes·have been removed from it. 
Water is poured over both of them, the drenched woman is tied 
to the donkey, and they are thus brought back to the' village, 
while the women all the way are praying to God for rain. 
Until these prayers are fulfilled the woman and the donkey 
are not allowed ~o eat, and the woman besides, though freed 
from her bands, must spend her nights in the open air with 
her head uncovered and her hair dishevelled. It is interest-
ing to notice in this connection that fasting, like prayer 
and almsgiving, is one of the practices recommended by Islam 
for the purpose of obtaining rain; but considering the cir-
cumstances in which it occurs in the p~esent case, it almost 
looks as if this change in the living were supposed to cause· 
rain for a similar reason as is the change in the appea~ance. 
The dishevelling of the hair may· be a female cou~terpart to 
the male custom of removing the turban, but we shall later on 
see that the fluttering of tne loosened hair is also be'lieved 
to produce rain, and this would explain-why the woman has to 
pemain out-of-doors ti~l the drought has come·~o·an end. A 
much simpler custom practiced for a similar purpose in the 
same tribe i'a for boys to go to a spring and gargle them-
selves with its water.l 
• Diabolical Possession. It-is thought· that mental and 
nervous diseases-and ot er morbid conditions are due to-dia-
bolical 'possession·. If an epileptic has a fit, no one goes' 
near him; It Is saidj "Fih el Haouaicha n (bad devils are 
inside ·nim) , .. and the· crisis· is allowe·a t'o pass without help 
being offered to him. ·- It is not because of a sentiment of 
indifference, ·or inhumanity, that the Moroccans act in this 
manner, but solely from fear of contagion.· It is believed 
that the devils which produce the ep~leptic convulsions do 
not wish to be disturbed, and that they would pass into the 
body of whoever came into contact with the epileptic. It is 
the same thing with attacks of hysteria.2 
.. • l A ..._.- .. -
• Gures for Diabolical Possession. Diabolical'posses-
sion is also cured y t e saints accord ng to belief. 
... .. ... ... ~ ... .. - .. ... 
At the shrine of'Moulqsour, in Marakech;·those thought 
to be possessed by d~vlls are ·washed in the court'of the sanc-
tuary with water from a fountain in the courtyard. Thay·are 
then given some of the water to drink out of a new clay gob-
let,·which they are to smash at the·gate of the Koubba (tomb 
site, mine), before leaving the sanctuary; 'The water is 
supposed ~o have washed away the possession; and by breaking 
the cup the evil has also been destroyed. 
. . 
~nother supposed healer· of possession and hysteria is 
the holy Sidi Rannal, whose zaouia is at Sidi Rahhal in the 
Zambrana district. "There is a small hil~ close by, which is 
called coudiaat 1 •·aafou, the hill of healing. Those afi'licted 
spend a night there, and after this incU:bat·ion the saint ef-
fects a cure. They are also made tq perform the djeb of Sidi 
Rahhal at his shrine. This sacred dance must take place iD' 
tlie dark~ It consists·in·oscillatfng movements of the head, 
backwards ana· forwards, with bare head. ~ These movements are 
slow at first, and then gradually become very rapid, while 
the sufferer keeps singing. • • • 
- This saint is also supposed to cure deafness, sore 
throat, lameness, barrenness, and madness. 
. . . 
Moulay Abdallah"Ben H6sseine, whose·sanctuary is at 
Tameloth, twenty'kiiometres from Marrakech; and Moulay ·Ibrah~ 
are supposed to cure diabolical possession, impotence, and 
barrenne~s, which are all thought to be caused by magic spells. 
lQuoted from Ibid, pp.ll3-ll~. 
- ... - ....... - .... "' .. 
2~uoted from Legey, .2:2.• cit., P• 206. 
It is said of Moulay Abdallah Ben H6sseine that he has 
66 commandments (zawiyas I suppose); ••• and has tlie ~ank·of 
Sultan·among the sarnts~ It is he who renews the myste~i6us 
powe~ of the juggle~s and or the soothsaye~s~ It suffices 
fo~ them to spend three nights nea~ his tomb, for the saint 
to appea~; and to give them·the tassa~out or key; His powe~ 
ove~ nervous temperaments ca~ eas~~Y be unde~stood.l 
6. R~tes fo~ Cu~ing Sterility. ·A ba~ren woman is under 
a ~epro_ach f'o~ the whole or· her life. Hence a widow whose 
marriage was childless finds it ve~y difficult to marry again. 
It is said of he~ that sne is·a mule and that if she rema~ries 
she will b~ing neithe~ milk no~ butter with he~. 
. . 
The ~truggle a~ains~ b~~renness is ~herefore only natural. 
Men·eat the testicles of a sheep when it is they who a~e 
in fault. 
Women swallow the testicles of a cock; •••• 
. . 
Moroccan·women make tagities, o~ stews, with the-placenta 
of sheep and goats ana with the foetus·or sheep and of dogs. · 
They hope to thus obtain the prolific virtue of these animals. 
and practice opothe~apy_~awa~~s. 
· When a ba~~en woman assists at a birth in the mountains 
of' the Glaoui, she· cat·ches hold of the· afte~-bi~th wliieh lias just been expulsed, takes it between he~ teeth, and runs away 
and spits it out on the grouna, and sits on·it for about an 
hou~. When the ministering midwife has finished looking · · 
after the motlie~ and child, she goes tip to the barren woman, 
makes he~ place he~self as if she we~e in labour, and exho~ts 
~er to expel her child, and makes he~ go·through the p~etence 
of giving birth. The evil ·spell whicn made her ba~~en is 
thus con~u~ed and she be~o~es fe~t~l~. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
In o~der to combat the evil spell cast upon he~, the 
barren woman also draws water in dead silence from seven 
Semmaoui wells, wh1ch a~e never covered. She washes herself 
in-this wate~ on Friday and theh pours it out at the thresh-
old of the mosque at the hour of the Great Praye~. With tlie 
wate~ she has cast away the evil spell which will no longe~ 
be able to wo~k;: fo~ the faithful, cha~ged with holy'bless-
ing, will destroy its evil st~ength when "they walk ove~ the 
water. To complete· the ~ite she fUmigates he~self with sul-
phur and assafoetida under her clothes. Instead of wate~ 
1~uoted f~om Ibid., PP• 214-216. 
from the seve~ wells,- she sometimes uses the urine of her 
mother, which will transmit to her the fruitfulness of a wom-
an who has had a child. 
. . 
on·the coast a barren woman washes away the bad luck in 
the sea. She takes a comb and a handful of alfa and goes to 
the shore with a relation or friend who she can trust. She 
seeks out a·deserted spot ·and undresses herself and offers 
her body seven times to the waves, which thus wash away all 
the evil, the bass, ·which she has been carrying, and bear it 
away as they roll back. Then she combs ·her hair and scrubs 
herself'with"the·alfa, which serves as a·brush, and then·she 
throws away the comb and her hair combings, and the alfa, into 
the sea, and says: 
11I cast in you· to Waves) the evil fate 
Which cast a spell on my oelly, 
That ¥OU should_unfasten ~y girdle.n 
If pregnancy does not ·take place in due time after this 
the barren woman is tattooed in order to combat her evil fate. 
A cross is pricked in between her shoulder-olades and another 
is tattooed on her"ankles. This has greae magic power, for 
it keeps off tlie evil eye of· ·the genii (d.1oun, mine) of the 
earth as well as that of human beings. 
' 
To complete the rite, the woman throws into the sea the 
chemise that she was wearing when it was performed and seven 
pebbles upon ·which ·a·taleb (holy man of Islam, actually mean-
ing student) .has written: _ . . 
"Release this woman from her evil fate." 
Plants which produce· an abundance of seed, and vegetables 
with quantities or leaves, are also used to combat sterility. 
A handful of harniel; for instance,· is taken and washed seven 
times and is then passed seven times over the fumes of in-
ce~se. It is' kneaded with dates, and a paste is made of it 
and eaten"night and day. As the harmel and date palm have a 
great many leaves and yield abundant fruit, it is thought 
tha~ they impart their powers of reproduction to the sterile 
woman. 
A very complicated preparation call:ea khemir~:, or leaven, 
is also taken to cure ·barrenness. The woman who takes it is 
supposed to acquire the remarkable power of reproduction exer-
cised by leaven. 
Tliis "mixture is generally prepared by a sorceress, ·or by 
a mokaddema or servant of·a sanctuary. She-takes some chervil, 
ferihe!,"cressl ahd"harmell "all"of wliich plants yield seed in 
abundance, and adds some amber. She sacrifices a new-born 
' -
puppy (the dog being a prolific animal), cuts it-up into 
small pieces, and lets everything·soak together for seven 
days in a vessel containing water, and then at the'end of 
seven days she sends it all to the childless woman,· who mixes 
it up with ordinary'broth and partakes o~ it for three days. 
She also has the pieces of'puppy cooked and eats them up. 
The third day she goes to the bath and resumes conjugal re-
lations with her husband. · 
Oti the·twenty~seventh day of Ramadan, ana on the day· of 
the Achoura, when certain fUneral rites are celebrated, it is 
customary to lay ~ranches o~ ~y~~~e. on g~aves~ 
ChildJ.e·ss ·women go 't'o the cemetery on· .tnese days and 
steal the· br-anches of m"Yrt'Ie · deposited "oy pious people ·on the 
tombs of forgotte~ and unknown individua~s,_and exclaim: 
"I salute thee, 0 Dead '( 0 'Buried one r, -
I khow not if thou are a woman or a man, · 
If thou are ·a man,· I say to thee: "Father,"· 
If thou art a woman, I say to thee: "Mother," 
An~. fo~give me.~~-
After having thus"placed herself under the pro~ection of 
the tiriknown ·and forgotteii. dead, they· bear~ away the myrtle 
leaves. 'When they get home they chop up the leaves and eat 
them with tneir husbands, after which they perfor.m'the sexUal 
act. The evil spell is then destroyed, and the myrtle leaves 
will endow the women with their power of reproduction, thanks 
to the'protection of the dead to whom they paid respectful 
homage. 
The procupine is employed against-sterility, for it has 
the power of' averting the evil eye. 'The foot of a porcupine 
is sometimes mount'ed on a silver ring and is worn as a magic jewel for this reason • 
. . 
·or, again, an entire procupine is taken, ·as the whole of 
it has tne same magic properties·as its parts. It is put 
into' a saucepan·which is'hermetically sealed and which serves 
as an oven for cremat·ion, and it is 'IE:fft on· the fire till 'it 
is burnt to cinders. ·Pulls called remad derbane (porcupine 
powaer)"are made"of the ashes mixed with honey, and are sup-
posed to'be specially efficacious against barrenness caused 
by the evil eye. 
Saints~ holy fountains, and wa~erfalls all play a part 
in curing sterility ~au~~d- by black magic. 
· It o~en suffices t6'make a ziara;·or pilgrimage, to the 
sanctuaries 1n·order·to cure barrenness; ·out-certain rites 
are generally performed near the sacred tombs. 
Thus a~ the sanctuary of Lalla Izza Hamad, at Marrakech, 
the mokaddema, or guardian of the sanctuary, combs and plaits 
the hair of tlie pilgrim-on the right-side of her·head. ·she 
retains the comb and the· hairs on it; and'thus keeps back the 
bass, or evil, w.hich prevented conception. 
. . ... " 
'When a stei'ile"woinaii goes to beg·for the protection of 
.Saint Moulay Ibrahim, above Tannahout, she takes off her belt 
and lays it on the·tomb for a whole night, during which she 
meditates and sleeps in the shadow of the holy saint. The 
next day she takes the belt again, which has cast away the 
evil with·whlch she was"impragnatedi~ and which is now full 
of baraka, and puts it on next to her skin. She must wear it 
like that for seven days. By favour of the saint she is cured 
of her barrenness. 
- . 
Near the sanctuary or· ·Moulay Ibrahim there is a mill 
which plays an important-part in the cure of diseases, ~and of 
barrenness rn·particular. Pilgrims come there from every 
part of Mo:occo. ,P 
Barren women·take off all their clothes and stand below 
the mill. They comb their'hair and throw the comb and the 
hairs on it into the water, and the stream·carries away theft' 
trouble. They also throw·tneir chemise in, and take a douche 
themselves under the mill, and before"leaving they drink 
severi gi.l.lps of"water from· the· same spot.' "Their husbands 
often take part in the pilgrimage ·and perform the s~e rite. 
All the evil spells which prevented them from procreating are 
washed by the water falling from the holy mi11 and are carried 
~way_b~ ~h~ ~t~e~m~ 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
In the inountains·or the Glaoui, beyorid Demnat, the eas-
cade of Moulay Ighi is famous for its powers of curing barren-
ness. Barren women go there accompanied by the mokaddema. 
-~hey are bare~~ooted, and only wear a chemise and a kerchief 
~on their head. They como their ha"ir like they do· at the mill. 
of Moulay Ibrahim·and throw the comb and combingsl their che-
mise and kerchief, into the waterfall. ~hey return home free 
from their b~rden and charged with b~raka. 
Although sterility is"fought against by means of·magic, 
there are certain women who practice rites for· abortion in·· 
order to free themselves from the result of conception. "Nev-
ertheless, abortion is condemned. It is believed that women 
who bring it about are tormented after death in their graves 
by a11 the chilaren who were deprived of~ life" by them. It 
is believed that they will be changed into bitches on the Day~ 
of JUd~e~~~ ~n~-~ill_ be se~t to howl in hell.l 
· 7. Pregnancl• It is believed tliat an angel fashions·- the 
child' in the mot er's wombs, like a sculptor makes a beauti-
ful statue· out o~ a 'shapeless mass of clay; When the work is 
completed and the'·organs·are all f'ormed, the angel writes its 
~e~tin~ ?n.t~e_forehead ?f.t~e_f?e~u~. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
A Moslem woman 1s not· allowed to visit the dead, as the 
fear of deat~ ~i~~ cause abortion. 
A pregnant woman in Morocco is in terror of-miscarriage. 
During the whole of lier pregnancy she wears the claws of an 
eagle fastened inside her belt, or even on her abdomen under 
her clothes. These claws prevent abo~ion caused by the·evil 
eye, and they also indicate to the child the gesture of claw-
ing on to its mother. 
A pregnant woman can also have a herz, or amulet, Written 
by the taleb• She must wear it directly on lier abdomen, and 
should have it renewed once a month,· as it loses its power. · 
But slie must never burn or throw away the herz which has been 
replaced. She should wash the magic ihk"from it in a basin 
of water and use the water for ablutions.2 
~ . ~ --
8. Protection or Saints Against Miscarriage. Ali the . 
s~ants in Morocco ·grant· ·their protection· against· miscarriage. 
When a woman 'has had a ·miscarriage and then conceives again; 
she places herself Under the protection of the saint to whom 
she was consecrated. She'brihgs candles and sugar to the· 
guardian of the sanctuary, anatells·her of her condition. 
She tlien· receives some semolina, oil, and salt that have been 
consecrated, and must 'break her fast with them in"the early 
morn2ng aurlng the ~irst seven days of each month. "The · 
mokaddema also combs out her hair for her, and~laits a lock 
of it·according·to the accus~omed fashion, or qaida, of the 
saint. This 'lock mus~ not be unplaited until the moment of 
deliverance, arid ensures the protection of the saint during 
the whole of 'the pregnancy. 
. - -
The small bag con~aining the flour charged with baraka 
must never be placed on the-ground. The greatest care should 
be taken of it, a~d it should be hung up at the head of the 
woman's bed. If·the respect due to holy objects was not-to 
be offered to it, it would at once lose its magic virtue. 
l~U?~ed fr?~ Ib~d, PP• 106-112. 
2Quoted from Ibid, PP• 115-116. 
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••• It ~s believed that misca~riage·is·due~to the jeal-
otisy'of a female aevii called tabaa~ the pursuer, who kills 
the child in its mother's womb.l 
' . 
; Beliefs Concernin ¥re anc .··certain customs·are 
followed oy t a·pregnant woman in orocco. ··For instance,·1r·-
she happens to'catcli signt"of the mo6n-·during her ninth month, 
she must at once loosen her belt in order to have an easy de-
livery. 
She mus~ never sew nor spin at nighu for fear of'tne· 
child arriving with the cord twisted round its neck. • •• 
.,. " - . . .. . . .. ... ~ ... .. .. . .. .. .. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
'A pregnant"woman 1s made ·to look at a gazelle so that 
her child should have __ ~ina eyes!2 
· · ·10. Magic Means for Causing·5teriiitt. 'The magic·pre-
scr1ptions for making a woman·barren are very numerous; A· 
woman who aoes not want children gathers up gra~ns of ·barley 
that have fallen'from the mouth of"a 'mule' ana eats them up. 
The barley~ tiy·contact with the mouth o~ the mule;·which is 
sterile by nature, has'absorbed its characteristics and trans-
mits them to the woman. Slie cari also take the girth·which is 
used to fasten the saddle or the mule on to its bacK, and 
gird her abdomen witn it, and she·will obtain the same re-
sults.· The horn ·of· a mule's foot, carbonized and. ground 1nto 
powder, is ·a powerful ·medium for achieving sterility.· Mixed 
up with honey, it is made into magic pills which are commonly 
employed. 
The treadles of sheep gathered in the slaughter-house 
when the· animals are cleaned after killing them; are very 
much in' demand. They are swailowed oy'the womari who wishes 
to· be ste'rile, arid as she counts them· says''in her OWn mind, 
"Each ·treadle one year.·tt- Slie thus determines the duration of 
her voluntary childlessness. 
~ .. -- ~ ... .. ... .. ... -
The shoe of· a mule and a nail taKen Trom·the plank·used 
in washing the· aead are employed by sorceresses who wish to 
put a bride tinder a speii and·to condemn her to· steriLity. 
The rite is a complicated one; The-sorceress procures a piece 
of linen"stained with the blood of the monthly period~ or· 
with "blood from the aerlowering of the person in quest~on, 
and a bit torn from the" shroud or a newly burled carpse. She 
wraps the mule shoe or the nail and the blood-stained linen in. 
lQu?te~ fro~ Ib~d~ P~· -~1?-117. 
2Quoted from~~ P• 117. 
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w • -
the fragment o~ shroud arid buries them in a forgotten tomb, 
uttering an incantation which ends by expressing the ·wish:· 
trso Iong as I do not unearth these objects, so and so, the 
daughte:J:l of' so and so, shall be barren." 
' . ~ 
Black pearls are also very powerful against frtiitf'ulness; 
one is swallowed :t'or each year that one wishes to keep from 
conceiving. 
Dried f'igs which have lost their power of reproduction 
are also made use of' as·preventive char.ms for simiiar·purposes. 
' It suf:t'ices to steal a few·figs from a :runeral repast, and to 
hang them up in a·spet frequented by the woman against whom 
the spell-is directea, and it will go on working until she 
happens to cat~h si~~ of them.~ 
11. New Years Day and Outcome of' Year;· On New Year's . 
Eve the Shloh of' Aglu only eat tagulla, a kina of hard por-
ridge, mixed with oil and buttermilk; Every member or·the 
family puts the first lump he takes of it in a large wooden 
ladle, which is ··then placed in an opening in the wall. If 
in the morning oil is fourid on the surface of' the balls the 
year is believed to become good, whereas the absence or oil is 
·regarded as a bad omen; and a crack in the ·ball is supposed 
to ~hdicate that the person who put it there will get ill 
~u~iJ?-g . tl?-e . y~ a~. , _ _ . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
•, 
• • • It' 'is said that whatever a person does ·on New 
Year's Eve he will do throughout the coming·year. ~ • , and· 
that he who·theri fills 'his stomach well wi21 not· suf:t'er want, 
whereas he"wlio"g6es hungry to bed will remain hungry the 
whole yea~. • • ~2 
As appears from certain facts ••• , the magic forces· 
which are supposed to be at work·at New Year 1 s tide are not 
exclusively of a benefic~al"kind. "There are harmful influ-
ences as we11; arid against these· the people· endeavour to 
protect 'themselves partly· ·by abstaining from· certain acts 
which are looked upon as more or less dangerous, and partly; 
'it seems, by ceremonie·S" of a P1J('llificatory character. We have 
already noticed the common prohibition of"m$king seksu ( a 
N.A. dish) and the belief that certain evil-consequences will 
result :t'rom a "transgression of· this rule •••• Among·the Ait 
Tameldu, a Berber tribe in Sus, it is the custom on New Year's 
lQuoted from Ibid, PP• 1~2-114. 
-- .. - ~~"' 
2~u6ted from Westermarck, Oeremonies and Beliefs, PP• 62-
63. 
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Eve.· •• that 'the children· ·of' a village light ·a gig fire on a 
hill, leap over· it, and shout to ·the· children of' the neigh.:.·· 
bouring village, who have 'done the same on another hill close 
by; that they· have now thrown on tnem all their rleas and 
lice; they get an·answe~ in the same style,· ana the two· par-
ties then have a fight" with stones. These fires and the sub-
sequen~ fight also seem to be means of' purification, llke the 
fires ana ceremonial f'ights which in other places are found 
at Midsummer and asura, in the beginning of' the MUhammadan 
New Year.l 
. -
12. Transference of' Baraka f'rom One Person t0 Another. 
There are various ways in which a person may be f'illed with 
the baraka ·of'· a saint. The latter may transfer baraka to his 
hdim ("f'oliower·used in Northern Morocco) simply by spitting 
into his mouth. Or the saint may eat some f'ood"in the pres-
ence of' his haim on the last day they sp~na together and then 
tell him·to· eat of'·what is' left; when"the-hdlm has ~inisned 
his meal, the saint says to him, •• · ."You·have taken the 
Ioaf' of' 'bread", meaning that the servant has now partaken of' 
his baraka. 
- .. ~ - ~ .. .. - ... .... 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
The trarisf'erence of' ·baraka f'rom one·person to another may· 
even be brought about against the will o~ its possessor. Thus, 
whilst in·normal cases the s~rtari1 s baraka"is transferred ~o 
the new sovereign·by~he 'Sultan himself appointlng some mem-· 
ber 6f''his family, by preference one'of' his sons, as his suc-
cessor, it is also possible that his baraka somehow passes to 
a pretender during his lifetime, thoughT was told tnat it . 
generally does not remain with him for more than six months • 
• • • The Wazzan shereef's (descendants of Idriss the first 
sherif'ian monarch of' Morocco; they are much venerated through-
out Islamic circles, mine) are said to indulge in the wicked 
habit of' robbing other shereef's, wh6'visit them, of' their 
baraka, should the ratter leave behind any remains of' their 
meals, even'though lt be· only a bone. -For a similar reason 
other shereefs are afraid of shaking hands with a Wazzan 
shereef, and they avoid passing a piace where a shereef of 
this f'ami~y is sitting. So also, when· people "from-Fez make 
a pilgrimage to the'sanctuary of' the great saint Mula! 
Abdsslam ben Ms~s. -~ .in the-tribe of' the Bni Aros, they do 
not return by Wazzan but choosa·a longer route for fear lest 
the shereefs of Wazzan shou2a otherwise deprive them of' the 
baraka whic~ they have brougnt with them from'the holy-shrine. 
Nay, these shereei's are said to be so anxious to appropriate 
any baraka they can get hold of that when they entertain a 
guest, they do not offer him whole loaves of bread but break 
. 
1Quoted from~~ PP• 66-67. 
them Into pieces~ and eat··a-little o:f each Ioaf, in order to 
get tne oaraka o:f'the bread, which would-otherwise have·gone 
to the guest. Shereers·are general2y much afraid o:f losing 
their baraka oy·stealth. 'This is the reason wny they do not 
like other persons· to• kiss--their hanas;· and sonie o:f'-them . 
believe that thelr'oaraga may"be extracted :from them ·oy any-
body who should drink the water in Which ~he~·nave washed their 
hands after a meal; "Tliere·is·a saying-that the servant-of 
meri is their lord" ••• whicnmeans tliat a person wlio serves" 
other' people' by bringing them :fooa ahd ·arink" and pouring water 
over theirhands appropriates the~r oaraKa} ana·by thus 
gettlng.their accumulated'oaraka he may actually become a 
saint~ even though those whom he is serving·have not tnem-
selves a sufficiently large·quantityof baraka·to be looked 
upon as saints ~-the proper· sense ·o:r the-word. In this con-
nection it may also "be mentioned that"people cari by tlie:ft or 
magic tricks appropriate'the baraka of' rnanlmate thiri~s. -
There ·are'persons who-increase the oaraka"of"their heaps o:f 
threshed corn by taking"grain :from those o:f'others and'putting 
it on their 0wn, thereby depriving tlie o~her heaps o:f their 
holiness. -An old'Beroer living among the Ait Nder told me··· 
that"i:f somebody steals even the smallest quantity o:f'anotner 
person"s oil~~ he appropriates the ·bar·aka o:f all"the oil be-· 
longirig.to the latter. So also people~may, in various ways~ 
rob'tneir neighbours o:f the baraka which provides them with 
butter.l · 
' . 
.. . .. ... .. 
13. Evil Forces~ Brides·arid bridegrooms are in constant 
danger o:f being attacked by·jnun~· and·many or the ceremonies · 
at a weading·are intended to-protect them against'tliis danger. 
Brides may·even be carried ·away by a special jenn. ~ ; • The 
following is "saia to liave happened among the Bni ·Aros-; A 
oride had been brought ~0 ~he oridegroom's house and pu~ down 
on his oed. Whenche, shortly a:fter~ entered the room he . 
foUnd nobody there. He meritioned'it to-tlie bride's f~ther$ 
who consulted a scribe from Sus on tlie matter. The :fqi com-· 
forted him, and asked him to come back in a week. ·so he did. 
In the evening, the·fqi wrote something on a paper, which he 
kept for himself, ana aiso·wrote some words on the man's 
:forehead and on the palms of his lianas~ and·told liim to go 
to a certain' river and sit down on its oank, witliout-being 
afraid. At midhight'he would see ah army of jnun dressed in 
black$ ·and shortly afterwards ·anothe'I' army o:f jnun dressed in 
white; arid when they were· close to him he· should-· get' up and 
say to their sultan. ~ ~ • ttAr upon God and upon you·"~ ·and· · 
accuse.n~m·o~ havin:g·carried away·his daughter. The ·man did 
what the rqi told hfm to do, and saw everything wlilch had' 
been predicted. The jenn sultan told his vizier of the accu-
1~u6ted from Westermarck, Ritual and Belief~ I, pp. 41-
43• 
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satfon, and asked him if he knew who was ·the guilty one. The 
vizier answered that nobody else but a jenn belonglng·to the 
Ulad bel la-Hmar could have committed such an outrage. Re 
called for these jnun, who were then ih the sultan's army, 
and one of them confessed that'the kidnapped girl'was riding 
behind-him on his horse. The vizier commanded him· to give 
her back to her'father, ahd the suitan told the-vizier to 
punish the jenn. ·In the morning the father returned liome 
with his daughter, who was still unconscious. The fqi wrote 
a anarm for her and told the father to take her to Mulai 
Abdsslam' s shrine to get curea:. Thi~ ·story was tela me by· 
a ·scribe-who had heard it from-the fqi himself, so there can · 
be no·doubt about its accuracy. (This is subject to question, 
mine) .1 
BesiO.es ''the evil 'eye and -·the curse there· are other mys.;. 
terious malign influences wnicli are due to envy or'ill-will; -
namely practices called shor. • • 1 that is withchcraft. • • • 
• .. - ~,. of' ... ~ .. -
As we 'have noticed above, witchcraft is practiced by the 
aid of jnun, and to'sectire-tneir assistance names~of jnUn are 
mentioned in written. charms of this sort. Witchcraft by 
writing is extensiv·ely indulged in by scribes, and tlie gz-eat-
est experts in this as in other kinds of magic are found 
among the scribes from Sus. The Shloh maintain that these 
scribes become able to write powerful charms as soon as they 
have crossed the river Umm r-Rbe on their way northwards, 
even in case· the scribe had shown n6 such capacity while in 
his own country. IDther kinds of shor are in particula~ prac-
tised by women. When Semharus, the sultan· of ~he jnun, died 
he left behind a daughter who is still alive ana assists her 
own- sex til dolng evil; "hence women are even better ve·rsed in 
witchcraft-than scribes; While the charm written by a scribe 
easily los~s its efficacy before long, a·woman 1 s enchantment 
has generally a more enduring effect. Women ean really do 
wonderful things by sorcery. A Berber from Glawi told me 
that in a neighbouring t~ibe an old hag once transformed 
eight scribes into sheep, and that the enchantment lasted 
uritil a clever magician buried the hag alive' and read'incan-
tations over the sheep sprinkling them with earth •••• 2 
... - ~ . -
14. The Jackal and 'Magic. The jackal contains much me-
dicinal and magic virtue. ·persons suT~ering from 1-ooerd--
a term applied to various-complaints attributed 'to the catch-
ing of cold--have the~r o6d~es rubbed with melted jackal's 
fat (Ait Nde~), or eat jackal's flesh which has been boiled 
1~uo~ed fr?~ Ibi~~ I, PP! ~74~275! 
2~uoted from ~~ I, PP• 570-571. 
' . . ~ . 
in salt butter·ana rlavoured with garlic, onions, and cummin; 
but after being boiled the meat· must be removed from the pot 
with a spoon and not with the hana. 'The patient partakes~of· 
this dish for seven days, and eats it'with b~ead made of'corn' 
whichhas not been kept in the· granary, "so as not.tooe cold"; 
and for the same reason the 'bread should 'be made wi~hout 
yeast (Aglu). IT' a·womari becomes pregnant wliile.she has a· 
suckling at lie·r breast and her milk makes the suckling ill, 
she boils jackal's brain in butter arid makes the-child eat of 
it a few times, with the result, I·was ·told, ~hat i~ will 
recover ·(Ait Warain). Childless men and women ·who are 'de-
sirous of offspring burn the dried ih~estines·of a jackal· 
and fumigate themselves with"the smoke, letting it pass un-
derneath their clothes. ; • • A man who is incapable of· 
having sexual intercourse-hangs ·the driea gall-bladder of a jackal at his rignt·g~oin; I was told that this produces a 
marvellous erfect •• ·• -. A lying-in woman whose breasts 
contain no inilk cures herself by eating jackal'' s gall; cooked 
with butter, on three mornings before breakfast. • • • A' 
married woman who warits to be divorced by he~ husband procures 
from a scribe a, Charm written with the gall of a jackal, and 
puts it inside the husband's mattress o~ buries it at'the 
place where ne·sleeps; he"will then divorce her on the fol-
lowing'm6rning, however unwilling to do so he has been be-
fore •••• 
1 ~uoted ~rom ~~ II, PP• 319-320. 
APPENDIX B 
HONORIFic· TITLES 
Ouali~~aesignates a marabout, usually used by Islgmic savants, 
for Islamic-trained mystics. 
.. ~ ... . .. ,.._ .. .. .. 
Moula or Maulat--refers to shorfa ana those pretending to be 
shorfa; a ~o used as a term of respect for"Allah, the· 
Sultan; non-sherifian marabouts; ahd respected people. 
It·usually appears as the first hame o~ these people, 
e.g. King H~ssan is known as Mo~lal Hassan. 
Seyyid (abbreviated at times to Sidi, or §!}--is used prima-
rily as an honorific title for marabouts but is also 
used with regard to respected people. It means my lord. 
~ .. . " 
Ammi--~iterally meaning my uncle is used by some to designate 
---- mar~bouts as well as res~~c~e~ P.~ople. 
Abouna--meaning our father used for any venerated person. 
- • - .. .r - *' ,.,. 
Lalla~-designates·all women saints, and also is a term of 
respect for wives or f'emale""de"sceiidailts of shorf'a and 
marabouts,· e.g. the Moroccan princesses are known as 
Lalla Aisha, ete. 
• t .. ~ 
Seyyida (abbreviated form, sida)--is used f'or women who have 
some association with'religious people or are themselves 
considered as marabouts. 
Setti--litterally meaning my grandmother, but is used as a 
term of respect f'or relig~ously-associated women as well 
as women ~eld in high regard.l . . .. 
Note 1: 'With the exception of' Lalla, all the above honorific 
titles are of' Arabic origin. Lalla is most likely Berber 
in origin. 
Note 2: Among Arabic members of the Eastern Orthodox church, 
Seytid"is used to designate an arch-bishop as well as a 
bishop~·'AboUna is used to designate a patriarch of' an 
arch-diocese. 
lBased on Doutta, L 1 Islam, PP• 27•41• 
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Among most Arabic-speaking peopies, ammi is used as a 
term of respect for·non-rela~ives to-whOm one wishes to 
pay deference;·or'to one whom anotner is neither on very 
formal terms n~r ~ery per~o~al terms. 
Setti'is used to· address very respected women among the 
Arabic-speaking·people, or as a formal term of address 




1. Lea Deux OFphalins et l'Ogressa. Una femme avait un 
petit garcon et una petite fille. Elle mourut et le pare se · 
remaFia·. Sa nouvelle· femme lui dit un jour;- 11Abandonne tea 
enfants, lorsque·tu rapporteFas·aeux perdrix, il·y en·aura 
une pour'toi et une pour moi; aux ehfants tu'n 1auras plus rien 
a donner·l--Ainsi feFons-nous·'t dit-il. Fatma, la petite fille, 
qui ayait surpris la conversation, sren fut en pleurant aver-
tir son frere. Elle fit une~provision de son et de raisins 
sees qu'elle cacha dans son corsage. Et Iorsque son peFe les 
emmena pour les perare, elle'jeta ~a~et·la·les grains afin de 
reconnaitre son chemin.· Mais .. son·rrere, qui la suivait, les 
ratnassait et les ma:rigealt': ·nLalla·, lui 'dit-11, tu·laisses 
tombez»'de bien boimes chosesl-~Fils de mon ennemi, lui'cria-
t-elle; tu ve'UX. done rious egarer·lu Una fois dans 18. foret,·· 
leur pare les abandonna·et revint· saul. Le soir, au soupeF, 
it'diif: "Q.u'es-tu'deveriu, Alimed, mon filsl sl tu·etais ici·tu 
mangerais cette boucheel--~tr'es-tu devenue Fatma,· ma fille, 
soup ira la maratre •. 'Sl 'tu. etais ici, tu aurais ta paFt de ce 
Fepas que ':;t.e ehieri va aclieverl·n '(Enteridarit 1' appal de leurs 
parents) les·enrants, qui ~vaient pu retFouver leuF chemin et 
se tenaient'caches, s•·acrierent: 11Me volei, papal·n dit le pe-
t:rt·garcon.--"Me voiei lallal 11 dit la·petite fille. La fem-
me furieuse empoigna la louclie et·frappa son mari en maugre-
ant: n Jt iFai moi-m~me les perdr~ 111 
Le lendemain-leur pere las ramena dans la· foret et les y 
abandonna. s~ ~rouvant perdus les.enfants se mirent a pleu-
rer. Ils errerent ne saehant comment retrouver leur chemin. 
Ils parvinrent a uri rocher ou gitait un lion, s 1 abriterent en 
eet endroit pour la·nuit, et Dieu, qui les prit en pitie; 
leur envoya du couscous· et de la viande pour leur souper. 
Puis le lion vint· et flaira 1 1 odeur humaine. Lea voyant en 
peril, Dieu f.it hausser le rocher, at· le 'fit redescendre le · 
lendemain, danger ecarte. · "Maintenant partezln leur d~t:il. 
Ils partirent et dans le lointain apercurent du feu. 
Ils se dirigerent ·de ce cotE{: c retait une ogre sse qui cuisait 
son pain. La petite fille laissa son frere dehors et entra 
seule dans la taniere., Ella deroba un pain'et le donna a son 
fr~re. L'ograsse qui etait aveugle ne sa douta·ae z»ien. Le 
frere voulut aussi aller prendre du pain. "Tu ·n-1 iras pas; 
lui dit sa soeur, tu pourrais rire et nous trahirl" Et fort 
imprudemment il entra. Comma il tendait la main pour pren-
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dre du pain l'ogresse s•e"cl:>ia:. 11Kerchbouch1 enfant-du diable" 
Le garcon partit d 1Un lclat de rire et ·ave~tit ainsi l 1 ogres-
se de leur presence.· "Approchez, dit-elle, Ahmed et Fatma, 
mon fils et ma · i'ilJ.e 1 n Elle empoigna les deu.X enfants, mit · 
1 tun dans. une corbedlle de datte s, 1 r aut're dans una corbe ille 
de figues, pour les engraisser et les manger uri jour. La pe-
tite fille donna une aiguille a son frere~ elle en prit une 
aussi pour elle. Lorsque··r•o~resse venait les visiter et 
J.eur disait: "Etes-vous gras? la fillette lui montrait son 
aiguille et 'le garcon Ia sienne. Un jour, celui-ci perdit 
son aiguille et en avertit sa soeur. "Fils de mon ennemi, 
s 1ecria-t-elle, tu veux done notre mortl~- Lorsque l'ogresse 
vint le'lendemain, comme chaque jour, s 1 assurer de'l 1 etat des· 
e:n.fants,· le garcon lui tendit la ma:t:n: "Tu es grasl" dlt-elle. 
Ella alla vers sa soeur.~ · 11Es-ti.l. grasse; toi auss:lJ' Crai-
gnant alors que son rrere ne perit saul, ella jeta son aiguil-
le et lui montra sa main.· "Vous etes gras tous les deux.ff 
Et elle se prepara au .festin. 
- . 
,L'ogresse i'it chauf.fer son four et la petite fille'se 
mit a pleurer. Un corbeau, qui volait au-dessus d'elle, ·1a 
vit et· l.ui demanda: "Pourqtioi pleur'es.:.tu, o beau· visage que 
les larmes ne doivent pas attrlster?-~Par"Dieu, ce qu 1 il 
mfarrive et ce qu 1il me reste a endnrer; 0 oiseaul--Que me' 
donnerais-tu s~ je t 1evitais le trepas?--Mais· je n'ai rienJ--
Donne-moi seulement'iin ·pan de ta·robe, J'en garnirai le nid de 
mes petitsf" Elle·aachira un pan de ·sa rooe et le lui·donna. 
,Alors- il dit: "Quand 1 f ogre sse te. aira: . active le .feu; 0 . ' 
Fatma; ma .fille, tu repondras ·o rion, maman·ne mrs: appris qu•a· 
filerl ~uand elle·te dira: active le feu, ·o Ahmed, mon-.fils, 
tu repondras: non, mon pere ·ne. m1 a appris qu ra, labourer! ~­
Elle vous moritrera alors la maniere de .faire ·at au moment ou 
elle sera penchee sur le feu·vous la pousserez deaansl C1est 
ce qui arriva. Elle'leur montra la .facon·de s 1y prendre et 
ils la pousserent aans le· .feu. "De l'eaul de l 1 eau1 enfants 
du diable 1 Ils- je.terent de 1 1huile et ·r' ogre sse perit con-, 
sumee dans les flammes. Puis ils prirent possession de sa 
taniere. 
Quaria ils eurent epuise les provisions, ils se remirent 
~ errer et toujours pleurant parvinrent dans la maison·d 1Un 
chat Sauvage .ou l.e hasard ~es mana.. .Ce chat etait berger. 
Quand il revint le·soir du paturage, i~·ne s 1 aper~ut pas de 
la presence 'des en.fants'qui, meles·aux brebis; s''etaient in-
troduits dans son domaine~-·Ir·miaula: "Miaou1 miaoul que 
desires-tu, ma t~te? Du couscous avec ae la ·vianae·de mou-
ton ou de la viande de bouc?--De la viaiide· ae moutonl" dit-
elle. Il e"gorga un ·mouton et remplit sa marmite de viande. 
I~ .fit du couscous et s'en regala, et son appetit satisfait 
i~ sauta a l 1endroit·ou il dormait. La petite .fille sortit 
alors de sa c·achette, vola son reste de viande ·et le parta-
ga avec son frere. Le chat dormait paisiblement. Ayant a 
/ leur tour apaise leur ~aim, las enfants essuyerent leurs 
' ' mains a la queue du chat, puis ils sa coucherent. A son re-
veil, le chat alluma le reu, sa lava ·ra patte avant de de-jeUrier et de mener son troupeau·a l!herbage, mais il trouva 
sa marmite vide.· "Miaou1 miaoul ~it-il. · Q.ui done m·r a joue" 
ce tour, o ma·tgtel Il mi·aula, miaula et's'etant retourne 
vers ·sa queue, il y ~laira 1 r·odeur de la viande ~ "C' est 
bienl dit-11. Madame pro~ite de mon ·sommeil ·pour· aller··sa 
promener1" Il·croyait que c'etait sa queue qui avait man-
ge le rond de sa marmite. Il prit·un ·maillet de fer at y 
po~a sa queue; il en prit un autre, ~rappa et la coupa. Il 
s•evanouit sur l.a· coup. La petite .r·ilie s'em:para du·maillet 
at lui assena un autre coup sur la tete:· "Acheve-riloi, toi qui 
~rappesl--Inutile, le coup a bien porte" dit-elle. 
~ "' . .. .. 
~ Le chat mort, ils le jeterent dehors et s 1 installerent· 
dans son·logis. AEmed ~aisait pattre' l~s troupeaux. Fatma, 
sa soeur, ~ui avait'tresse ses chevaux ala facon des ~emmes, 
restait ·a. la ·maison. ·nieu 1 'avait dotee d 1une grande 1beaute 
at d 1une chevelure merveilleuse. La soir, a la rentree des 
brebis, elie acoueillait son frere avec'des oris de joie. 
Des chass·e:ars v.inrent un 'jour a passer par la. Comma cette . 
maison etait 'la·seule de toute la con~ree, ils s'y rendirent. 
"Donne-nous a boire, dirent-ils a la jeune fille.;..-Connnent 
ie .fe~ai-je? Mon frere est au paturage et la porte est fer-
meet--Attache le pot au bout de ta tresse1" Elle attaoha le 
pot a sa tresse at 'leur tendit a boire. Ils voulurent l'at-· 
tirer a eux et·l'emmener au roi.· Mais devinant leur dessein, 
elle prit~aes ciseaux at se ooupa la tresse. Ils rapporte-
rent le fait au rei. "Il existe, Seigneur, dans une maison 
perdue·dans la campagne una jeune ~ille si belle, que to1, 
le roi, tu·n•.as cartes pas la parellle en ton pala1s1--Ame-
nez-la mo1, sinon vous aurez la tete ooupeel" Ils s'en l'e-
tournerent: "'Pour 1·• amour de Dtiteu; o belle dame, donne-
ileus a boire1" Ils· ava1ent corrompu la chatte; oell.e-ci a-
vait cache las c1seaux de sa ·ma!tresse afin qu'elle ne coupat 
ses chevaux, et•c•est ains1 qu'ils purent la tirer a eux at 
1 1amener au roi. 
Lorsque Ahmed son·.rrere, ·ramena le so1r son troupeau; 11 
trouva la maison close. Or, c'etait une maison batie toute de 
fer. Fatma, ~ue las ohasseurs du roi avaient ravia, n 1 etai~ 
plus ia. · Il pleura, appela: "Lalla1 ·Lalla1" Il s 'assit da-
vant laporte, attendit longtemps,·personn~ ne vint lui ou-
vrir~ Il se tourna vers ses moutons: "Lequel .foroera la 
porte?" "!!aut• dit-il. Les moutons se ·mirent a tape!" contre 
la porte a grands coups de t~te sans reussir a l'enfonoer. 
La plus jeune dit: ttPourquoi ·ne m1as-tu·pas dit d'essayer? 
--Essaiel" Il prit'son·elan et d'un coup erifonca Ia porte. 
11Bravo,i:non agneau· oher1£" Le trotipeau rentra; il-rentra lui 
aussi, ma1s ne retrouva pas sa soeur. Il pleura· toutes les 
larmes de son corps, puis extenue, 11 dit a ses moutons': 
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ttJe veux vous trouver demain chang:s en"pieces"d'or, a l'ex-
ception de la brebrs teigneuse et de son petitl" Il trouva, 
Ie lendemain, le troupeau change en un amoncellement·de ri-
chesse~, a !'exception de la brebis teigneuse et de son petit 
qu 1 il egorgea. · 
I ./ /' Ahmed etait dote, lui aussi; d 1une grande beaute, et · 
peut-~tre meme qu'a ce poirit de vue ll surpassait sa soeur. 
Il prit la peau des deux bates, mit de 1 •·argent dans ·1 'une 
et rev~tit l'autre, celie de la brebis teigneuse. Puis il 
quitta sa demeure et s'en fut a"la"recherche de ·sa soeur que 
las chasseurs du roi avaient ravia; Il erra par monts·et par 
vaux, interrogeant tout le monde; quand il ar~iva un jour 
dans le pays"ou elle se trouvait. Il alla se poster au-des-
sus de la fontaine· •. Bien que vetue de peau, sa ·beaute rayon-
nait de plus d'eclat encore que eelle de· sa soeur. Le jeume 
fille qui venait puiser ae l'eau,·en voyant l'image au jeune 
homme qui se refletait dans 1 1eau, la prenait ~our la sienna 
et se disait: ·ttEtre ·si belle et venir puiser a la sourcel" 
Alors elle cassait sa cruche et s''en reveriait ·a. la' maison~ · 
Ahmed etait Ia quand la servante de sa soeur vint a la source. 
"Pour 1·1 amour de Dieu, lui. dit-il, laisse-moi" boire a ta cru-
che1--0hl fi~-elle,· teignetix, "fils de teigneux, tu veux"boi-
re ·a: la e:ruche de lalla Fatma 1 n Elle ne lui donna pas a boi-
re, mais revenue aupres de sa mattresse ella lui ditt '~ada~ 
me, un teisnetix, fils de teigneux, a voulu"boire a ta cruchel 
--Retourne, je te ·prie;·et laisse-lE~- boirel" ·lui ·d:tt.;;:elle. 
Elle netourna a la source et fit boire I'etranger ~ui mit au 
fond de la cruche, ia hague, les ciseaux et le ·peigne de sa 
soeur. La servante ·revint en pleurant. nPourquoi ce tei-
gn.eu.X a.;.t-il fait cela?". 'Elle porta la cruche a sa dame:· 
ffVoici ce qu 1·a fait Ie teigneuxl" Ella reconnut·s·a·bague, 
ses ciseaux et son·peigne et dit: "Par Dieu, esclave, si tu 
revois ce·teigneux, fils de teigneux, amene-le-moi1" L1 etran-
ger n'avait pas quitte sa ·place. La servants l'amena au pa-
lais dissimule dans tin paquet de luzerne. · ·Elle le conduisit 
a sa soeur qui le reconnut et le tint each,. Puis la nuit 
tomba; le prince vint·retrouver sa dame.· Celle-ci luit dit: 
"Que devrais-je faire, Seigneur,· si quelqutun ·de ma .familia 
venait me rendre visite?--Il serait le tiienveriu"t" Et ella ·-
lui racorita toute leur histoire. Le jeune 'homfue ·sa presenta, 
il plut au rol qui lui fit bon accueil. Ce roi'avait sept 
filles. Il-les fit appeler •. "Laquelle d'entre vous epouse~ 
rait ce garcon? leur dit-11". Elles refuserent; sauf la ca~· 
dette qui repondit:. "Pere, .f'epouserai celui qu'il te plaira 
de me donner. J 1 irais mama vivre dans la" foret si tu me 1 1 or-
donnais1ff' Al'ors le~roi lui donna en partage la moitie de s~n 
royaume et Ahmed vecut avec .sa soeur dans le palais du roi. 
l~uoted from E. Laoust,·contes·Berberes·du Maroc (Paris: 
Editions Larose, 1949), I, PP• 12S-128. " 
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2. Las Jhoun. Il etait une femme qui avait tine_p?tite 
Tille. Gette femme vint a mourir; son mari prit une secon-
de femme qui lui donna una autre fille. ·un jour safemfue lui 
dit: "Elo:tgne loin de mo"i ma belle-fillel--Ou lremmenerons-
nQus?--E~ena-la'da~s la"maison d'un ogre, perdue dans la To-
ret; loin dans le desertlu- Il emrnena sa f'ille'vers cette .. mai-
s6ri, 1 1y enferma et revint. Une jenniya vint f'rapper a la 
porte~ L'enfant lui ouvrit.et dit:· "Ma fille, soit la bien-
venue111 Una ·autre 'jenniya vint frapper a la porte, l'enfant 
lui dit: '"Ma !'ilia, 's"i tu· es des gens de ce monde, soit la 
bienveriiie'l"~ r;a: jenniya repondit: "Non, je suis de I'autre 
mondel--Ma chere, "lui dit-elle, entre at· soit la bienven:ualu 
~·-~_nf~nt· __ it~it' -~ccu~e~ ~ pl'eJ?a~er un :p,lat de _poissons; quand 
11 fut pret, ella appela ses hotes: 1Venez prendre votre · 
part~ de- ca qu 1 !I a plu 8; Dieii de nous· 
1
donnerln· ElJ.es mange-
I'ent, .. puis la jenniya, qui etait entl'ee la preridere, dit a 
l'aut~e: · "Fais·un voeu ~our'cette jeuna fille.--~ue veux-tu 
pour elJ.e'l-- Je '\'Oudrais que "lorsqU: 1 ella parlera una perie lui 
tombe de la bouche a chaque mot qu'elle dfral" Le pere de la jeune fille revint a cette maison et ouvrit laporte~ ·sa fil-
le lui parla et une perle tomba de sa'bouche a chacun de ses 
mots;, ella n·reut pas f'fil.i son p'ropos que las CJ.eux mains de 
son pere etaieh~ plaines de perles. Il la sortit de cette 
maison et la ramena chez lui. 
. . . 
·sa· femme ·lui alt: "Emmene ton autre fille l" Il la con-
diiisit vers cette maison et 1'1 y enferma; Les jnoun vinrent 
frapper \ ·la porte. Elle --leur dit: "qu 1y a-t-il de· comniun--
entre vous et moi?'t Ils-ins:tsterent': "Par"Dieu, ouvre-nous1" 
Ils'entrerent et la trouverent en train de preparer un plat . 
de viande. Quand ce plat fut cuit, vlle le.,retira du feu et 
se mit a manger·saule. Les jnoun alors le·lui enleveretit-et 
mangerent,,ptiis, se retournant contra ella, ·1a devorerent.· Quand'le pere revin~ il'trouva la maison ouverte; il entra, · 
chareha aa fille, chamore apres chambre,~et ne la tl'ouva pas~ 
Il pleura et"rentra chez lui: "Ta fille, l'ogre l'a devoree1" 
dit-il a sa femme.l 
o!\. ·3~ Les Marabouts de Tanaghmelt. L'ancetre ~int de Figuig. 
Il pa~vint a Walemzi ou il'b~tit une zaouia~ Il alla ensuite 
a Assametir et demanaa aux gens de lui indiquer un endroit pour 
y habiter. Arrive au lieu dit la "Source du Chikh", 11 tl'ou-
va les gens occuftes a lave!' dti linge. Ces'gens l'arreterent 
et lui dirent·: · 'Chante-rious quelque chose1.;.-Mai"s je ne suis 
qu'un marabout1--Si'tu refuses, nous te ferons chanter de for-
eel"- Alors 11 prononca ces mots (en araoe): · "Informe-moi, 
o mon oeill" '11leau .d.a. la source cessa atissitot de couier; les 
gens·eurent beau 1a chercher, ils ne la retrouverent pas. Ils 
lQuoted from ~~ I, P• 259· 
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partirent a la poursuite du saint, mais il avait disparu. II 
se rendi t aa ·18: au· village 'dTAssa:ineur · et pria las gens ae lui 
fixer lin androit ou: il pourrait viv,re: · "Si tu veux cette fo-
r~t, lui dirent-ils~ ·nous ta·~a donnons1tt Ils lui montrerent 
un endroit appele T~na~elt. 
/ ~ 
c•etait un lieu couvert de broussailles·et plein de betes 
sauvages. Le jour de la prise de possession, 11 ait aux. bates 
de quitter la foret avec~Ieurs petits et mit le feu a la 
brousse.· Une vipere resta· seule. Le saint la trouva et· lui 
dit~ "Pourqtioi n 1es-tu pas partie?--Jfi:d des oeufs et'mes 
petits ne ·softt 'pas encore e'clos" lui dit-elle.--Je te pardon-
ne, mais·quitte ce lieu,·aes que tes·pe~its seront n{sl-•De 
men cote, repondit le/sepPent jete promets devaht'Dieu que 
notre venin ne fera y~:~r aucun ~e tes descendantsl" 
·nepuis lors, ~n effect, si un· serpent pique un""homme de 
Tanaghmelt~ cet homme ne meurt pas. Les'gens d 1Assameur vin-
rent par la suite"implorer·re sa'fnt au sujet de leur source 
qu'il avait tarie. II' repondit a leur-·voeu et en fit jaillir 
l'eau ~e n?uvea~ en.~rappant ~e sa ca~e~l 
·g.. SJ.:di Himmi et s·:td:t .Ahmed Ahaheal. · Sid:t Himmi soup~ 
~onnait Ahmed Ahancal-de·na pas avoir de baraka; 11 vivait, 
lui avait~on dit, au·milieu de jeunes'filles. Il s'en·fut le 
trouver dans son·pays emmenant"son lion avec lui;. "Ou, atta-
cherai-je mon lion? dit-il en·arrivant.--"Mene-le a 1 1 eJtable 
et attache-lea cote·de·ma vachel--Mais, on n''attache pas un 
lion'S. cot~ a•une vache, s~"e'cr'ia-t-il, j 1 ai peur qu'il ne la 
aevorel n ·siai Ahmed Ahancal, ayant dev·ine' le but de sa visi-
te, re'peta: "Attache-le a c?te de la v~chel" 
Sidi Himmi passa la nuit'chez son confrere. Le matin; a 
son reveil; il courut a l'etable voir"si le lion n'avait pas 
devor~ la ·vaahe, il trouva· la vache et·pas de lion~ Il s 1 en 
fut avertir Sidi Ahmed ·Abancal: "Sidi, lui di"C.:.ii, le li6n 
n'es-t· plus· dans 1 1 etable, il n'y ·a que la vache·l-...;Vois-tu, 
lui expliqua-t-il, c~'e'st que tu es venu pour·m1 aprouver et 
t'enquerir de'ma baraka;·tu as cru·que je vivais au milieu de jeurtes fillesl· Meme si cela etai~, pourquoi· leur aurais-je 
manque d'egardl Maintenant, suis-moi a 1 1etablel Sidi'Ahmed 
Ahai.tcal dit a la vache:. "Rends le lion que tu as mangel" 
La vaclie-~endit le lion par la'bouche. Sidi'Rimmi baisa la 
t~e·au. marabout: "Pardonne-mol, lui ait-11, appelle sur moi 
les faveurs de Dieu, je su:ts ton serviteurl tt Il invoqua Dieu 
pour lui et Sidi Himmi s 1 en revint chez lui.2 
lQ~~~ed .f~?m Ibid~ I, ~P~ 284-285! 
2Quoted from Ibid, I, PP• 287-288. 
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APPENDIX D 
Plan for Rural Communes of·F~s and Tatilalet Provinces {Average Membership,Caids, and Tribes per Commune)l 
Ave·r. 
Memb. 
No. of Total in<hm-
<rom- No. of No. of Pop.· mune 
Province munes Tribes Caids (OOO's) (OOC1s) 
' Fes 
Circle ' .. of Fes-Banlieu 10 10 4 122 12 Circle of Karia Ba 
Mohammed 14 1~ 5 130· 9 C~cle of Se£rau . 5 2 56 1·1· 
Circle of Boulemane 9 7 5 52 6 
Circle of Ta'ounate 13 10 5 119 9 
-
Tafilalet 
Circle of Midelt a 11 4 6o 7 
Circle of Erfoud ·a 12 5 91 11 
Gircle of Ksar As--Souk 5 7 ~ 30 6 Circle of' Goulmima 9 ·a 54 6 
Circle of Rich 10 25 7 73 7 
. 







Students ,!!! Morocco, ~~ !2.2lJ:, .!.!!£ 1222al 
Ethnic Group 1 9n 3 9 w ---n- 1~9-S: 4 1 9 5 5 
Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total 
French 16,481 14,672 31,153 39,066 34,480 73,546 41,111 35,826 76,937 
f .. • ' • ~ • • , .. • .. • ,. 
Foreigners 5,196 4,781 9,977 5,734 5,288 11,022 5,725 5,360 11,085 
Moroccans · · · · · · ·· 
(Moslem) 19,955 5,349 25,304 166,089 4~,060 214,149 170,198 51,200 221,398 
Moroccans · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ' 
(Jewish) 9,952 9,556 19,508 20,187 20,527 40,714 19,600 20,656 40,256 
- -"" ~ .. • ... • , ~ "' 'I •• 'of --
TOTAL 51,584 34,358 ~5,942 231,076 108,355 339,43l 236,634 113,042 349,676 
~ ........ .. . .. .. . ~ .. .. ... ' . -~ ,. 
Note.: a) 1956 t·ot·als show 67 ;197 French children, 11,081 f'oreign, 33),988 Moslem Moroccan, 
and 36,958 Jewish Moroccan • 
.. . ~ .. - ~ - "'" ... "' - .. "' 
Source: La Conjoncture Economiq1.1~ M!lr.Q_~aine, 1955, P• 5 (with adaptations). 
~·· . .. ~=-·--~ 
~aKen f'rom L. Gray Cowan, The Ec6nomic Development of' Morocco (Santa Monica: 
mimeographed by Rand Corporation, 1958), P• 82. 
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The purpose o~ the study is two~old: (1) to bring into 
objective ~ocus the actual problems many new nations o~ 
A~rica now face--i.e. those attendant to the process o~ build• 
ing rapidly modern unitary societies ~rom previously seg-
mented, illiterate and primarily tradition-oriented popula-
tions; and (2) to broaden and de~elop social science 
theory to deal with this relatively new phenomenon. Morocco 
is our case study. 
It is immediately recognized that in order for any 
society, in sociological ter.ms, to exist as an on-going 
system, it must have a minimal degree of social integra-
tion. The concept of social integration has been developed and 
de~ined in the context of already established societies. It 
implies, of course; that a social structure exists and that 
part of that social structure is devoted to integrative 
functions. 
The new African countries do not have the luxury o~ 
an acclimation period. They must develop their societies 
quickly. But their problems are m~~ First, they have 
within their boundaries a congeries of previously autonomous 
or semi-autonomous tribal groups who must now be brought into 
single societies. But the fact is that these countries do 
not possess fully developed and generalized social structures, 
participation in which produces sufficient social integration 
for society ~evelopment and maintenance. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to .const~uct such structures with the limited 
capital available to them. It is even more difficult when one 
considers that this must be planned, and social science has 
not reached the stage where it can provide kn0wledge for 
successful social planning. 
The problem then becomes one of how to develop immediately 
sufficient integration of the various and socially unequal 
groups within a country. In lieu of patterned for.ms of 
behavior, some appeals and mechanisms are sought to check 
various members of these countries from behavior threatening 
the development of the societies, until such time as unitary 
structures can be instituted. 
~ 
The study approaches the problem through the case study 
method, and as such, conclusions reached are limited to 
the area discussed, though they have implications for others. 
Material gathered for the study is based primaril~ on 
library research. Introductory, historical and ethn0-
logical data are presented as background material to Morocco. 
The latter help to place Moroccan problems of social integra-
tion in proper per~pective. Next, a chapter on the efforts 
to construct the modern unitary structure is presented. From 
' 
this emanates an analysis of the difficulties of developing the 
structural basis of social integration, and the increasing 
difficulties in finding sufficient means to control socially 
destructive behavior4 Impatience by various groups to realize 
the goals defined in the early days of nationalist struggle, 
as well as contempt by them for the efforts of the Government, 
further complicate the situation. Since there is little in 
the way of for.mal structural regulation of social conflicts, 
such opposition is checked quite often by force. Some in 
the Western World express concern over this demonstration of 
authoritarianism. However; seen in its proper perspective, 
it can be viewed as an instrument of integration. Left un•· 
cheeked, such opposition groups could possibly retard and 
even destroy the efforts of the Government--inefficient and 
insufficient as they may be at times--to construct the 
structural basis of social integration, and thus society 
itself• 
Mass education programs; the role of the ruler and 
economic programs are also explored as other instruments of 
initial integration in the process of society building. 
The conclusions reached by the study are that countries 
such as Morocco will continue to reflect numerous cleavages 
and will resort to force for some time to come. Hopes for 
democratic development are given substance in spite of 
present authoritarian trends. The study also suggests 
that the present content of the concept of social integration 
is not adequate as a tool for analysis of integrational 
problems in newly developing societies. 
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